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This dissertation investigates Taiwan’s role in the twists and turns in its 
relationship with China from 1987 to 2004. It employs the methods of both case studies 
and the VAR (vector autoregression) time-series analysis to assess the impact of the 
following four factors on Taiwan’s actions toward China: (1) the democratic transition in 
Taiwan, (2) Taiwan’s electoral politics, (3) cross-Strait economic exchanges, and (4) U.S. 
Taiwan Policy. The research conclusions are as follows.  
First, President Lee Teng-hui’s rational calculation in the late 1980s guided him 
to launch domestic political reforms while continuing former President Chiang Ching-
kuo’s liberalization of Taiwan’s China policy. Consequently, Taiwan’s democratic 
transition was accompanied by the appearance of a peaceful policy toward China. 
Second, in order to win votes from the electorate, which increasingly embraced a 
Taiwanese identity after the mid-1990s, Taiwanese politicians tended to launch 
aggressive electoral campaigns against China. Accordingly, domestic elections turned out 
 viii
to be a conducive factor for Taiwan’s conflictual actions toward China. Third, politicians’ 
electoral consideration also overrode Taiwanese businessmen’s preference for cross-
Strait stability. As a result, cross-Strait economic interdependence was unable to restrain 
Taiwan from taking aggressive policies toward China. Fourth, because Taiwanese 
politicians tended not to give in to U.S. pressures during Taiwan’s elections, the U.S. 
could not successfully stop Taiwan’s provocative actions toward China as elections 
neared in Taiwan. It was only when Taiwanese leaders sought to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan 
relations after election seasons ended that the U.S. could induce Taiwan to act 
cooperatively toward China. 
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In 1949, the KMT (Kuomintang or Nationalist party) regime moved to Taiwan 
after losing the civil war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since then, Taiwan 
and China have become one of the few pairs of enduring rivals in the world that have 
existed for more than a half century. For nearly four decades, the relationship between the 
two countries has been characterized by hostility, military standoff, distrust, and lack of 
dialogue. But since 1987 the development of cross-Taiwan Strait relations has witnessed 
several dramatic twists and turns that involve not just the pair of rivals but also an outside 
great power, the United States.  
In November 1987, the Taiwanese government announced that it would allow its 
citizens to visit their relatives in China. The years following the announcement were 
marked by a series of measures that illustrated the liberalization of Taiwan’s China 
policy. Since then the exchanges of people, goods, and capital, across the Taiwan Strait 
continued to gradually increase. The cold war between the two countries had been 
replaced by détente.1 However, in mid 1995 the détente came to an end when Taiwan’s 
President Lee Teng-hui visited the U.S., prompting aggressive reaction by China which 
conducted missile tests near Taiwan. This incident damaged the Taiwan-China 
                                                 
1 Since the mid-1960s cross-Strait relations had entered into a cold-war period in which the two sides’ 
standoff continued without any artillery fights and air/sea skirmishes, such as those occurred during the 
1950s and early 1960s. 
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relationship and began a string of tense events during the period from mid 1995 through 
2004, which were never before seen during the past three decades.  
During this tumultuous period, with hostilities escalating across the Taiwan Strait, 
the United States’ involvement in Taiwan-China relations also increased. For instance, in 
1996 President Clinton ordered two carrier battle groups to deploy around the Taiwan 
Strait during China’s missile tests near Taiwan. Then in 1998, Clinton announced the 
“Three No’s” when visiting Shanghai, which curbed U.S. support for Taiwan. Later in 
2001, President George W. Bush said the U.S. would do what was necessary to defend 
Taiwan from China. Bush backed up his commitment by granting a large arms-sale 
package to Taiwan. However, in 2003, to stop Taiwan from changing the status quo 
across the Strait, Bush expressed his opposition to the referendum agenda promoted by 
Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian. 
This dissertation is aimed at investigating Taiwan’s role in these twists and turns 
of its relations with China from 1987 to 2004. The main research question I propose is: 
What explains Taiwan’s friendly policies as well as confrontational postures toward 
China during this period of time? In order to answer this question more specifically, I 
plan to assess the impact of the following factors on Taiwan’s China policy: (1) political 
development in Taiwan; (2) cross-Strait economic exchanges; and (3) U.S. policy or 
actions toward Taiwan. These factors are directly related to the development of the 
Taiwan-China relations since the late 1980s.  
Domestically, while cross-Strait relations started to unfold in 1987, Taiwan was 
also about to undergo the transition into democracy. In the dyadic interactions, economic 
exchanges, such as trade and mainland investment, had become a major component of 
cross-Strait relations since the late 1980s. Internationally, the United States started to 
involve itself deeply in cross-Strait issues in the 1990s. Therefore, studying the effects of 
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these factors helps develop a better understanding of the formation and changes of 
Taiwan’s China policy. 
Undoubtedly Taiwan, China and the U.S. are all accountable for the changes in 
cross-Strait relations during this period. That said, I contend that Taiwan deserves more 
attention because in most cases it was Taiwan that initiated critical changes in cross-Strait 
relations. For example, in 1987 Taiwan started to liberate cross-Strait exchanges, which 
contributed to détente between Taiwan and China. Later, it was President Lee’s 1995 trip 
to the U.S. that rekindled hostility with China. Therefore, determining the factors that led 
to the behavior exhibited by Taiwan in its relationship with China merits scholarly 
attention.  
QUESTIONS AND DEBATES 
Based on the research topics I have mentioned, I will address the following four 
groups of questions in this dissertation: (1) Why was the launch of political reform in 
Taiwan accompanied by the emergence of a peaceful China policy? (2) What effects did 
elections have? Did they increase or decrease the probability that Taiwan would take 
provocative action toward China? Why? (3) The liberalists claim interstate commerce can 
lead to peace among nations. Did cross-Strait economic exchanges stop Taiwan from 
initiating confrontational actions against China? If not, why not? (4) As a third party, 
what effects did the United States have on Taiwan’s actions toward China? Did 
America’s policy toward Taiwan effectively constrain Taiwan’s provocative actions? 
Why or why not? 
The above questions are significant in that they are grounded in four prominent 
debates in IR theories; therefore, by answering those questions this research would 
contribute to the four theoretical debates with the insights that are gleaned from Taiwan’s 
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experiences. Before these debates are discussed in detail in the following chapters, I will 
offer a simple introduction to each of them. 
(1) Whether or not a democratizing state is more war-prone. Mansfield and 
Snyder argue in their pioneering study (1995) that democratizing states are more likely to 
fight wars than are mature democracies or stable autocracies. Several other studies 
challenge their argument by claiming that the foreign policy of a democratizing country 
can still be peace-oriented (e.g. Lebow 1995; Malcolm and Pravda 1996; McFaul 1997-
1998).  
(2) Whether or not candidates’ foreign policy will become more aggressive when 
campaigning in elections. Some scholars argue that in a democratic country politicians’ 
foreign policy would turn conciliatory on the eve of elections (e.g. Gaubatz 1991; Lake 
1992), while others assert that politicians are likely to launch aggressive policies when 
elections approach (e.g. Nincic 1990; Smith 1996, 1998a, 1998b; Wu 2000a; Lin 2004). 
(3) Whether or not economic exchanges can cause peace between nations. One 
school of thought in the IR literature argues that economic exchanges between states 
would contribute to interstate peace (e.g. Polachek 1980; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999; 
Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Gartzke and Li 2003), but other scholars disagree that 
there is any causal link between interstate commerce and peace (e.g. Gowa and Mansfield 
1993; Barbieri 1996).  
(4) Whether or not a third party or outside power can effectively manage a 
regional conflict. Some scholars suggest that a third party could contribute to the 
resolution of a regional conflict (e.g. Fearon 1993: 3; Wagner 1999: 13- 14; Walter 
2002), while others mention a third party is likely to deepen or prolong such conflicts 
(Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999a, 1999b; Goldstein et al. 
2001; Woodward 1995; Ciment 1997). 
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THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The research in this dissertation applies an approach that focuses on domestic 
politics of international relations. The study of international relations has long been 
dominated by the paradigm of realism. A defining feature of realism is that it generally 
attributes state behaviors to international constraints and opportunities, or more 
specifically, the systemic factors such as the distribution of power between states or in 
the international system (Trubowitz, Goldman, and Rhodes 1998: 4; Levy 1998: 146). 
For example, in his seminal work Theory of International Politics the founding father of 
structural realism Kenneth Waltz argues that state behaviors are dictated by the structure 
of the international system that includes anarchy and the distribution of capabilities 
across states (1979: chapter 5). However, since states that face similar international 
environments can still act in very different ways, many scholars have pointed out the 
insufficiency of realist explanations that only emphasize systemic characters. Instead, 
some of scholars offer a framework of two-level games to explain how decision makers 
make policies by balancing themselves between domestic constraints and international 
pressures (e.g. Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993).2 Still others redirect 
their endeavor onto the role that domestic politics play and study how domestic 
institutions, interests, ideas or information have shaped policy making in the areas of 
national security and foreign economic relations (e.g. Keohane and Milner 1996; Milner 
                                                 
2 In Putnam’s work the idea of two-level games is “a metaphor for domestic-international interactions” 
(1988: 433). Putnam uses international negotiations as an example: a two-level game is just like a situation 
that a national leader faces when engaging in an international negotiation. That is, because the leader would 
confront pressures from both domestic groups and foreign countries when negotiating an international 
agreement, he or she is involved in both a domestic game and an international game at the same time. The 
point for the national leader is how he/she should make a decision to satisfy both domestic demands and 
international expectations so that he/she will not be evicted from his seat. Thus, the two-level game is an 
approach that focuses on how politicians in a country balance between domestic pressures and international 
constraints. 
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1997; Trubowitz 1998; Trubowitz, Goldman, and Rhodes 1998; Snyder 1993; 
Christensen 1996; Zakaria 1998).  
My dissertation will continue this effort by explaining Taiwan’s actions toward 
China from the perspective of Taiwan’s domestic politics. Based on the self-interest 
assumption of the rational choice school, it argues that the reason why Taiwan brought its 
China policy onto a peaceful track in the late 1980s but then let it derail in the mid-1990s 
could be understood from the following fact: Taiwanese politicians regarded their 
domestic political interests as the primary consideration during and after Taiwan’s 
democratic transition. For instance, on the eve of the KMT breakdown as an authoritarian 
regime, Lee Teng-hui chose to initiate more political reforms while continuing Chiang 
Ching-kuo’s conciliatory China policy shortly after he took over the presidency. He did 
this because it would help him secure his power. Later, as Taiwan’s democratic transition 
came to a close and elections turned into an institutionalized mechanism for domestic 
political competition, politicians or political parties tended to launch aggressive 
campaigns highlighting Taiwan’s independent status when elections neared. This is 
because they believed these campaigns would help them win elections by maximizing 
votes, particularly when more and more Taiwanese voters started to feel a Taiwanese 
identity. Meanwhile, Taiwanese leaders’ pursuit of electoral interests had also 
overwhelmed the business community’s policy preferences as well as the United States’ 
expectation about a stable Taiwan Strait, thus rendering cross-Strait commerce and U.S. 
Taiwan policy unsuccessful in maintaining a peaceful cross-Strait relationship. 
IMPLICATIONS  
This dissertation is significant in both practical and academic terms. Practically, 
the Taiwan Strait has become a critical area whose instability is likely to affect the other 
parts of the world. As East Asian security specialist Robert Ross has said, the Taiwan 
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Strait is one of the flash points in East Asia where a regional conflict is likely to burst out 
(Ross 1999). In particular, China has continued to increase the number of missiles aimed 
at Taiwan, while rising Taiwanese nationalism as well as potential separatism in Taiwan 
are also challenging Chinese leaders’ patience. If a military conflict between Taiwan and 
China eventually occurs, the consequences will involve not just the high costs of human 
lives and resources in both countries but also a possible super-power military 
confrontation between the U.S. and China, just like what almost happened in March 
1996. Moreover, the political and economic stability of East Asia or even the whole 
world might also be jeopardized by a cross-Strait war. These negative effects are serious 
enough to make not only policy makers but also scholars around the world pay more 
attention to studying both cross-Strait relations as well as the factors associated with 
cross-Strait peace and conflict. 
This dissertation has academic significance as well. Because the development of 
cross-Strait relations after the initiation of cross-Strait exchange is relatively recent, the 
scholarly research on it is correspondingly limited in the field of political science. In 
addition, it is common that people who study Taiwan-China relations only pay attention 
to policies or detailed descriptions of events. Consequently, theoretical accounts of cross-
Strait relations are rare. But for political scientists the relationship across the Taiwan 
Strait provides very rich research materials. For example, the interactions that exist 
between domestic politics and foreign (cross-Strait) policies, between cross-Strait 
economic relations and political relations, between Taiwan, China and the United States 
are all good cases against which several IR theories can be tested. As such, since the late 
1990s scholars in Taiwan have started to apply some newly-developed political science 
theories to research the relationship between Taiwan and China.3 This dissertation is just 
                                                 
3 For example, see Bau and Wu 1999; Wu 2000b. 
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an attempt to continue and contribute to this ongoing effort of theorizing cross-Strait 
relations. More specifically, this research does not aim to build any new political science 
theories. Instead, it tries to understand cross-Strait relations from the perspectives of 
theoretical frameworks and then offer explanations that are built upon the literature’s 
insights. By grounding the research questions in the four prominent theoretical debates, it 
seeks to find out whether or not the experiences of Taiwan-China relations support any 
theory in the debates and explain why.  
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the research 
methods and data that I will apply. Chapter 3 explains why Taiwan took a peaceful 
approach in its China policy during most of the period of democratic transition. Chapter 4 
discusses how elections contributed to the appearance of Taiwan’s conflictual actions 
against China. Chapter 5 examines whether or not cross-Strait economic exchanges 
affected Taiwan’s actions toward China. Chapter 6 investigates how the United States’ 
policy toward Taiwan influenced Taiwan’s actions toward China. In Chapter 7, I present 
my conclusions.  
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Chapter 2 
Data and Methods  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation I will apply both case studies and statistical analysis as the 
main research methods. Case studies are in-depth studies of why and how an event (i.e. 
case) occurs. Since this dissertation is an empirical study that researches the empirical 
experiences or phenomena about Taiwan’s China policy, cases will be useful in providing 
related factual information as well as exemplifying and supporting my arguments. The 
choice of cases in this project will depend on the research topic in each relevant chapter, 
so I will just explain each in their respective chapters. As for the materials about the 
cases, they come mainly from news articles from Taiwan’s major local newspapers (i.e. 
China Times and United Daily News). In addition, I also conducted interviews with some 
Taiwanese scholars, journalists, and former officials in the summer of 2005 for 
supplementary information.  
Statistical analysis is widely used in empirical research as a source of evidence 
because it tends to demonstrate specific behavior patterns that exist among a large 
number of samples. The major statistical method I am going to employ is the VAR 
(vector autoregression) time-series analysis (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989). Since 
VAR is a relatively uncommon approach in political science research, the rest of this 
chapter will focus on introducing this method, some other relevant tests, and the data that 
will be used in the analysis. I will start with the sources and measurement of the data. 
Then I will give an introduction to the VAR model and the model’s application in the 
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studies of international relations. In the third section I discuss the stationarity tests for the 
data series. The last two sections are the model’s specification and estimation. 
DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT  
The dataset for the VAR analysis in this project is composed of the variables of 
state actions, elections, the market related to cross-Strait commerce, and the TAIEX (the 
index of Taiwan’s stock market). It covers two different periods of analysis.  
State Actions 
The first part is the VRA event dataset that includes the dyadic actions between 
Taiwan, China and the United States during the period from 1990 to 2004. This dataset is 
built with the VRA Reader program, a software tool developed by Virtual Research 
Associates, Inc. (VRA) to parse Reuters’s news reports on events of state actions.4 The 
events parsed through the VRA Reader will then be processed using two steps. 
First, because state actions range from verbal actions such as making policy 
announcements to physical actions like leaders’ visits to other countries, the events will 
be categorized into various state actions by coding with the IDEA (Integrated Data for 
Events Analysis) protocol that includes all WEIS (World Event Interaction Survey, see 
McClelland 1978) scheme and some other supplementary codes. For examples of the 
WEIS codes, see Appendix A. 
Second, since these state actions can also be friendly or hostile, the Goldstein net-
cooperation scale (Goldstein 1992: 376- 377) is used to convert the IDEA codes that are 
attached to the various state actions. As Appendix B shows, the Goldstein scale assigns a 
                                                 
4 The author thanks Dr. Patrick Brandt of the University of Texas at Dallas and Dr. John R. Freeman of the 
University of Minnesota for kindly offering the Goldstein-format VRA dataset on the part of Taiwan-
China-U.S. relations. The original raw VRA dataset (which includes all events for 1990-2004 for the entire 
world) is available on Gary King’s website (http://gking.harvard.edu/events/). For an introduction to and 
evaluation of the VRA dataset, see King and Lowe (2003). 
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weighting of cooperation (above zero) or conflict (below zero) to each IDEA event code. 
Therefore, each state action has a value of cooperation (which is positive) or conflict 
(which is negative). For the actions of state A toward state B within a specific period of 
time (a day, a week, or a month, etc.), this value is “the sum of all A’s weighted 
cooperative actions toward B in that period” minus “the sum of all A’s weighted 
conflictual actions toward B in the same period.” This turns out to be A’s “net 
cooperation” toward B in the period. If A’s net cooperation is positive, it means for that 
period of time A’s actions are generally cooperative or friendly toward B. On the other 
hand, A’s negative net cooperation means its actions are generally confrontational or 
hostile toward B during the time. In order to catch the quick-changing dynamics of states’ 
actions, I use a “day” as the unit of analysis. Thus, the event data used in this project are 
state actions’ daily “net cooperation” time-series. 
In this project I assume that the actions of Taiwan directed toward China were not 
only closely related to China’s actions against Taiwan but also associated with Taiwan’s 
interaction with the United States, as well as the interaction between China and the U.S. 
Accordingly, I will include the following six state-action variables into the VAR model: 
TC (meaning Taiwan’s “net cooperation” toward China), CT (China’s “net cooperation” 
toward Taiwan), UC (U.S. “net cooperation” toward China), CU (China’s “net 
cooperation” toward the U.S.), UT (U.S. “net cooperation” toward Taiwan), and TU 
(Taiwan’s “net cooperation” toward the U.S.).  
Elections 
In order to see whether or not Taiwan’s actions against China turned more 
aggressive when elections drew closer, I will include two election variables, presidential 
election and parliamentary election (the Legislative Yuan elections and the National 
Assembly elections), into the model. To gauge the effect of an approaching election, 
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each of the variables is measured by the number of days to the next (same) election.5 
That is, the closer an election is, the smaller this variable’ value will be.  
Note that in my model presidential election refers to the direct presidential 
elections that were held in 1996, 2000 and 2004. On the other hand, parliamentary 
election includes the 1991 National Assembly election and the Legislative Yuan elections 
that were held in 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. I did not include the other National 
Assembly election since it was held on the same day as the first direct presidential 
election in 1996 and consequently its analytical significance was overwhelmed by the 
presidential election.6 
Market of Cross-Strait Commerce 
I will also add a variable China Stocks that represents the market factor of cross-
Strait commerce into the model. “China stocks” (or “China-concept stocks”) is a term 
that generally refers to the stocks of Taiwan’s locally listed firms that heavily invest in 
China. The research that studies the relationship between conflicts and interdependence 
usually uses trade as the variable of interdependence. But due to the lack of daily data 
about cross-Strait trade or mainland investment,7 I had to locate another variable that 
carries daily market information about cross-Strait commerce to match other daily-based 
variables in the VAR model. The only such data I found was the stock prices of the 
Taiwanese listed firms that have invested a substantial amount of money in China.  
This China Stocks variable is the daily change of a stock index that was calculated 
by the TEJ (Taiwan Economic Journal, a private stock research company in Taiwan). In 
order to avoid the unit-root problem in the VAR analysis, I use the index’s daily change, 
                                                 
5 The author thanks Jih-wen Lin for suggesting this measurement of elections. 
6 The 1996 National Assembly election was also the last regular election for the National Assembly 
members. 
7 In official records, trade and investment data are usually compiled on a monthly basis. 
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i.e. its differenced series, as the China Stocks variable. This index is based on the stock 
prices of those Taiwanese listed firms whose cumulated investment amount in China in 
one specific year was among the top 30 firms. I ranked all the Taiwanese listed firms 
according to their individual accumulated mainland investment amount to determine 
these top 30 firms.8 “Accumulated amount” means the total amount a listed firm has 
invested in China from the first year it started to invest to the year when it was ranked.9 
The calculation of the index was conducted in the same way that the TAIEX index is 
calculated. 
Lin and Roberts (2007: 147) have said, “Financial market participants daily make 
fine-tuned, firm-specific investment decisions by drawing on a wide range of 
information, including relevant changes in the political environment. As a part of this 
investment calculus, market participants must judge for any firm the relevance of any 
given political event to the firm’s prospective fortunes.” The top 30 mainland investment 
listed firms mean that these firms are more deeply engaged in cross-Strait commercial 
activities, investment and trade as well, than other listed firms.10 Therefore, the index 
made up of their stock prices would have the following implications.  
First, it is the aggregate evaluation of financial market participants on the top 30 
firms’ profitability in China. So, if the economic exchange between Taiwan and China 
has been occurring in a market of cross-Strait commerce, then this index would stand for 
                                                 
8 The data of each listed firm’s yearly mainland investment amounts are provided by Taiwan’s Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. I sum up each firm’s yearly amounts to get the firm’s cumulated amount in one specific 
year. 
9 The Taiwan government did not permit mainland investment until 1991. So, only 2 listed firms invested 
in China in 1991 (the same two firms were also picked up in 1990 when calculating the index); and 12 in 
1992. The number of these listed firms passed 30 in 1993. 
10 One notable fact regarding cross-Strait economic activities is the close link between trade and 
Taiwanese investment in China. As Tung says, Taiwan-invested enterprises in mainland China play a major 
role in importing materials, machinery, parts, semi-manufactured goods and capital goods from Taiwan. “In 
the mid-1990s, around one-third to two-thirds of Taiwan’s exports to China were driven by these Taiwan-
invested enterprises.” (2003: 6) 
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the financial market’s overall assessment against this market of cross-Strait commerce. 
Second, because the index represents the financial market’s overall assessment against 
the market of cross-Strait commerce, unlike trade amount or investment amount, it 
would reflect the qualitative (or non-quantitative) side of cross-Strait commerce. This is 
just like an overall stock index in a country, which tends to reflect (the market 
participants’ evaluation of) the quality of that country’s economy. As a matter of fact, 
since the assessment of financial markets against cross-Strait commerce would be based 
on lots of information that includes trade and investment, this index has already taken 
care of the quantitative side of cross-Strait economic exchanges. Third, just like other 
financial markets in the world, the financial market participants’ evaluation of the top 30 
firms’ profitability in China also tended to be sensitive to political events, particularly 
those associated with cross-Strait relations. Thus, this index can appropriately measure 
the market participants’ overall preference about any political event in Taiwan-China 
relations.  
TAIEX  
The daily changes of the TAIEX will also be included in the VAR model. This is 
because the variable of China Stocks is closely related to the TAIEX. More accurately, 
the TAIEX is made of the stock prices that include those of each year’s top 30 listed 
firms. In this case, the two variables are highly correlated.11 Thus, adding the variable of 
TAIEX will avoid the under-specification of the VAR model, particularly when China 
Stocks is also the dependent variable of one of the model’s equations. The TAIEX data is 
available from the website of the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC).12 To 
                                                 
11 According to the author’s analysis, the Pearson correlation between the two variables is 0.844. 
12 The website of TSEC is www.tse.com.tw . 
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avoid the unit-root problem in VAR analysis, this TAIEX variable will be the daily 
changes (i.e. the differenced series) of the TAIEX index.  
Figures 2-1 to 2-10 are the time series plots of the above variables.  
 
 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Periods of Analysis 
Since the period covered in this dataset is from 1990 to 2004, I had to limit my 
time-series analysis to this span of time rather than trace it back to 1987 when cross-Strait 
contacts began. In addition, the analysis will be applied to two different sub-periods of 
time. The first period is from January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1995. This is the period of 
détente between Taiwan and China because the exchanges across the Strait were friendly 
and no significant event damaged this atmosphere of détente. The second period is from 
July 1, 1995 to December 31, 2004, during which time the two countries’ bilateral 
relations were marked by tension and conflict after President Lee Teng-hui visited the 
U.S. in June 1995. I will discuss more about the division into these two sub-periods in 
Chapter 3. 
VECTOR AUTOREGRESSION  
A Model of Reciprocity in International Relations 
State actions constitute the basic unit of analysis in international relations. For 
students of international relations, the most complex part about state actions is to 
determine the sources of their appearance. Generally speaking, an action of a country can 
be the result of the country’s own past behaviors. It can also be affected by the past 
behaviors of another country. Sometimes the past behaviors of a third country can 
exercise influence too. Therefore, it is important to choose an appropriate analytical tool 
when searching for the source of state actions. For the following two reasons, I pick up 
the VAR time-series analysis as the major analytical tool in this dissertation.  
First, a time-series analysis takes into account the variables’ values at various 
points of time. Thus, when being applied to the study of state interactions, this analysis 
would possess more potential to catch the temporal dynamics of state actions. Second, 
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instead of omitting some variables, a VAR model would equally consider all the variables 
that are causally connected to each other. That is, these variables are endogenous rather 
than exogenous ones in a VAR model. Therefore, when modeling interstate actions, any 
actions that are directed by one country toward another would never be left out of the 
model. This analytical feature is critical for studies of state interactions because, among a 
group of countries which interact closely with each other, the actions of any country tend 
to be inter-causally connected with other countries’ behaviors.  
Some scholars have already applied the VAR model to the studies of international 
relations. For example, Goldstein and Freeman (1990) trace the interactions between 
China, the United States, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period to see if any 
reciprocity occurred in any dyad among the three powers. This pioneering effort is then 
followed by Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997), Pevehouse and Goldstein (1999b), and 
Goldstein et al. (2001), which analyze the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s 
and the interstate relations in the Middle East during the 1980s and 1990s. Without a 
doubt, the VAR model is also appropriate for the analysis of Taiwan’s actions toward 
China, which involves not just the interaction between Taiwan and China but also the two 
countries’ respective interaction with the United States. 
Then, what is a VAR model? A VAR model is a system of independent equations. 
When modeling interstate actions, each equation in the VAR model has a dependent 
variable that represents one country’s actions toward another country. Moreover, all 
equations share the same right side independent variables. These independent variables 
usually consist of recent past actions (i.e. lags) of all endogenous variables. Sometimes 
we can add exogenous variables into the independent variables too, although their lags 
are not necessarily included. In addition, a constant and an error term will also be put on 
the right side of each equation. 
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As Freeman, Williams, and Lin mention, one specific feature about the VAR 
model is that hypothesis tests are not based on the significance levels of individual 
coefficients but on the joint statistical significance of single variables or blocks of 
variables. For this purpose, the block F tests are used to assess the joint significance. 
Moreover, a certain form of dynamic analysis, “innovation accounting,” or impulse 
response function, is sometimes employed to estimate how the VAR system would 
respond to a shock coming from one of the variables (1989: 845- 847). I will further 
discuss the block F tests and the impulse response function in the section on model 
estimation. 
Endogenous Variables and Stationarity Tests 
One necessary condition for a time-series analysis to get unbiased estimates is that 
the data series being analyzed should be stationary. In other words, the series’ “mean, 
variance, and autocovariance (at various lags) should remain the same no matter what 
point we measure them; that is, they are time invariant” (Gujarati 2002: 798). As Gujarati 
explains:  
Why are stationary time series so important? Because if a time series is 
nonstationary, we can study its behavior only for the time period under 
consideration. Each set of time series data will therefore be for a particular 
episode. As a consequence, it is not possible to generalize it to other time 
periods. Therefore, for the purpose of forecasting, such (nonstationary) 
time series may be of little practical value. (2002: 798)  
Hence, it is required that people test the stationarity of the data series before 
conducting any time-series analysis, including the VAR analysis.  
In my VAR model, I test the stationarity of the series of all endogenous variables. 
They include all six state-action variables (TC, CT, UC, CU, UT, and TU) and the 
differenced series of China Stocks and TAIEX, the variables of cross-Strait commerce and 
Taiwan’s stock-market. I treat these variables as endogenous because I assume they are 
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inter-causally connected with each other. That is, I assume that the variables of both 
cross-Strait commerce and Taiwan’s stock market are not just connected to each other but 
also to those state-action variables since economic activities can easily be affected by 
international events. In addition, I assume each state-action variable is potentially related 
to some other state-action variables, just as the works of Goldstein and Freeman (1990) 
and Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997) assume. I make this assumption because the 
interactions between Taiwan and China (i.e. TC, CT) could not be fully understood 
without considering the United States’ actions toward both Taiwan and China (i.e. UC, 
UT) and the two countries’ actions toward the U.S. (i.e. CU and TU). Moreover, I also 
assume that state actions are likely to be affected by the variables of cross-Strait 
commerce and Taiwan’s stock-market. For example, it is possible that Taiwan’s leaders 
would consider cross-Strait commerce or the island’s domestic economic performance, 
which tends to be reflected by the stock market, before they took action toward China.  
The test for stationarity can be done with the approaches of graphical analysis and 
the unit-root test (Gujarati 2002: 807; 814- 820). As Figures 2-1 to 2-10 show, except for 
the election variables,13 the figures of each endogenous variable’s time series generally 
indicate that over the years the variables’ values have not been increasing or decreasing. 
That is, they show no upward or downward trends. This suggests that the means of these 
variables have possibly been unchanging, which implies the variables are probably 
stationary. In order to see if this conclusion is correct, I also conduct the unit-root tests 
that include both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
test. Table 2-1 displays the results of these tests. The results confirm that, excluding the 
election variables, the series of each variable are stationary for both periods of time.  
                                                 
13 The way the election variables are created will make them nonstationary. This is fine since they will not 




Table 2-1. Results of the Unit Root Tests 
 1/1/1990- 6/30/1995 7/1/1995- 12/31/2004 
Variable Series ADF test PP test ADF test PP test 
CT -10.359*** -43.745*** -8.702*** -52.359*** 
TC -10.672*** -44.799*** -9.316*** -58.140*** 
CU -9.259*** -41.450*** -8.859*** -53.397*** 
UC -8.711*** -42.183*** -8.832*** -53.342*** 
TU -9.239*** -41.336*** -8.876*** -58.592*** 
UT -10.120*** -40.729*** -8.881*** -56.866*** 
TAIEX -10.249*** -41.849*** -10.358*** -57.986*** 
China Stocks -11.263*** -44.580*** -10.394*** -57.709*** 
Note: 1. The tests are conducted with STATA, 8th edition. Both ADF and PP tests show 
the test statistics of Z(t). 2. The lag length for the 1st period of time is 15, the 2nd period 




As mentioned earlier, in a VAR model each equation shares the same right side 
independent variables. These independent variables are mainly composed of recent past 
actions (i.e. lags) of all endogenous variables, but sometimes some exogenous variables 
will be included too. In my VAR model there are eight equations, with each equation’s 
independent variables including the eight endogenous variables that I mentioned above. 
In addition, I also add two exogenous variables, that is, the two election variables, into 
the independent variables. I treat the election variables as exogenous because, as I 
mentioned earlier, they are measured by the number of days to the next (same) election. 
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By measuring this way, the variation pattern of the variables’ values is fixed and can 
hardly be affected by other endogenous variables. 
The VAR model that I construct is as follows. In each equation, αi is the constant, 
εi is the error term, and k is the number of lagged terms. 
 
 
TCt = α1 + TCt-1 + TCt-2 +…+ TCt-k + CTt-1 + CTt-2 +…+ CTt-k   
+ UCt-1 + UCt-2 +…+UC t-k + CUt-1+ CUt-2+…+ CUt-k 
 + UTt-1 + UTt-2 +…+ UTt-k + TUt-1+ TUt-2+…+ TUt-k  
+TAIEX t-1 + TAIEX t-2 +…+ TAIEX t-k  
+ China Stockst-1 +China Stockst-2 +…+ China Stocks t-k 
 + presidential election + parliamentary election + ε1  (1) 
 
CTt = α2 + TCt-1 + TCt-2 +…+ TCt-k + CTt-1 + CTt-2 +…+ CTt-k   
+ UCt-1 + UCt-2 +…+UCt-k + CUt-1+ CUt-2+…+ CUt-k 
 + UTt-1 + UTt-2 +…+ UTt-k + TUt-1+ TUt-2+…+ TUt-k  
+TAIEX t-1 + TAIEX t-2 +…+ TAIEX t-k  
+ China Stockst-1 +China Stockst-2 +…+ China Stocks t-k 
+ presidential election + parliamentary election + ε2  (2) 
 
UCt = α3 + TCt-1 + TCt-2 +…+ TCt-k + CTt-1 + CTt-2 +…+ CTt-k   
+ UCt-1 + UCt-2 +…+UCt-k + CUt-1+ CUt-2+…+ CUt-k 
 + UTt-1 + UTt-2 +…+ UTt-k + TUt-1+ TUt-2+…+ TUt-k  
+TAIEX t-1 + TAIEX t-2 +…+ TAIEX t-k  
+ China Stockst-1 +China Stockst-2 +…+ China Stocks t-k 
+ presidential election + parliamentary election + ε3  (3) 
 
CUt = α4 + TCt-1 + TCt-2 +…+ TCt-k + CTt-1 + CTt-2 +…+ CTt-k   
+ UCt-1 + UCt-2 +…+UCt-k + CUt-1+ CUt-2+…+ CUt-k 
 + UTt-1 + UTt-2 +…+ UTt-k + TUt-1+ TUt-2+…+ TUt-k  
+TAIEX t-1 + TAIEX t-2 +…+ TAIEX t-k  
+ China Stockst-1 +China Stockst-2 +…+ China Stocks t-k 
+ presidential election + parliamentary election + ε4  (4) 
 
UTt = α5 + TCt-1 + TCt-2 +…+ TCt-k + CTt-1 + CTt-2 +…+ CTt-k   
+ UCt-1 + UCt-2 +…+UCt-k + CUt-1+ CUt-2+…+ CUt-k 
 + UTt-1 + UTt-2 +…+ UTt-k + TUt-1+ TUt-2+…+ TUt-k  
+TAIEX t-1 + TAIEX t-2 +…+ TAIEX t-k  
+ China Stockst-1 +China Stockst-2 +…+ China Stocks t-k 
 + presidential election + parliamentary election + ε5  (5) 
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TUt = α6 + TCt-1 + TCt-2 +…+ TCt-k + CTt-1 + CTt-2 +…+ CTt-k   
+ UCt-1 + UCt-2 +…+UCt-k + CUt-1+ CUt-2+…+ CUt-k 
 + UTt-1 + UTt-2 +…+ UTt-k + TUt-1+ TUt-2+…+ TUt-k  
+TAIEX t-1 + TAIEX t-2 +…+ TAIEX t-k  
+ China Stockst-1 +China Stockst-2 +…+ China Stocks t-k 
+ presidential election + parliamentary election + ε6  (6) 
 
TAIEX t = α7 + TCt-1 + TCt-2 +…+ TCt-k + CTt-1 + CTt-2 +…+ CTt-k   
+ UCt-1 + UCt-2 +…+UCt-k + CUt-1+ CUt-2+…+ CUt-k 
 + UTt-1 + UTt-2 +…+ UTt-k + TUt-1+ TUt-2+…+ TUt-k  
+TAIEX t-1 + TAIEX t-2 +…+ TAIEX t-k  
+ China Stockst-1 +China Stockst-2 +…+ China Stocks t-k 
+ presidential election + parliamentary election + ε7  (7) 
 
China Stocks t = α8 + TCt-1 + TCt-2 +…+ TCt-k + CTt-1 + CTt-2 +…+ CTt-k   
+ UCt-1 + UCt-2 +…+UCt-k + CUt-1+ CUt-2+…+ CUt-k 
 + UTt-1 + UTt-2 +…+ UTt-k + TUt-1+ TUt-2+…+ TUt-k  
+TAIEX t-1 + TAIEX t-2 +…+ TAIEX t-k  
+ China Stockst-1 +China Stockst-2 +…+ China Stocks t-k 
+ presidential election + parliamentary election + ε8  (8) 
 
A precise time-series analysis also depends on employing an appropriate number 
of lagged terms (i.e. the lag length, k) in the model. In a time-series equation, the 
dependent variable at time t is presumed to be affected by the independent variables at 
past points of time, from time t-1 to time t-k. Therefore, it is important to determine the 
suitable lag length when specifying the time-series model. To determine the appropriate k 
for both periods of time, I apply Sims’ (1980: 17- 18) modified likelihood ratio tests. 
These tests are composed of several rounds of tests on different pairs of lag numbers. In 
each round of test, a lag number will always be larger than the other, with the shorter-lag 
(restricted) model as the null hypothesis and the longer-lag (unrestricted) model as the 
alternative hypothesis. I will start with a pair of lag numbers that are both relatively small 
in the first round of test. If the longer lag is accepted in this round, then I conduct the 
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second round to test it against another lag number that is larger than it. Usually this step 
will be repeated for a few rounds until an appropriate lag length is located.  
Appendix C’s Table C-3 shows the results of these ratio tests. For the first period 
of time (from January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1995), I start with 10 lags vs. 5 lags. The test 
results show that the lag length of 10 is accepted, so I test 15 lags vs. 10 lags in the 
second round and the results show 15 is accepted. Then I test 20 lags vs. 15 lags and it 
turns out that 20 is rejected. This means 15 is a possible lag-length candidate. So I test 25 
vs. 20, 30 vs. 25, 35 vs. 30, and 40 vs. 35, and find that 25, 30, 35, 40 are all rejected. I 
test 30 vs. 15 and 30 vs. 10 as well, and 30 is rejected in both tests, which leaves 15 and 
10 as possible lag lengths. But since the test of 15 vs. 10 accepted 15, 15 will be the most 
appropriated lag length for this period of time. As for the period from July 1, 1995 to 
December 31, 2004, at first 15 seems to be a good lag-length candidate too because 10 is 
accepted in the test of 10 vs. 5 but rejected in the test of 15 vs. 10, and 20 is rejected in 
the test of 20 vs. 15. But other tests show that a longer lag-length is possible: 25 is 
accepted in the test of 25 vs. 20, and 30 is accepted in the test of 30 vs. 25. Because 35 is 
rejected in the test of 35 vs. 30 and 40 rejected in the test of 40 vs. 35, 30 seems to be a 
suitable lag-length too. So I tested it against 15 and 10, respectively, and it is accepted in 
both tests. Therefore I decided that 30 is the most appropriate lag-length for this period of 
time. 
Model Estimation  
One thing that is worth noting is the method of determining the significance level 
of each independent variable. In a VAR model, whether or not independent variables are 
significant in affecting the dependent variable is judged by the results of the block F tests 
(Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989: 845-846; Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999a: 8). The 
independent variables in a VAR model may include several lagged terms. In terms of 
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analytical purposes, for any specific independent variable in the model such as TC, the 
significance of every individual lagged term (i.e. TCt-1, TCt-2, or TCt-k) is less important 
than the combined significance of all the lagged terms. Therefore, I have to apply the 
block F tests to assess the “joint statistical significance” of all the lagged terms of the 
variable. By conducting these tests, whether or not the Granger causal power of one 
(lagged) independent variable is significant on the dependent variable can also be 
revealed.14   
One specific feature of the block F tests is that they can only show the joint 
significance of a lagged independent variable but not the “joint coefficient.” Therefore, if 
the research needs to determine how the dependent variable would respond to one 
particular independent variable, a certain form of dynamic analysis, “innovation 
accounting,” or impulse response function must be used to see if the dependent variable 
reacts positively or negatively to that independent variable. In an impulse response 
function, one variable is “shocked” by another variable’s one-standard-deviation increase 
in the variance and then reacts with various degrees of intensity, either positive or 
negative, at different points of time. Generally, the overall direction of its reactions at 
these points of time could be judged by graphical analysis, while the number of those 
points of time is the same as that of the lagged terms in the model. Therefore, if a 
dependent variable’s graphical trace of response is above 0 most of the time, then it 
means it reacts positively to the independent variable. If the trace is below 0 most of the 
time, then it means the dependent variable’s response to the independent variable is 
negative. If the trace of response is above 0 sometimes and below 0 at other times, then it 
would be difficult to judge the general response direction. 
                                                 
14 As Freeman (1983: 328) quotes Pierce (1977), a variable X is said to “Granger cause” another variable 
Y, if “Y can be better predicted from the past of X and Y together than the past of Y alone, other relevant 
information being used in the prediction.” 
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I present the results of this VAR time-series analysis in Appendix C. Since the 
topic of each following chapter differs from each other, I will summarize the results as 
needed and present them in the relevant chapters. 
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Chapter 3   
Explaining the Peaceful China Policy of a Democratizing Taiwan 
 
INTRODUCTION 
How a country’s democratic transition affects its foreign policy is one of the 
fervent debates in the literature of international relations theory. While some argue that 
democratizing states tend to act bellicosely, others assert that young democracies are 
likely to be peace loving in their foreign policies. Taiwan happened to go through a 
process of democratization from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. In this chapter I discuss 
the connection between Taiwan’s democratic transition and the orientation of its China 
policy during the transitional period.  
For the period from 1987 to the mid 1990s, Taiwan was experiencing the 
transition into a liberal democracy. In July 1987, the ruling KMT regime lifted the martial 
law decree, which had been set up to consolidate the KMT’s authoritarian rule when the 
regime had just moved to Taiwan. In January 1988, the ban on publishing new 
newspapers was also removed. In January 1989, a law allowing the organization of new 
political parties was passed. This law legalized the existing opposition party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and signified the beginning of party politics in 
Taiwan. In May 1991, the KMT government also repealed the R.O.C. (Republic of 
China) Constitution’s Temporary Provisions to demonstrate its determination to 
normalize the country’s constitutional framework.15 At the end of that year, all the 
                                                 
15 According to the website of Taiwan Yearbook, in the face of the threat from the Chinese communists, 
the National Assembly added to the Constitution a set of “Temporary Provisions during the Period of 
Mobilization and Combating Rebellion” in 1948. The Provisions superseded the Constitution and were 
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original members of the First National Assembly and First Legislative Yuan resigned in 
accordance with the 261st Ruling of the Council of Grand Justices that was reached in 
June 1990. After about four decades’ suspension, the elections of the Second National 
Assembly and the Second Legislative Yuan were eventually held in December 1991 and 
December 1992, respectively.16 The island’s democratic transition was set to come to a 
close when the constitutional conference that was held in July 1994 officially changed the 
presidential election system to that of a direct presidential election. Eventually, the 
transition was completed when people in Taiwan directly elected the president in March 
1996 for the first time in the island’s history.17 
As Taiwan was transforming into a democracy, did any change occur to its policy 
toward China during this time? If so, what is the connection between Taiwan’s 
democratic transition and its China policy during that transitional period?  
I argue that the process of Taiwan’s democratization also simultaneously 
witnessed a particular period of cross-Strait relations in which the direction of Taiwan’s 
China policy was generally peaceful. This was a direction of China policy that was more 
peaceful than that of the previous four decades because Taiwan kicked off cross-Strait 
contacts and exchanges to create détente across the Taiwan Strait. Compared with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
designed to enhance the president’s power during the emergency period of the communist uprising. 
( http://english.www.gov.tw/Yearbook/index.jsp?categid=22&recordid=52746 ) 
16 The elections were suspended by the Temporary Provisions during the Period of Mobilization and 
Combating Rebellion due to the occurrence of the Chinese Civil War. Consequently, the original members 
of the two congressional bodies, who were all elected in mainland China, were allowed to continue their 
jobs indefinitely after moving to Taiwan.  
17 As Linz and Stepan say (1996: 3), a democratic transition is considered to be completed when “a 
government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de 
facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative, and judicial power 
generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.” Taiwan’s 1996 
presidential election is generally regarded as the conclusion of its democratic transition since the political 
development in its aftermath meets the conditions mentioned by Linz and Stepan. For example, see Higley, 
Huang, and Lin 1998: 148; Lin 1998: 371; Lin and Chu 2004: 7. Note that the completion of Taiwan’s 
democratic transition does not necessarily mean the island has accomplished its democratic consolidation.  
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following period, the direction was also more peaceful because during its democratic 
transition, Taiwan continued to follow the “One China” policy, the bedrock of stability 
for cross-Strait relations.   
I propose a theory that highlights the political calculations of Taiwan’s leader, 
President Lee Teng-hui, to explain the relationship between Taiwan’s democratization 
and the simultaneous emergence of a peaceful China policy. This theory assumes that Lee 
was a rational politician whose best interest was to consolidate power. By pointing out 
the constraints and options for Lee, the theory concludes that Lee’s best choice was to 
focus on political reforms while continuing President Chiang Ching-kuo’s China policy 
that stressed the “One China” policy and cross-Strait engagement. Lee’s decision 
eventually led to the appearance of a peaceful China policy during Taiwan’s 
democratization.  
To test this theory, I present empirical evidence to show that the direction of 
Taiwan’s policy toward China during the period of democratic transition was generally 
more peaceful than that in the period following the completion of democratization. 
Utilizing a daily event dataset compiled by Virtual Research Associates, Inc. (VRA), the 
analysis compares the frequencies and intensities of cross-Strait cooperation and conflict 
between the transition period (1/1/1990-6/30/1995) and the consolidation period that 
followed (7/1/1995-12/31/2004). 
This chapter is organized as follows. The following section quickly reviews the 
literature regarding democratization’s effects on foreign policy. Then I will lay out the 
theory that explains the link between Taiwan’s democratization and the concurrent 
emergence of a peaceful China policy. The next section will analyze Lee Teng-hui’s 
political calculations, followed by a section explaining how Lee’s rational decision led to 
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the peaceful China policy. Then I present the empirical evidence. The last section 
concludes this chapter. 
FOREIGN POLICY OF A DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRY 
The debate over the way a country’s democratization or regime transition affects 
its foreign policy started when Mansfield and Snyder released a seminal study in 1995. 
Although the school of democratic peace theory (DPT) claims that democracies do not 
fight each other because of the restraints of democratic institutions and norms (Doyle 
1983, 1986; Layne 1994), Mansfield and Snyder claim in this study with the support of 
statistical findings that it is common to see democratizing countries act aggressively or 
become war-prone in their foreign policies. According to them, the seeds for 
democratizing countries to get involved in interstate conflicts are buried in the soil of two 
factors: weak institutions and threatened elites or groups. They argue that, as a country 
starts to democratize, its new institutional arrangements tend to be weak, and the losers in 
the reform process are likely to feel threatened. These weak institutions and threatened 
interests can easily create a political impasse in which no stable political coalition and 
state authority can exist. In order to break through this political impasse, politicians are 
inclined to resort to some tactics that can eventually lead to war. 
On the contrary, some studies find that democratizing states are actually peaceful 
in their foreign policies. For example, by emphasizing the role of the ultimate decision 
maker, Lebow (1995) argues that Mikhail Gorbachev’s commitment to domestic political 
and economic reforms is one of the conditions associated with the former Soviet Union’s 
conciliatory foreign policy toward the West in the late 1980s. In his challenge to 
Mansfield and Snyder’s argument, McFaul (1997-1998) claims that because the political 
leaders, political organizations, and economic groups that had both normative and 
material interests in international cooperation dominated throughout Russia’s transition, 
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Russia’s regime change in the 1990s did not really prompt any major international 
conflict. Malcolm and Pravda (1996) also disagree with Mansfield and Snyder by 
asserting that due to the anti-conflict public opinion and the absence of a powerful 
belligerent coalition that challenged the regime, no adventurous foreign policy had 
appeared in Russia since the 1990s.18 
Therefore, no agreement has yet been reached in the literature regarding the effect 
of democratization on the direction of a country’s foreign policy; while some argue that 
the transition into democracy could lead to the emergence of an aggressive foreign 
policy, others claim that the newly born democracies’ foreign policies will be peaceful. In 
this chapter I join those who disagree with Mansfield and Snyder by providing a case 
study on Taiwan’s experience.  
LEADERS’ RATIONAL CHOICE 
Although the literature shows that democratization might bring about a 
cooperative foreign policy at the same time, scholars still have different opinions on how 
a country’s democratic transition links to the emergence of such a foreign policy. Some 
of them point out that the leader’s commitment to political reforms is a key factor; others 
mention the role played by winners of political reforms or domestic political contexts. 
Although these factors are likely to explain Taiwan’s case as well, I argue that the state 
leader’s rational calculation is an important factor that cannot be ignored when explaining 
the peaceful China policy during Taiwan’s democratization.  
The state leader’s role is significant in Taiwan’s transition into democracy. Unlike 
the transitions initiated by the sudden collapse of non-democratic regimes, by an armed 
revolution, by a military coup, or by an uprising of civil society, Taiwan’s 
                                                 
18 Some other scholars also challenge Mansfield and Snyder’s argument with new case studies or different 
statistical findings, for example, see Wolf, Weede, Enterline, Mansfield, and Snyder 1996; Thompson and 
Tucker 1997; Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Enterline 1998. 
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democratization was a top-down one in which the state had control over the speed and 
scope of the transition.19 Therefore, the state leader who planned the transition is a 
critical actor that cannot be overlooked.  
It is presumed that rational leaders will seek to stay in power as long or as safely 
as possible (Levi 1997: 24). As the person who manages the transition of a regime, the 
state leader in a democratizing country will only take steps that could prolong not only 
the regime’s existence but also his political life, especially when he is new and 
inexperienced and without any strong power base. Thus, while the leader is playing a 
two-level game in which he must at the same time deal with both domestic reforms and 
the country’s foreign policy, he is likely to estimate the benefits and costs of each 
possible policy option by taking into consideration the resources he has and the 
constraints against him before he picks an option that could serve the goal of keeping 
himself in power safely. In my opinion, such a rational choice made by the state leader 
explains to a considerable degree why Taiwan’s policy toward China was generally 
peaceful during its democratic transition. In other words, I argue that, the appearance of a 
relatively peaceful China policy during Taiwan’s democratic transition to a large extent 
can be traced back to President Lee Teng-hui’s strategic calculation soon after he took 
over power. 
Lee Teng-hui’s Calculations 
In 1987, in the face of a changing environment, President Chiang Ching-kuo 
made two moves that were unprecedented in Taiwan’s political development as well as 
its relations with China. First, he initiated a limited scope of political reforms by 
                                                 
19 As Chu (1992: 37) points out, “They [the incumbent reformists in Taiwan] demonstrated their capacity 
and intention to limit the scope of reform by controlling the course and pace of institutional reforms, setting 
the sequence of liberalization, and redesigning the political institution and election rules in the 
Kuomintang’s favor. Also, in no instance did they make concessions to the opposition at the cost of 
weakening their own position within the party-state.” 
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renouncing the martial law decree and granting permission for the publication of new 
newspapers. Second, he changed his own “three no’s” policy (that is, the policy of “no 
contact, no compromise, and no negotiation” with Mainland China) that was set up in 
1979 by removing the ban over Mainland visits. Therefore, as Lee Teng-hui succeeded to 
the presidency what awaited him was the challenge of a two-level game of dealing with 
Taiwan’s domestic political reforms and Taiwan’s relationship with China. But, there 
was still one more critical test for Lee. That is, as a new and inexperienced leader, he also 
had to survive challenges from his political enemies. 
Soon after taking over from Chiang Ching-kuo, Lee found that he was weakened 
and isolated by the mainlanders in the KMT. In the early 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo 
recruited a few Taiwanese elites, including Lee, into the regime when he was the premier. 
But mainlanders still remained the dominant group in the KMT when Lee became the 
first native-Taiwanese president in the Republic of China’s history in 1988. Lee met his 
first challenge when a group of mainlanders attempted to stop him from taking over 
Chiang Ching-kuo’s party leadership by opposing Lee’s nomination for the KMT 
chairmanship. Subsequently, his new foreign policy thinking, shown by some of his 
diplomatic actions, also drew strong criticism from many KMT mainlanders as deviating 
from the traditional “One China” policy.20 In February 1990, the challenge from the 
mainlanders became severe when Lee chose Lee Yuan-tsu as his running mate for the 
presidency. Being unsatisfied with the fact that Lee Teng-hui nominated Lee Yuan-tsu 
instead of any of their members or allies, these mainlanders joined other political foes of 
Lee’s to nominate their own candidates for the party’s presidential primary. Although this 
challenge against Lee Teng-hui was eventually unsuccessful, it still caused a split within 
the KMT, between those who supported Lee Teng-hui (called the mainstream faction) 
                                                 
20 Lee’s new foreign policy thinking is termed “pragmatic diplomacy.” 
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and those who disagreed with him (the non-mainstream faction). To appease or even split 
his rival faction, Lee nominated Hao Pei-tsun, a major leader of the non-mainstream 
faction, as premier in May 1990.21 But Hao, also a mainlander, proved to be a veto 
player against Lee’s policy and thus a huge obstacle for Lee to stabilize his power.  
These examples show that Lee as a Taiwanese was weakened and isolated by the 
mainlanders in the KMT regime. Thus, Lee’s problem was not only how to deal with the 
two-level-game of domestic reforms and Taiwan’s relationship with China; he also 
needed to worry about how to consolidate his own power base when playing this two-
level game. 
Lee’s Policy Options 
Judging from Lee’s policies throughout his terms as president, he could have had 
the following different policy options when confronting the issues that Chiang Ching-kuo 
left behind in January 1988. First, Lee could choose to focus on deepening domestic 
political reforms and keeping Chiang’s China policy, which opened cross-Strait 
exchanges but insisted that the “One China” policy remain unchanged. Second, he could 
instead leave political reforms at that and put his efforts into switching Chiang’s China 
policy by redefining the Taiwan-China relationship (i.e. seeking Taiwan’s de facto 
independent status) as well as tightening cross-Strait exchanges,22 similar to what he did 
in his later presidential years. Third, he could focus on both continuing domestic reforms 
and changing China policy’s direction at the same time. The fourth option for Lee was 
doing nothing further regarding both issues. Of these four options, Lee’s best choice 
                                                 
21 See Chen 1995: 208. 
22 In 1996 Lee announced the policy of “no haste, be patient” to restrict Taiwanese businessmen’s 
investment in China. In 1999, he announced the “special state-to-state theory” to clearly define Taiwan as a 
de facto independent country. 
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would be the one that could help him survive the mainlanders’ challenges and consolidate 
his power. 
The constraints imposed upon Lee by Taiwan’s political environment at the time 
had been a critical factor affecting Lee’s choice of policy options. First, switching Chiang 
Ching-kuo’s China policy would be against Lee’s advantage given the power relations 
inside the KMT in the late 1980s. Because the mainlanders, still the dominant group in 
the KMT, were Chiang’s loyal followers and strong supporters for the “One China” 
policy and cross-Strait exchanges, 23  any attempt of redefining the Taiwan-China 
relationship and tightening cross-Strait exchanges would only cause an instant and direct 
conflict between Lee and the mainlanders. This was a risky conflict that Lee had to avoid 
since he was very likely to be defeated without any strong power base.24  
In addition, even if Lee chose to directly confront the mainlanders by changing 
Chiang’s China policy, he would also find it difficult to mobilize any support from the 
public. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the lack of a strong Taiwanese identity among 
the people in Taiwan had made the mobilization of support on national identity issues 
difficult. Thanks to the KMT regime’s successful patriotic education policy in schools for 
                                                 
23 As Lin, Chu, and Hinich (1996: 459) mention, “the nonmainstream faction favored broader economic 
and cultural exchange across the Taiwan Strait…” Because most mainlanders in the KMT joined the non-
mainstream faction, we could know that the mainlanders supported the expansion of cross-Strait exchanges. 
24 In fact, Lee made a few delicate efforts in this regard, but he was smart enough to stop going further 
after encountering the mainlanders’ resistance. For example, Lee took some unprecedented diplomatic 
actions not very long after becoming president. These actions differed from those in the Chiang Ching-kuo 
period in that Lee did not insist on using Taiwan’s official title “the Republic of China” on some diplomatic 
occasions, in addition to trying to impress upon the world that Taiwan and China were two separate 
countries. Lee’s actions included the following: In April 1988 Lee decided to send a delegation to the Asian 
Development Bank’s annual meeting in Manila, even though China was also in attendance. Then, during 
his visit to Singapore in March 1989, he said he “was not satisfied with, but can accept” the fact that the 
Singaporean government called him “the President from Taiwan” rather than “the President from the 
R.O.C.” Later in May 1989, he sent a high-level delegation to Beijing to attend another annual meeting of 
the Asian Development Bank, which was the first official visit by Taiwanese officials to China. Because 
the mainlanders in the KMT shared a strong Chinese national identity and were faithful guards of the “One 
China” principle, these diplomatic actions soon resulted in their suspicion and criticism that Lee was going 
to change the “One China” policy. Consequently, before Lee secured his power within the KMT in 1993, 
he never explicitly tried to change Chiang Ching-kuo’s China policy. 
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four decades, the fact that most people shared a strong Chinese identity instead of a 
Taiwanese identity did not really change in the early years of Lee’s terms as president. 
For example, according to a survey conducted in the summer of 1990 by National Taiwan 
University, when asked if they regarded themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, 
75.3% of the respondents disagreed while only 13.4% agreed. (More precisely, among 
those who responded, 36.6% said they strongly disagreed, 25.5% disagreed, and 13.2% 
slightly disagreed. 2.2% of the respondents said they strongly agreed, 5.4% agreed, and 
5.8% slightly agreed [See Figure 3-1]).25 Also, according to surveys by the Election 
Study Center at National Cheng-chi University (see Figure 3-2), in the period from mid-
1992 to mid-1995, the percentage of those who thought of themselves as Chinese was 
still relatively higher than those who thought of themselves as Taiwanese.26 Therefore, 
given the strong Chinese national identity shared among the people of Taiwan, redefining 
the Taiwan-China relationship would still be a hard option for Lee. 
In contrast, conducting more political reforms appeared to be an optimal option 
for Lee to undermine the mainlanders’ strength. On the one hand, expanding electoral 
venues by opening the elections of the two aged congressional bodies (the First 
Legislative Yuan and First National Assembly) could allow more local Taiwanese 
politicians to participate in national elections and then join the political center to become 
Lee's political allies. On the other hand, changing the presidential election system from 
indirect election to popular election could assist Lee to rally support from the vast amount 
of native Taiwanese voters in his campaign and thus build his own power base at the 
grass-root level.  
                                                 
25 The survey question was, “Do you think that you are a Taiwanese rather than a Chinese?” The survey 
was conducted by the 306 Workshop of the Political Science Department at National Taiwan University in 
July and August of 1990. The frequency analysis was completed by the author. 
26 Note that there was another option for the respondents in the Election Study Center’s survey, that is, 
they could think themselves as “both Taiwanese and Chinese.” 
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Figure 3-1. Distribution of National Identity in Taiwan 






























Figure 3-2. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in 



















































































Taiwanese Both Taiwanese and Chinese Chinese Non response
Source: Election Study Center, National Cheng-Chi University, Taiwan.    
(http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03-2.htm) 
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More importantly, Lee could also utilize the pressures from both the opposition 
party and public opinion to consolidate his power through political reforms. Political 
reform was the major issue targeted by the oppositional DPP in the late 1980s. Back in 
March 1987 when the party was still illegal, they passed a resolution at their party 
congress to request new elections for the two congressional bodies. In December, they 
held a demonstration on the same issue and again in January 1989. In December 1989, 
they held a demonstration that called for a direct presidential election. In a statement in 
March 1990, they asked the KMT government to make a timetable for solving some 
significant reform issues, including the new elections of the Legislative Yuan and 
National Assembly as well as the direct presidential election. 
Meanwhile, public opinion supported the new elections of the two congressional 
bodies as well. For example, a large-scale student movement that occurred in March 1990 
strongly urged life-long members of the National Assembly to retire. A 1990 survey by 
National Taiwan University also showed that only 10.1% of the respondents did not 
support the retirement of all the original members of the First Legislative Yuan and First 
National Assembly, while 73.6% agreed. (More precisely, among those who responded, 
1.5% said they strongly disagreed, 3.5% disagreed, and 5.1% slightly disagreed. 36.7% of 
the respondents said they strongly agreed, 22.1% agreed, and 14.8% slightly agreed [See 





                                                 
27 The survey question was, “Do you think all the original members of the First Congress (i.e. Legislative 
Yuan and National Assembly) should retire?” The frequency analysis was completed by the author. 
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Figure 3-3. Voters’ Opinions about the First Congress’s Future 
Do you think all the original members of the First





























Later on, when the presidential election system became a focal issue on the 
agenda of constitutional amendment in early 1992, a survey conducted by National 
Taiwan University showed that 26.3% of the respondents supported the format of indirect 
elections, while 32.1% supported popular presidential elections. In early 1993, another 
survey by National Taiwan University showed that those who supported an indirect 
presidential election dropped to 19.5%, and those who supported a direct election rose to 
43.1%.28 (More accurately, in 1992, 9.1% of the respondents said they insisted on 
choosing the format of indirect election, 17.2% said they were supportive of but not 
insistent on an indirect election. 13.3% insisted on a change to a direct election, while 
18.8% supported but did not strongly demand a direct election. In 1993, 7.3% of the 
respondents said they insisted on an indirect election, and 12.2% said they supported but 
                                                 
28 The surveys were respectively conducted in January and February of 1992 and 1993. The survey 
question was, “What is your opinion on the presidential election system?” The frequency analysis was done 
by the author. 
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did not insist on an indirect election. 21.8% insisted on switching to a direct election, 
while 21.3% supported but did not insist on a direct election (See Figure 3-4). In other 
words, Taiwanese voters also supported the political reform that would change the 
presidential election system to the format of direct election. 
 
 
Figure 3-4. Voters’ Opinions about the Presidential Election System 





































Political Reform as Lee’s Priority 
The above analysis indicates that the best choice for Lee was the first option, that 
is, focusing on domestic political reforms while making no changes to Chiang Ching-
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kuo’s China policy. Indeed, Lee’s talks on many occasions show that, instead of working 
on the redefinition of Taiwan-China relations, he chose to focus on political reforms as 
his first priority. For example, in June 1990 he said “we should generate the dynamic of 
the unification of the whole of China with a more active democratic spirit as well as a 
much healthier constitutional system.” In April 1990 he said, “strengthening the 
constitutional system and fulfilling democratic politics are the only fundamental ways to 
enrich the ‘Taiwan experience’ and direct the country’s unification in the future.” In a 
May 1991 article he talked about why he focused his efforts on political reform:  
We believe that freedom, democracy, and prosperity have become our 
most precious and powerful assets. We should seek the identification and 
support from our compatriots on the mainland with our economic 
accomplishments and particularly political achievements. This is why I 
declared clearly in my inaugural speech that I would manage with all my 
efforts to finish the constitutional reform within two years.”29  
Then in an interview by The Washington Times on July 4, 1991, Lee said: 
What is most important is our own internal democratic reforms; nothing 
has a higher priority than this. . . . When we are fully successful in our 
democratization, our dealing with the mainland will be seen by the whole 
world in a totally different light. We will also be in a more powerful 
position when we negotiate with the Chinese Communists.  
He added, “Only after we have strengthened our own democracy will we be ready 
to consider other important moves vis-à-vis the Mainland.”30 
These examples show that, first, Lee put Taiwan’s democratization as the most 
pressing agenda right after taking over power; second, he would kept Taiwan’s China 
policy on the road that was paved by Chiang Ching-kuo. In my opinion, this decision is 
                                                 
29 For details about these talks, see KMT 1992 (29, 141, 180), which is a collection of Lee’s talks that was 
published by the KMT. Emphases are added. 
30 Quoted from Lin (1998: 356). Emphases are added. 
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the key to understanding why a peaceful China policy occurred while Taiwan was 
experiencing its democratic transition. 
THE FOREIGN POLICY CONSEQUENCE OF LEE’S RATIONAL CALCULATION 
Lee’s rational calculation led to the appearance of a peaceful tone in Taiwan’s 
China policy during Taiwan’s democratic transition. This happened in two ways. First, 
when following Chiang Ching-kuo’s China policy, Lee’s emphasis on pursuing 
unification with China had been a factor that stabilized cross-Strait relations. Second, 
when national identity issues rose as a factor that was likely to destabilize cross-Strait 
relations in 1991, corruption issues that resulted from Lee’s democratic reforms soon 
displaced national identity issues to take center stage in Taiwanese politics. 
Consequently, the détente across the Strait was able to be sustained for a longer time. 
Lee started to plunge into major political reforms in 1990. In April, the KMT 
came to a consensus of putting an end to the tenure of all the old members of the 
Legislative Yuan and National Assembly. Later in June, Lee reached an agreement with 
the DPP in the National Affairs Conference to embark on constitutional reforms and the 
detailed plans of implementing these reforms were debated and decided in constitutional 
conferences before being put into the Additional Articles of the R.O.C. Constitution. 
Eventually, when the direct presidential election was finalized as the new format of 
presidential election in the July 1994 constitutional conference, both Lee’s mission of 
political reforms and Taiwan’s democratic transition were in fact about to come to a 
close.  
In the meantime, as Lee also chose to keep his China policy on the same track as 
Chiang Ching-kuo’s, some significant friendly gestures also appeared in Taiwan’s actions 
toward China as the island’s democratic transition was on its way. In particular, Lee 
continued to emphasize future unification with China as the ultimate goal of Taiwan’s 
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China policy. For example, in August 1990 Lee announced a plan to set up the National 
Unification Council under the Presidential Office to show Taiwan’s determination to 
pursue unification. The goal of unification was even written into the 1991 Guidelines for 
National Unification, the highest-level principles directing the making of mainland policy 
at the time. Such emphasis on unification or the “One China” principle was in close 
agreement with China’s expectations and consequently constituted the critical factor that 
kept Taiwan’s China policy looking peaceful. In addition, Lee also kept opening cross-
Strait economic, social, and cultural exchanges. In particular, to solve the problems that 
occurred from these exchanges, Lee allowed the Taiwan government to hold several 
semi-official administrative talks with China over topics such as mutual repatriation of 
illegal Taiwanese or Chinese immigrants, cooperative containment of maritime crimes, 
the certification of official documents, and so on. Cross-Strait dialogue culminated in the 
1993 Koo-Wang Talks in Singapore, the highest-level talks between the KMT and CCP 
governments since 1949. These exchanges and dialogues caused an atmosphere of 
détente that had never been seen in the Taiwan-China relationship.31 
The peaceful tone of Taiwan’s China policy was also sustained by the 
displacement of destabilizing national identity issues by issues of corruption. The 
controversies over national identity issues emerged soon after Taiwan’s democratic 
transition began. On the one hand, they appeared within the KMT when Lee Teng-hui’s 
diplomatic actions drew the mainlanders’ suspicion and criticisms that Lee was going to 
                                                 
31 The fact that cross-Strait economic exchanges were among the factors contributing to this détente 
atmosphere seems to contradict Chapter 5’s VAR results in which cross-Strait commerce had no peaceful 
effect on Taiwan’s China policy during the first period. But as I will discuss in Chapter 5, this insignificant 
effect in VAR results might come from two reasons. First, cross-Strait commerce did not produce much 
significant commercial interests until its scale grew larger in 1993, which was late in the first period. 
Second, the appearance of a peaceful China policy in this period resulted mainly from President Lee Teng-
hui’s rational calculation, not his consideration of businessmen’s commercial interests. Therefore, the 
peaceful China policy should be traced back to Lee’s strategic calculation rather than cross-Strait economic 
exchanges. 
 47
change the “One China policy.” On the other hand, they also came from the fact that the 
oppositional DPP switched their campaign to pursuing Taiwan’s independence right after 
Lee initiated political reforms. In particular, issues of national identity became a 
destabilizing factor for cross-Strait relations when in October 1991 the DPP released their 
“Taiwan-independence party platform” that explicitly stated the party was seeking to 
establish a sovereign and independent “Republic of Taiwan.”  
But as Lin, Chu, and Hinich (1996) point out, issues of national identity were 
almost immediately overwhelmed by those of socioeconomic justice, in particular the 
KMT’s political corruption that resulted from Lee’s reforms. As Lee Teng-hui tried to 
bring more Taiwanese politicians into his party by way of political reforms, he also 
brought political corruption into the KMT. This was because when political reforms had 
turned elections into a regular political practice, Lee also put effort toward building close 
ties with both local factions and business groups to ensure KMT election victories. One 
way to do this was nominating members of local factions and business groups as KMT 
candidates in exchange for support from these factions and business groups. As a result, 
political corruption such as vote buying and bribes, which before existed only in local 
politics, was also extended to the national level. In addition, “money politics,” created by 
the exchange of interests between the KMT and business groups, were also tolerated by 
the government. 
Right after its disastrous defeat in the Second National Assembly election that 
was held in December 1991, the oppositional DPP realized that national identity issues 
were still not appealing enough for the party to mobilize widespread electoral support. 
Therefore, it switched its cause to that of socioeconomic justice and soon targeted the 
KMT’s political corruption. On the eve of the Second Legislative Yuan election that was 
held in December 1992, the DPP proposed a “welfare state” platform to campaign for 
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socioeconomic justice. Moreover, in 1993, a few KMT members who disagreed with 
Lee’s policies left the KMT and formed the New Party. The New Party was a party that 
supported unification with China and thus differentiated itself from the DPP on issues of 
national identity, but it joined the DPP to attack the KMT’s money politics and political 
corruption. Thus, a new political cleavage of socioeconomic justice emerged over the 
traditional issues of national identity as a focus of Taiwanese politics.32 Consequently, 
for some time, Taiwanese politicians rarely employed national identity issues to mobilize 
political support; thus the peaceful tone in Taiwan’s actions toward China could be 
continued also. 
Nonetheless, national identity was still the fundamental cleavage lying across 
Taiwan’s political landscape. After Lee Teng-hui secured his power base in early 1993 
and solved the last important issue of Taiwan’s political reforms, the presidential election 
system, in the 1994 constitutional conference, the increasingly competitive electoral 
competition between the KMT, the DPP, and the New Party brought national identity 
issues back onto his new agenda. In June 1995 Lee launched an unprecedented 
diplomatic action by paying an unofficial visit to the United States. This action 
highlighted the beginning of his attempt to redefine Taiwan-China relations. But the 
strong reaction that it drew from China also ended the cross-Strait détente that occurred 
during Taiwan’s democratic transition.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EVENT DATA 
Taiwan’s China policy during the democratic transition was more peaceful than 
that in the decades prior to the transition. Thanks to Lee’s abidance to the “One China” 
policy while promoting political reforms, cross-Strait relations were also relatively more 
                                                 
32 See Lin, Chu, and Hinich (1996) and Lin, Chu, Huang, and Zhang (2003) for details of conflict 
displacement in Taiwan’s political development. 
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peaceful than in the ensuing period of democratic consolidation in which the policy was 
gradually abandoned.33 In this section I present empirical evidence to support this 
observation.  
My evidence is based on analysis of the VRA daily events dataset, which is the 
same event dataset that I will utilize throughout this dissertation. The VRA dataset spans 
15 years, starting in January 1990 and ending in December 2004. For the needs of this 
analysis, I will divide this sample into two periods, the first from January 1990 to June 
1995, and the second from July 1995 to December 2004. I set the cutoff point at the mid-
point of 1995 mainly because of the following reasons.  
First, Lee’s U.S. tour in June 1995 is generally regarded as a turning point of the 
development of cross-Strait relations. It resulted in China’s first wave of missile tests 
against Taiwan in July 1995, thus marking the start of the deterioration of Taiwan-China 
relations.34 In other words, the atmosphere of cross-Strait relations before June 1995 was 
generally different from that after June 1995.  
Second, I have argued that the public’s embrace of a Chinese identity in the early 
1990s is a condition that Lee took into account when he made his rational calculation. 
But more importantly, as I will elaborate in the next chapter, the rise of Taiwanese 
identity is also closely related to the deterioration of cross-Strait relations. June 1995 
happens to be a watershed point in the trend of national identity. As Figure 3-2 shows, the 
proportion of people who embraced a Chinese identity had exceeded the proportion of 
                                                 
33 For example, President Lee announced the “special state-to-state theory” in 1999; President Chen Shui-
bian said in 2002 that Taiwan and China are two separate countries located at each side of the Taiwan 
Strait, i.e. “one side, one country.” 
34 For instance, former chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Su Chi says that tensions in cross-
Strait relations obviously thawed in the first half of the 1990s but rose again after mid-1995, particularly 
after Lee’s visit to the U.S. See Su 2003: 28- 37. 
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people who embraced a Taiwanese identity until about June 1995. After that point, the 
amount of people who embraced a Taiwanese identity surpassed those who embraced a 
Chinese identity, and it has kept rising ever since.  
Third, the constitutional conference in July 1994 had already settled the issue of 
the presidential election system, even though the first direct presidential election, which 
marked the end of Taiwan’s democratic transition, was not set to be held until March 
1996. Therefore, by mid-1995, Lee’s democratic reforms were about complete.  
 
 
Table 3-1. Frequencies of Cooperative and Conflictual Days  
 Cooperation Conflict 












Taiwan 8.1% 6.6% * 3.2% 6.1% *** 
Taiwan to 
China 9.4% 8.0% * 4.9% 6.2% * 
Note: *** p<.001, * p< .05; one-tailed test 
 
 
Table 3-1 presents the (relative) frequencies of both cooperative and conflictual 
days that Taiwan initiated. The frequencies of China-initiated eventful days are listed in 
the table as well.35  
 
 
                                                 
35 I divide the number of cooperative (or conflictual) days in a period by the total days of the period to get 
the frequency of cooperative (or conflictual) actions in that period. 
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We learn from the results of the difference of proportions tests that all the 
differences between the two periods are statistically significant.36 Thus, Table 3-1 (as 
well as Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6) essentially shows that, in terms of frequency, both 
Taiwan and China initiated significantly more cooperative days and fewer conflictual 
days in the first period than in the second period.37 Concerning China’s actions toward 
Taiwan (CT), cooperative days decreased from 8.1% in the first period to 6.6% in the 
second period. Meanwhile, conflictual days increased from 3.2% in the first period to 
6.1% in the second period. Concerning Taiwan’s actions toward China (TC), cooperative 
days decreased from 9.4% in the first period to 8.0% in the second period, while 
conflictual days increased from 4.9% in the first period to 6.2% in the second period.  
These results indicate that, in general, Taiwan was launching conflicts at a 
significantly lower rate in the first period than in the second period; at the same time, it 
was initiating cooperation at a significantly higher rate in the first period than in the 
second period. In this sense, empirical evidence supports the expectation that Taiwan’s 
actions toward China during democratic transition were relatively more cooperative than 
during the post-transition period. 
In terms of the intensity of cooperation and conflict, however, my analysis does 
not indicate a clear difference between the two periods except in conflicts initiated by 
China toward Taiwan. 38  Table 3-2 compares the means of the daily scores for 
cooperation and conflict between the two periods for both Taiwan-initiated and China-
                                                 
36 The tests are conducted with STATA 8.0 by using “two-sample test of proportion.” 
37 Note that this is a day-based rather than event-based dataset. Therefore, if the net cooperation of one 
specific day is positive, the day will be regarded as a cooperative day. Similarly, if the day’s net 
cooperation is negative, then it will be a conflictual day. See chapter 2 for the definition of net cooperation. 
38 The “difference of means” tests are conducted with STATA 8.0 by using “two-sample t test with 
unequal variances.” 
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initiated actions.39 The results show that the mean scores remain virtually the same 
across the two periods except in conflicts China initiated against Taiwan. As expected, 
the intensity of China-initiated conflicts increased drastically, from a daily average of -
.13 in the first period to -.32 in the second period, and the difference is highly statistically 
significant. However, there is no significant change in China’s cooperative actions 
toward Taiwan. Nor is there significant change in Taiwan’s actions, cooperative or 
conflictual, toward China.  
 
 
Table 3-2. Daily Averages of the Intensity of Cooperation and Conflict 
 Cooperation Conflict 












Taiwan .21 .21  -.13 -.32 *** 
Taiwan to 
China .24 .25  -.20 -.20  
Note: *** p<.001; two-tailed test 
 
 
Thus, despite increasing intensity in China-initiated conflicts, Taiwan-initiated 
actions became less cooperative and more conflictual only in frequency but not in 
intensity. My explanation is that in their actions and reactions toward China’s 
increasingly intense threats, Taiwanese politicians mostly appealed or could only resort to 
low-intensity rhetoric. In other words, they talked the talk, but did not walk the walk. 
                                                 
39 I divide the sum of all daily scores in one period by the total number of days in that period to calculate 
the mean score of the period. The sum of daily scores in one period is the total of scores of all daily actions, 
regardless of cooperative or conflictual, in the period. 
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This fact can be understood from the development of Taiwan’s domestic politics after the 
mid-1990s, which was characterized by competitive elections and the rise of a Taiwanese 
national identity. 
Although national identity issues receded from Taiwan’s political landscape once 
socioeconomic justice emerged as a new political cleavage in 1992, they never really 
disappeared. Politicians turned their attention to national identity issues such as Taiwan’s 
international status when the reform agenda was settled in 1995. In particular, national 
elections (especially presidential elections) that were introduced by democratic reforms 
have provided an arena for politicians from rival political parties to compete with each 
other on these issues. It was against this backdrop that President Lee gradually switched 
his agenda to the redefinition of cross-Strait relations. His visit to the U.S. in June 1995 
was an example of such an attempt.  
Lee’s U.S. visit led to China’s missile tests against Taiwan in the summer of 
1995. But as Figure 3-2 shows, China’s overreaction also contributed to the continuing 
growth of Taiwanese identity. In turn, an escalating Taiwanese identity provided 
incentives for politicians to campaign on national identity issues in fierce electoral 
competitions, which only provoked even more intense conflictual actions from China. 
This vicious circle typically occurred when a presidential election was nearing. In other 
words, mounting Taiwanese identity became a structural force that led politicians toward 
campaigning against China. And, because several national elections were held during the 
second period, including three presidential elections (in 1996, 2000, and 2004), it was not 
surprising to see Taiwan-initiated conflictual actions become more frequent in that 
period. 
However, unlike China, whose conflictual actions against Taiwan often involved 
military threats, Taiwanese politicians’ actions against China tended to be mostly 
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rhetoric, for example, Lee Teng-hui’s “special state-to-state” theory and Chen Shui-
bian’s “one side, one country remark. Pressures from the U.S., threats from China, and 
Taiwan’s lack of capability may have prevented Taiwanese politicians from following up 
their rhetoric with more intense provocations. But rhetoric was often good enough for 
campaign purposes. 
The above discussion has brought our attention to the role of Taiwan’s domestic 
elections. In the next chapter I will discuss in more details how elections affect Taiwan’s 
actions toward China. 
CONCLUSION  
Two conclusions could be drawn from the above analysis. First, the state leader’s 
rational calculation is a significant factor in explaining the association between a 
country’s democratic transition and its foreign policy orientation during the transition. It 
is particularly so when each and every move of the country’s regime transition is 
managed by the leader himself.  
Mansfield and Snyder claim that democratizing states are likely to act 
belligerently in foreign policy, but just as some other cases have shown, Taiwan’s case 
also shows that the foreign policy of a democratizing country is likely to be peaceful. In 
this chapter I argue that President Lee Teng-hui’s rational calculation is the key to 
understanding why Taiwan’s China policy appeared generally peaceful during its 
democratic transition.  
As a new and inexperienced leader who was facing the breakdown of the KMT’s 
authoritarian regime, Lee not only had to extend the regime’s life but also his own 
political career. Therefore, when playing the two-level game of dealing with both 
domestic political reforms and the relationship with China, Lee chose the best option to 
help him survive, that is, concentrating on political reforms while maintaining the 
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direction of Chiang Ching-kuo’s China policy. Compared to changing the China policy, 
which would both endanger Lee’s career in his struggle with the mainlanders and lack 
public support, conducting political reforms by expanding electoral venues would not 
only undermine the mainlanders but also enjoyed significant public support. 
Consequently, as Lee launched his political reforms, a peaceful China policy that 
highlighted cross-Strait exchanges and the “One China” principle also emerged. In 
addition, the corruption issues that came as a result of Lee’s reforms happened to develop 
over national identity issues and consequently help to sustain the peaceful direction of 
Taiwan’s China policy for some time.  
Second, Taiwan’s democratic transition contributed to the conflictual China 
policy that appeared at the time when the transition was almost done. The empirical 
evidence in this chapter shows that from mid-1995 to 2004 Taiwan had initiated more 
conflicts and less cooperation than from 1990 to mid-1995 toward China. Therefore, 
some people who think Taiwan was still in the process of democratizing might argue that 
Mansfield and Snyder’s argument is still right in Taiwan’s case. But, I argue that the 
mechanism leading to the beginning of Taiwan’s conflictual China policy is different 
from what Mansfield and Snyder have mentioned.  
In their 2005 book Mansfield and Snyder argue that war is most likely a few years 
after the beginning of an incomplete transition from autocracy toward democracy. This is 
because the incomplete transition could easily lead to a mixed regime in which state 
institutions are weak and the fortunes of elites are uncertain. “Because state institutions 
are too weak to guarantee elites a soft landing, elites look to their own still-considerable 
resources to recruit mass allies and manipulate fragile democratic processes. They often 
do this by provoking nationalist sentiment, and an increased risk of international conflict 
is a common by-product.” (2005: 54) 
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Taiwan’s conflictual China policy did have something to do with Taiwanese 
nationalist sentiment, but its appearance was not because of elites’ sense of uncertainty 
about their political future. In the 1990s, the losers in Taiwan’s democratic transition, or 
the politicians who felt uncertain about their future because of losing power in the 
transition (i.e. those of KMT non-mainstream faction), were fully out of the game and 
lacked any stage to exercise political influences after Lee Teng-hui consolidated his 
power. Other elites’ sense of uncertainty had also been considerably reduced by two elite 
settlements: the 1990 National Affairs Conference and the 1996 National Development 
Conference. In these two extraconstitutional conclaves that were called by Lee, elites of 
different political parties respectively reached their consensus over domestic political 
reforms and Taiwan’s status versus mainland China (Higley, Huang, and Lin 1998: 149; 
Higley and Burton 2006: 97- 98). Particularly, with the consensus of resuming regular 
congressional elections, the National Affairs Conference helped strengthen the newly-
born democratic institutions. Consequently, there was not much sense of uncertainty 
among each camp of elites nor would there be any incentive for these elites to appeal to 
nationalism.  
Instead, the appearance of a conflictual China policy was the policy outcome of a 
fully democratic political system. Taiwan’s democratic transition had brought about the 
institutionalization of political competition between different political parties. When 
people’s Taiwanese national identity became stronger, the competition between these 
political parties was likely to encourage politicians to appeal to Taiwanese nationalism, 
which consequently contributed to the rise of a conflictual China policy. This was the 
result of mature democratic competition, not that of political impasse or weak 
institutions. This is similar to a mature democratic country which may still embark on an 
adventurous foreign policy, as long as that policy is made through the democratic 
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process. In my next chapter I will turn to the link between Taiwan’s domestic electoral 
competition and its China policy, and I will further elaborate my argument there. 
In sum, we should be cautious when applying Mansfield and Snyder’s argument 
to Taiwan’s case. It is true that after 1995 Taiwan’s policy toward China turned more 
conflictual, but this occurred in a different context from what Mansfield and Snyder have 
described. In particular, Taiwan’s conflictual China policy emerged at a time when the 
island’s democracy had already been in position, if still not fully-developed. The island’s 
democratic institutions, such as its electoral systems, were young but stable. The 
competitions between opposing camps of elites were severe, but these elites could still 
follow the fundamental democratic game rules in their struggles with each other40 and 
reach crucial agreements in the two elite settlements. As Higley and Burton say, elite 
settlements tend to signify the emergence of a stable representative regime and eventually 
liberal democracy (2006: 101). In other words, we can say that Taiwan was in fact 
continually stepping toward a fully-grown democracy. Thus, its conflictual policy against 
China occurred exactly after it almost finished the journey to democracy, not when it got 
stuck in a mixed regime during the transformation from authoritarianism. 
                                                 




The Impact of Elections on Taiwan’s Actions Toward China  
 
INTRODUCTION 
How a country’s elections affect its foreign policy is one of the major debates in 
international relations theory. Some studies show that politicians are likely to initiate or 
campaign for aggressive foreign policies when elections draw near. However, other 
research indicates that on the eve of elections candidates tend to take a conciliatory 
approach in handling their foreign policies. Since the 1980s, elections have turned into an 
important ingredient of Taiwanese politics. They contributed to the growth of the 
opposition movement and pushed toward the eventual democratic transition. After the 
completion of the transition, they also played an important part in the power alternation 
and thus the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy. So, as a democratic mechanism for 
domestic competition, what is the role that elections play in the making of Taiwan’s 
China policy?  
In this chapter I am going to discuss how elections have influenced Taiwanese 
politicians’ actions toward China. I argue that elections provide an arena for politicians to 
advertise different ideas in front of voters. Because national identity is a divisive political 
issue in Taiwan, Taiwanese politicians tend to campaign for national identity issues in 
elections. In particular, the explicit or implicit campaigns for Taiwan’s independence, 
which would provoke China by challenging its sovereignty claim over Taiwan, tended to 
appear when national elections neared. In this sense, elections were likely to encourage 
Taiwanese politicians to act confrontationally toward China. 
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I lay out an explanation to elaborate this argument. I claim that national identity 
first rose as a significant political issue in Taiwan in the early 1990s and then in the 
period after the mid-1990s. In the early 1990s, it was the opposition party, the DPP, who 
campaigned for the cause of Taiwan independence in national elections. These campaigns 
were more motivated by the opposition’s traditional anti-establishment policy of fighting 
against the KMT regime. The significance of national identity decreased after the 1991 
National Assembly election when socioeconomic justice issues surfaced as a new 
political cleavage in Taiwan. But the competition between the KMT and the DPP to 
improve Taiwan’s poor international status, along with China’s containment against these 
efforts, contributed to the rise of a Taiwanese identity around the mid-1990s. Since then, 
growing Taiwanese identity has driven both the KMT and the DPP to initiate electoral 
campaigns that stressed Taiwan’s independent status.  
By using the VRA (Virtual Research Associates, Inc.) events dataset, I conduct a 
VAR (vector autoregression) time-series analysis to support my argument that Taiwan’s 
actions toward China would turn conflictual when elections neared. In addition, to 
illustrate my explanation about how the political cleavage of national identity brought 
about politicians’ provocative campaigns, I will also explore some cases in details. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The next section reviews the studies 
that research the impact of elections on foreign policy. Then I explain why Taiwanese 
politicians campaigned on the issues that provoked China in national elections. The 
following two sections present the results of the VAR analysis and case studies, 
respectively. The last section is the conclusion. 
ELECTIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
Scholars have acknowledged the connection between a country’s elections and its 
foreign policy, but disagree on how elections influence the directions of foreign policy. 
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The democratic peace theory claims that democratic institutions can constrain state 
leaders’ intention of using force. Following this theory’s tradition, some scholars assert 
that a country’s domestic elections can contribute to the emergence of a peaceful foreign 
policy in the country. For instance, when explaining why democratic states are less likely 
to fight wars with each other, Lake (1992) says voting is one of the “voicing” means the 
society can apply to restrain the state. Gaubatz’s study on democratic countries’ 
involvement in wars from 1815 to 1980 concludes that “democratic states have entered 
more wars in the early stages of their electoral cycles and fewer wars in the later stages” 
(1991: 238). In a later work Gaubatz suggests again that elections tend to reduce state 
leaders’ incentives to engage in wars. He argues this is because elections open a political 
space in which the anti-war elite can air their views. Since running against these antiwar 
voices entails political risk and costs by disrupting the social unity that a country needs 
when going to wars, state leaders are likely to decline the option of fighting the wars and 
instead stay on a peaceful course (1999: 27, 78). 
On the other hand, some other studies point out that elections are associated with 
adventurous foreign policy or even wars. For example, Nincic’s research (1990) shows 
that, in terms of strategic spending, the number of arms control agreements and the 
frequency of holding summits, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was generally more 
hostile during presidential election years. He argues that this tendency can be explained 
by the political reward structure in which the American people tend to punish leaders 
who mistakenly underreacted to a Soviet threat rather than those who wrongly 
overreacted to that threat in presidential elections (p.374). In addition, because a U.S. 
president does not have to run for reelection in his second term, Nincic’s research also 
shows that U.S. presidents’ Soviet policy tended to look more cooperative in their second 
terms than in the first terms.  
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Similarly, Smith (1996; 1998b) asserts that because voters tend to keep competent 
leaders and remove incompetent ones, state leaders in democratic countries are likely to 
take a hawkish approach in their foreign policy to display their competence, especially 
when the government’s economic performance is poor or when they expect a close 
election. In another study, Smith claims that because not only hawkish voters but also 
dovish voters want to win wars, altogether they are likely to elect hawkish leaders who 
tend to fight longer and who are harder to defeat than dovish leaders. This electoral 
advantage for hawks can therefore encourage leaders to be as hawkish as possible (Smith 
1998a: 310).  
Although not necessarily related to elections, the insight of the scapegoat theory 
(or the diversionary theory of war) can also explain why politicians take assertive foreign 
policy positions when elections are imminent. This theory argues that state leaders are 
likely to start an external crisis or war to divert people’s attention from their domestic 
weakness, or in expectation of overcoming the domestic challenges or crises they 
encounter (Lebow 1981: 61-80; Blainey 1988: 72-74). This occurs because external 
crises can easily produce a “rally around the flag” effect that strengthens people’s support 
for state leaders during crises. Apparently, this effect is a strong incentive for politicians 
to drive their foreign policy toward a provocative course when running for elections. 
The above literature shows that although researchers disagree with each other on 
how elections influence foreign policy, they still share a common point of view, that is, 
voters’ preferences, or voters’ preferences that politicians perceive, are able to affect how 
politicians make their foreign policy. For example, Gaubatz mentions the elite’s anti-war 
voices can restrain politicians from going to war when elections are approaching; Nincic 
suggests that the political reward structure among American voters would lead to an 
aggressive policy toward the Soviet Union in a presidential election year; and Smith 
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claims voters’ inclination to keep competent leaders could be an incentive for candidates 
to take a hawkish foreign policy.  
In my opinion, voters’ preferences do constitute an important factor in shaping 
candidates’ foreign policies, evidenced by what occurred in Taiwan after the mid-1990s. 
However, voters’ preferences are not necessarily the only driving force. As Taiwan’s 
experience in the early 1990s shows, in a country that was going through transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy, the opposition movement’s attempt to bring down both 
the old regime and the national identity created by that regime could also play a role.  
ELECTIONS AND THE CLEAVAGE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY IN TAIWAN 
The clash between opposing national identities had been a major political 
cleavage in Taiwan. I argue that, as a structural factor, this political cleavage was closely 
associated with the fact that Taiwanese politicians tended to direct confrontational actions 
toward China during their electoral campaigns. 
In free elections, candidates can promote different political opinions in their own 
campaigns. Therefore, elections provide an institutional arena for politicians to sell 
different ideas to voters. Generally speaking, the various ideas promoted by different 
candidates tend to reflect the social or political cleavage of a society. For example, in a 
society that is divided into different classes, a candidate who represents labor interests is 
likely to campaign on an issue that is in conflict with the opinion of a candidate who 
defends the interests of business or land owners. In Taiwan, a dominant political cleavage 
has taken shape along the controversies of the national identity since the 1980s: as 
opposed to those who regard themselves as Chinese and argue for Taiwan’s unification 
with mainland China, some other people consider themselves as Taiwanese rather than 
Chinese and support for Taiwan’s independent statehood in international society. In other 
words, all the national identity controversies point to the core debate of Taiwan’s political 
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future, i.e. whether Taiwan should pursue its own independence or unification with 
mainland China. Therefore, elections in Taiwan have become a competing field for 
candidates to sell opposing views of national identity issues, particularly those of Taiwan 
independence. As China had always claimed sovereignty over Taiwan, campaigning for 
any Taiwan-independence opinions in Taiwan’s elections would be regarded as a 
challenge to China.  
In the last chapter I mention that national identity became a salient issue in 
Taiwanese politics for the first time around the early 1990s and then in the period after 
the mid-1990s. Without a doubt, the appearance of the Taiwan-independence rhetoric in 
elections was a main cause for the ascent of the issue. The question is, what was the 
mechanism that motivated Taiwanese politicians to promote Taiwan’s independence or 
similar issues in electoral campaigns? In my opinion, the mechanisms were somewhat 
different in the above two periods. Of course, the common goal of politicians during 
elections is gain power. But, depending on the circumstances, politicians can take 
different routes to reach this goal.  
In the early 1990s, it was the DPP who campaigned for Taiwan independence in 
elections. These campaigns were primarily motivated by the opposition’s traditional anti-
establishment stance that tried to bring down an authoritarian regime and the national 
identity that it created. Therefore, the promotion of a separate national identity in 
elections was aimed at rallying popular opinion against the KMT. In the period after the 
mid-1990s, both KMT and DPP politicians campaigned for ideas that stressed Taiwan’s 
independent status. As wining elections is winning power, they were motivated by 
competing for the votes of the growing population who embraced a Taiwanese identity. 
The political cleavage of national identity in modern Taiwanese politics is rooted 
in the period of the KMT’s authoritarian control. Since the time it moved to Taiwan, the 
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KMT regime not only had curtailed people’s political freedom and civil rights but also 
suppressed native Taiwanese’s self-identity by imposing the ideology of the “One China” 
principle upon people through the education system. Thus, the goal of the opposition 
movement, whose members were mostly native Taiwanese who were purged by the 
KMT, was to overthrow the KMT government and establish an independent country that 
is both democratic and sovereign on the island of Taiwan. Taiwan’s international 
isolation, which was caused by diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s, such as losing U.N. 
membership in 1971 and breaking official ties with the United States in 1979, had further 
strengthened the opposition’s belief that only when Taiwan became an independent and 
sovereign country would other countries in the world establish official ties with Taiwan 
again.  
As the first opposition party in Taiwan, since its incecption the DPP has inherited 
the dual goal of establishing a democratic and an independent country. Although these 
two goals were equally important in their minds, as I have mentioned in the last chapter, 
DPP members spent most of the time targeting democratic reform in the late 1980s and 
therefore helped President Lee Teng-hui consolidate his power through political reforms. 
It was only after they reached an agreement in the National Affairs Conference with Lee 
on political reform issues that the DPP turned to the issue of Taiwan’s independence in 
the early 1990s.41 In other words, when the DPP’s cause of democratic reforms was co-
opted by Lee, the opposition party had no other choice but to find a new battleground for 
their fight against the KMT. And, since Taiwan’s independence was the only goal left on 
their agenda, the DPP was able to secure the new battleground and switch their focus 
very quickly.  
                                                 
41 For details of the National Affairs Conference, see Higley, Huang, and Lin 1998. 
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It is undeniable that DPP politicians’ electoral campaigns for Taiwan 
independence during the early 1990s were aimed at expanding the party’s vote shares by 
mobilizing those voters who supported the cause of Taiwan’s independence. But I think 
their actions were also closely related to their attempt to reach the goal of Taiwan 
independence quickly and successfully. Just as elections became the main mobilization 
mechanism that the opposition utilized to exercise popular pressures on the KMT over 
the issues of democratic reform (Chu 1992: 48), by selling the idea of Taiwan 
independence in their election campaigns, the DPP turned elections into a mechanism 
that mobilized pressures on the KMT over the issue of Taiwan’s national identity.  
On the other hand, in the period after the mid-1990s, provocative campaigns were 
mainly driven by the rising Taiwanese identity among the electorate. The awakening of 
people’s Taiwanese consciousness began with the DPP’s “rejoin the U.N.” campaign in 
the early 1990s. Although the national identity issue receded from center stage in 
Taiwanese politics when the DPP’s explicit advocacy for Taiwan independence led to its 
defeat in the 1991 National Assembly election and when socioeconomic justice emerged 
as a new political cleavage, the DPP still continued to campaign on the platform of 
national identity but with a different appearance. Under the disguise of attempting to 
strengthen Taiwan’s international status, the DPP’s campaign for Taiwan’s U.N. 
membership received extensive support from the Taiwanese people. Therefore, this was a 
successful campaign for the DPP since it not only implicitly furthered its cause of Taiwan 
independence but also put pressure on the KMT by highlighting the weakest part of the 
KMT government’s performance, i.e. Taiwan’s poor international status.  
In the face of the DPP’s challenge and pressure, President Lee switched his 
agenda to Taiwan’s foreign relations after he settled the issues of political reform and 
secured his power base within his own party around the mid-1990s. He not only launched 
 67
the bid to join the U.N. but also paid several visits to Taiwan’s allies and non-allies. His 
diplomacy culminated in his trip to the U.S. in June 1995, which resulted in the cross-
Strait missile crises during that summer. But China’s attempt to contain President Lee’s 
diplomatic maneuvers, particularly its missile tests around Taiwan, also considerably 
increased the percentage of the people who embraced Taiwanese identity. In March 1996, 
China fired missiles near Taiwan again in an effort to prevent Lee from being elected in 
the first direct presidential election. However, this intimidation was not only in vain but 
also led again to growing Taiwanese identity. The mounting Taiwanese identity thus 
constituted an incentive for politicians, the KMT and the DPP alike, to campaign on the 
issues that could appease voters’ Taiwanese consciousness. Therefore, candidates were 
likely to direct conflictual rhetoric against China when elections were forthcoming. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM CASES  
In this section I discuss in detail how Taiwanese politicians employed the national 
identity issues to turn their electoral campaigns into conflictual actions toward China. As 
I have explained, the incentive mechanism for politicians in the early 1990s was 
somewhat different from that after the mid-1990s, so I will pick up my cases from both 










Table 4-1. Taiwan’s Elections (1990-2004) 
 Date Election(s) 
1991/12/21 National Assembly 
1992/12/19 Legislative Yuan 
1993/11/27 Local 
1994/12/3 Local 
1995/12/2 Legislative Yuan 
1996/3/23 Presidential / National Assembly
1997/11/29 Local 
1998/12/5 Legislative Yuan / Local 
2000/3/18 Presidential 
2001/12/1 Legislative Yuan / Local 
2002/12/7 Local 
2004/3/20 Presidential 
2004/12/11 Legislative Yuan 
Note: The 1994 local election was to elect the mayors 
of Taipei and Kaohsiung cities plus the Taiwan 
provincial governor. The 1998 and 2002 local elections 
were for the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung cities 
only.  
 
The 1991 National Assembly Election  
The promotion of Taiwan’s independence and Taiwan’s political democratization 
had been the ultimate mission of the opposition movement. Meanwhile, they were also 
the two guiding principles of the opposition’s campaign against the KMT regime. 
Therefore, when President Lee took over the DPP’s political reform issues in the National 
Affairs Conference in June 1990, the DPP began to switch their focus to the cause of 
Taiwan independence. This redirection of the DPP’s campaign against the KMT could be 
seen from the following events.42 
                                                 
42 See Kuan 1996: 68. 
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Shortly before the Legislative Yuan’s supplementary election in 1989, DPP 
chairman Huang Shin-jie clearly stated, “For the time being, talking about democracy 
and freedom is more important than talking about unification and independence for the 
DPP.” He also mentioned the opposition party’s strategy to win the upcoming election 
was to stress the fact that the DPP was more capable of bringing democracy and freedom 
to Taiwan than was the KMT.43 However, on October 7, 1990, just less than four months 
after the close of the National Affairs Conference, the DPP’s party congress passed a 
resolution which stated that Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty did not cover mainland China 
and the territory of Outer Mongolia. Obviously, this resolution was a direct challenge to 
the KMT’s “One China” policy which claimed sovereignty over both China and Outer 
Mongolia. Later in November of the same year, the DPP’s central standing committee set 
up a “Committee for the Campaign for Taiwan’s Independent Sovereignty” in order to 
fulfill their October resolution. In the same month, Chai Trong-Rong, a DPP member 
who just returned to Taiwan from exile in the U.S., also organized “the Association for 
the Promotion of Referendums” that aimed to decide Taiwan’s future through a 
referendum. On December 25, 1990, the DPP launched a demonstration for the cause of 
Taiwan independence, which attracted thousands of people to join. 
It is against this background that the DPP kept campaigning for Taiwan 
independence both explicitly and implicitly in 1991, the year that the Second National 
Assembly election was set to take place. On the one hand, they put their effort toward the 
issue of making a new constitution. This was a very provocative action in the eyes of 
both the KMT and Beijing because unlike constitutional amendments, constitution-
making was an implicit attempt to establish a new country. This effort started in May 
when the central standing committee of the DPP decided to promote a campaign for 
                                                 
43 United Daily News, November 15, 1989, p. 3. Emphasis is added. 
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creating a new constitution. In August, they carried on the endeavor by holding the 
“People’s Constitution-Making Conference” and passed the so-called “Constitution Draft 
for Taiwan” which argued for the change of Taiwan’s official title from “the Republic of 
China” to “the Republic of Taiwan.”44  
In the mean time, the DPP members also launched the “rejoin the United Nations” 
campaign, a movement that attempted to send Taiwan back to U.N. with complete 
sovereign status. For instance, Chai Trong-Rong organized two demonstrations 
demanding a referendum on the U.N. issue in Taipei and Kaohsiung and was joined by 
thousands of people. Then, in September 1991 DPP member Annette Lu organized a 
propaganda team to lobby the U.N. General Assembly for Taiwan’s U.N. membership in 
New York. On September 30, 1991, DPP Legislator Frank Hsieh and the KMT 
government’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs debated the U.N. issue on TV. 
The DPP’s crusade for Taiwan independence reached its peak in October, only 
two months before the election. During the party congress held on October 13, 1991, the 
DPP added a “Taiwan independence” article into its platform after brutal debates between 
different camps. The article clearly advocated for the establishment of an independent 
and sovereign “Republic of Taiwan”45 and thus challenged both the KMT’s and the 
CCP’s pledges for unification between Taiwan and China.  
It is true that one motivation behind the DPP’s campaign for independence-related 
issues was to mobilize the voters who supported Taiwan independence in order to 
maximize the votes they could catch in the 1991 election. For example, when mentioning 
the “Constitution Draft for Taiwan” that was passed in the “People’s Constitution-
Making Conference,” the director of the DPP policy center, Huang Huang-hsiung, said its 
                                                 
44 Ibid., August 25, 1991, p. 2. 
45 Ibid., October 14, 1991, p. 1. The DPP’s party platform was thus called “the Taiwan independence 
platform” thereafter. 
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major goal was to set down the party’s campaign theme for the upcoming National 
Assembly election.46 In addition, those DPP members who argued for the inclusion of 
“Taiwan independence” in the party’s platform also thought it helpful for the 
mobilization of DPP supporters.47  
Nevertheless, this motivation was shaped more by DPP elites’ missionary spirits 
toward promoting the cause of Taiwan independence, rather than by voters’ preferential 
structure which was unfavorable to the DPP. According to an island-wide survey that was 
conducted by National Taiwan University in the summer of 1990, when asked if they 
supported the separation of Taiwan from China, 39.4% of the respondents strongly 
disagreed, 23.1% disagreed, and 12.5% slightly disagreed. Only 1.5% of them strongly 
agreed, 2.7% agreed, and 4.3% slightly agreed (See Figure 4-1).48  
 
Figure 4-1. Voters’ Opinions about Taiwan’s Independence   
Do you think Taiwan should separate from China




























                                                 
46 Ibid., July 12, 1991, p. 4. 
47 Ibid., October 14, 1991, p. 3. 
48 The survey was conducted by the 306 Workshop of the Political Science Department at National 
Taiwan University. The frequency analysis is completed by the author. 
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In other words, public support for the DPP’s Taiwan independence cause was 
very low at the time. If the DPP decided to follow majority opinion, then they would have 
immediately stopped their promotion of Taiwan independence. But this did not look like 
an option for DPP leaders. For instance, DPP chairman Huang Shin-jie said that since the 
DPP had passed the “Constitution Draft for Taiwan” and put it as the party’s main theme 
of the electoral campaign, then it was also reasonable to list the “Republic of Taiwan” in 
the platform. He also thought that since the KMT had set up the “National Unification 
Council,” then it was not a big deal for the DPP’s platform to include the “Republic of 
Taiwan” because that was just a balance against the KMT.49 Chen Shui-bian, the future 
president and then a DPP legislator, argued that because Taiwan independence was not 
just a political opinion but also one of the critical options for the future of Taiwan’s 20 
million people, the DPP had to fight against the KMT for the freedom to express opinions 
regarding Taiwan’s future.50 
The 1996 and 2000 Presidential Elections 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, growing Taiwanese identity became a significant 
force that shaped politicians’ positions on national identity issues in elections. Although 
politicians did not clearly promote Taiwan independence any more, the rising Taiwanese 
identity had led them, KMT and DPP alike, to campaign with opinions that still implied 
Taiwan independence. 
The DPP’s showing in the 1991 National Assembly election turned out to be 
weak. As Table 4-2 shows, the DPP's vote share ascended from 22.22% in 1986 to 28.2% 
in 1989, but dropped to 23.94% in the 1991 election. Because the KMT won 71.17% of 
the votes in the 1991 election, a vote share that is significantly higher than what it got in 
                                                 
49 United Daily News, September 27, 1991, p. 2. 
50 Ibid., October 12, 1991, p. 2. 
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1989 (60.83%),51 the DPP’s shrinkage of 4.26% in its vote shares from 1989 to 1991 was 
regarded as a fiasco for the party. This defeat temporarily stopped the DPP’s advance in 
promoting Taiwan’s independence. Instead, the party switched its focus to attacking the 
KMT’s “money politics,” and as a result socioeconomic justice rose above national 
identity as a new political cleavage in Taiwan (Lin, Chu, and Hinich 1996).  
 
 
Table 4-2. DPP Vote Shares (%) 
Election Year vote share 
Legislative Yuan 1986 22.22 
Legislative Yuan 1989 28.2 
National Assembly 1991 23.94 
Legislative Yuan 1992 31.03 
Local  1993 41.03 
Legislative Yuan 1995 33.2 
Presidential  1996 21.13 
National Assembly 1996 29.9 
Local  1997 43.3 
Legislative Yuan 1998 29.6 
Presidential  2000 39.3 
Legislative Yuan 2001 33.4 
Local  2001 45.3 
Presidential  2004 50.11 
Legislative Yuan 2004 35.724 
Local  2005 41.95 
Sources: Chu, 1992; website of Election Study Center, National 
Chengchi University; United Daily News. 
 
                                                 
51 Ibid., December 22, 1991, p. 1. 
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Although the DPP failed in their explicit promotion of Taiwan independence, they 
were quite successful in the implicit attempt. Their “rejoin the U.N.” campaign was 
widely supported by the Taiwanese people. In a poll conducted by the United Daily News 
on September 18 and 19, 1991, 60.8% of all respondents and 65.8% of respondents who 
were KMT supporters agreed that Taiwan should rejoin the United Nations.52 This 
campaign not only awakened people’s Taiwanese identity by rallying their aspiration for 
Taiwan’s complete sovereign status, it also emphasized Taiwan’s international isolation, 
which occurred during the KMT’s rule. Consequently, it generated strong pressure 
against the KMT. 
President Lee Teng-hui responded to the DPP’s challenge by launching a wave of 
diplomatic endeavors, particularly after he removed the KMT’s non-mainstream faction 
in early 1993, and finished settling all major issues of political reform, including that of 
the presidential election system, in 1994. In April 1993 he declared a bid to rejoin the 
U.N. Then starting from 1994, he paid visits to several allies and non-allies. In 1994, he 
visited the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, South Africa, and 
Swaziland. In April 1995, he traveled to the United Arab Emirates and Jordan.53 Lee’s 
diplomatic venture culminated in his visit to the U.S. in June 1995, which was six months 
before the 1995 Legislative Yuan election and nine months prior to the first direct 
presidential election. There is no question that Lee’s diplomatic actions were aimed at 
soothing voters’ growing aspiration for Taiwan’s full international status.  
Lee’s U.S. tour was a critical point in the development of Taiwanese identity. 
China was irritated by the fact that Lee did not mention any word of “China” in his 
                                                 
52 The data were provided by the Office of Survey Research, Academia Sinica, Taipei. The results came 
from the author’s analysis of the data. 
53 See Su 2003: 36; Chang 2000: 115- 127. Lee’s first foreign visit was the trip to Singapore in 1989. 
From 1990 to 1993, the time he was preoccupied with domestic reforms and the consolidation of his power 
base, he did not travel abroad.  
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speech at Cornell University and thus criticized his U.S. trip as an act producing “two 
Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”54 In addition to launching a series of criticisms 
against Lee, China also postponed the second high-level administrative talks that were 
scheduled to take place soon thereafter. In July and August China fired missiles toward 
the waters near Taiwan. Then again in March 1996, China fired missiles trying to stop 
Lee’s victory in the presidential election. But from Figure 3-2 (in Chapter 3) it appears 
that after the missile crisis in the summer of 1995, the percentage of those who embraced 
a Taiwanese identity began to surpass that of those who embraced a Chinese identity. 
Apparently, by generating a “rally around the flag” effect among Taiwanese people, 
China’s intimidation had contributed to the rise of Taiwanese identity. 
As elections turned more and more competitive, the distribution of people’s 
national identities also became a factor that affected politicians’ positions on related 
issues. Particularly in presidential elections, which elect only one winner from a single 
district of the whole nation, candidates had to follow the preferences of the majority of 
the nation’s voters in order to maximize their votes. Figure 3-2 shows that the difference 
between the percentage of those with a Taiwanese identity and of those with a Chinese 
identity grew larger and larger after December 1996. Therefore, when the 2000 
presidential election was looming, it was not surprising to see politicians embracing the 
issues that echoed the rising Taiwanese identity. The most significant example is 
President Lee’s outspoken declaration of the “special state-to-sate theory” in July 1999, 
which was eight months before the election. On July 9, 1999, when interviewed by the 
delegation from the Deutsche Welle Radio, Lee declared:  
The 1991 constitutional amendments have placed cross-strait relations as a 
state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state relationship, 
rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate government and a 
                                                 
54 United Daily News, July 29, 1995, p. 10; June 12, p. 6. 
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renegade group, or between a central government and a local 
government.55  
At the time, with a presidential election just around the corner, when the 
percentage of those sharing the Taiwanese identity reached an all-time high and the 
percentage of those holding the Chinese identity an all-time low,56 Lee’s motivation to 
announce the “theory” was very likely aimed at boosting votes for KMT presidential 
candidate Lien Chan.57  
Concerning the issue of the Taiwan-China relationship, the Taiwanese identity 
that was shared by a significant portion of Taiwanese people also drove other presidential 
candidates to position themselves at the points that were close to Lee’s. For example, 
although DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian took the so-called “new middle-of-the-road 
approach” in his presidential campaign to dilute his image as a Taiwan independence 
supporter, he still argued that Taiwan and China were in “a special relationship between 
two states,” a similar wording to Lee’s “theory.” Another candidate, James Soong, who 
left the KMT to run as an independent candidate, considered both sides of the Strait in “a 
quasi interstate relationship,” which is still comparable to Lee’s “theory.”58  
The 2004 Presidential Election  
The year prior to the 2004 presidential election also witnessed politicians’ 
campaigns that were driven by people’s strong Taiwanese identity. The two most 
                                                 
55  Quoted from the website of Taiwan Security Research http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/SS-990709-
Deutsche-Welle-Interview.htm . 
56 As Figure 3-2 shows, 39.4% of the respondents had the Taiwanese identity but only 13.5% of them 
carried the Chinese identity in June 1999. 
57 Lee’s action might also have been motivated by other factors such as his sense of urgency about the 
issue of Taiwan’s international status. See Su 2003: 77; Zou 2001: 222. 
58 For Chen’s and Soong’s definitions of the Taiwan-China relationship, see United Daily News, February 
18, 2000, p. 3. 
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significant instances are President Chen Shui-bian’s announcement of promoting a new 
constitution, and his race with his opponents on the referendum issue. 
On September 28, 2003, five months before the 2004 presidential election, Chen 
claimed the DPP would promote the birth of a new constitution in 2006.59 This was a 
claim that strongly implied the pursuit of Taiwan’s independence because as I said 
earlier, a new constitution means the establishment of a new country. Thanks to the fact 
that in 2003 more than 40% of Taiwanese people embraced the Taiwanese identity, 
Chen’s campaign for a new constitution was effective. As Table 4-3 and Figure 4-2 show, 
after his announcement, Chen and his vice president Annette Lu were able to catch up 
with their opponents (the Pan Blue camp’s candidates, i.e. KMT chairman Lien Chan and 













































































































Source: United Daily News polls. 
                                                 
59 Ibid., September 29, 2003, p. A1. 
60 The Pan Blue camp was composed of the KMT and the PFP (People First Party) who shared the 









2003/4/18 44 27  
2003/8/6 42 31  
2003/9/14 46 32  
2003/10/1 43 28 Chen declared the plan about a new constitution (on 9/28). 
2003/10/16 42 36  
2003/11/10 42 38  
2003/11/18 41 34  
2003/11/28 42 34  
2003/12/8 40 39  
2003/12/11 45 39  
2003/12/24 41 38  
2004/1/4 44 38  
2004/1/15 42 35  
2004/1/28 40 37  
2004/2/4 40 36  
2004/2/11 41 37  
2004/2/14 41 35  
2004/2/18 42 36  
2004/2/21 40 35  
2004/2/25 40 37  
2004/2/29 38 35  
2004/3/7 41 38   







As a matter of fact, before Chen’s “new constitution” campaign, he had already 
initiated the campaign for holding referendums. With the fueling of people’s strong 
Taiwanese identity, this campaign contributed to the phenomenon of “racing to the 
referendum,”61 where both DPP and KMT presidential candidates competed against each 
other on the issue of referendum.  
Holding any referendum is also a provocative action in China’s eyes since any 
Taiwan-independence issue could be determined by a referendum too. But the occurrence 
of the following two events helped Chen find the referendum issue suitable for his 
reelection campaign. First, in the spring of 2003, former DPP chairman Lin Yi-hsiung, 
who was widely respected by DPP members and was an anti-nuclear activist, launched a 
campaign that asked President Chen to hold a referendum with regard to the construction 
project of Taiwan’s Fourth Nuclear Power Plant. Taking advantage of Lin’s pressures, 
Chen started to promote the legislation of the Referendum Law. Second, during the 
SARS epidemic crisis, China rudely stopped Taiwan’s attempt to officially participate in 
activities organized by the World Health Organization (WHO). Chen responded by 
arguing for holding a referendum about Taiwan’s entry into the WHO,62 which enabled 
him to continue his campaign on the referendum issue.  
Chen’s referendum campaign, including his effort on the Referendum Law’s 
legislation, was strongly opposed by the Pan Blue camp. The Pan Blue’s obstruction to 
Chen’s campaign included: first, in March 2003, their legislators blocked the DPP’s draft 
of the Referendum Law in the Legislative Yuan’s Internal Affairs Committee; then in 
                                                 
61 The term comes from Wu (2004). 
62 United Daily News, May 21, 2003, p. A2. 
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early June they killed the draft in the legislature’s floor session, which was not long after 
Chen’s declaration in May that he would hold a referendum to join the WHO.63 
An interesting twist occurred in the Pan Blue’s struggle with Chen when they 
agreed with the legislation of the Referendum Law in late June. This sudden change was 
pushed by concern that voters might withdraw their support from the camp if they 
believed the DPP’s accusation that the Pan Blue was opposing people’s political right to 
hold referendums.64 Therefore, Pan Blue leaders Lien Chan and James Soong announced 
their support not only for the legislation of Referendum Law but also the referendum on 
the project of the Fourth Nuclear Power Plant,65 although they claimed that they were 
against any referendum that would change Taiwan’s status quo.66 This change in Pan 
Blue attitude was just an overture in a bidding war between the Pan Blue camp and Chen. 
On October 23, the Pan Blue camp released their draft of the Referendum Law, in which 
any referendum about constitutional change was not allowed.67 Two days later, Chen 
Shui-bian responded by announcing his plan to hold a referendum on the making of a 
new constitution.68 On November 13, the Pan Blue returned fire when James Soong 
declared that his camp would wholeheartedly support the legislation of the Referendum 
Law and put no limits on the topics of referendums.69 On November 15, Lien Chan 
released his “trilogy of a new constitution,” in which he suggested the addition of an 
article to the constitution by mid 2004 to ensure people’s right to hold referendums about 
                                                 
63 For Chen’s announcement, see ibid., May 21, 2003, p. A2. 
64 Ibid., June 23, 2003, p. A2. 
65 Ibid., June 28, 2003, p. A3.  
66 Ibid., July 4, 2003, p. A1. 
67 Ibid., October 24, 2003, p. A2. 
68 Ibid., October 26, 2003, p. A3. 
69 Ibid., November 14, 2003, p. A2. 
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constitutional amendments. Lien’s “trilogy” also suggested that a referendum on a new 
constitution be held by early 2005.70 On November 27, the Referendum Law that 
approximates to the Pan Blue version was passed in the Legislative Yuan with the 
dominance of Pan Blue legislators, which was regarded as a defeat for the DPP. On 
November 29, Chen Shui-bian took his revenge. He announced that, in accordance with 
Article 17 of the Referendum Law, he would hold a referendum, on the same day as the 
upcoming presidential election, to defend the country’s sovereignty and security.71 This 
was the so-called “defensive referendum” that Chen proposed. 
As the culmination of his referendum campaign, Chen’s announcement on 
November 29 basically concluded his race with the Pan Blue on the issue. There is no 
doubt that both Chen and the Pan Blue might not have gone so far on the referendum 
issue without the strong Taiwanese identity that was shared among many people in 
Taiwan.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EVENT DATA 
In this section I will present empirical evidence from event data to show that 
Taiwanese politicians tended to engage in conflictual actions toward China when national 
elections approached. I conduct a VAR time-series analysis on the VRA events dataset to 
gauge the effects of elections on Taiwan’s actions toward China. As I show in the chapter 
of research methods and data, the VAR model includes two election variables that are 
measured by the number of days to the next election: one for presidential elections and 
the other for parliamentary elections (i.e. the Legislative Yuan election and the National 
                                                 
70 Ibid., November 16, 2003, p. A1. 
71 Article 17 of the Referendum Law says, with the Executive Yuan’s resolution, the president can hold a 
referendum on national security issues when any external threat is able to interfere with the country’s 
sovereignty. Chen argued Taiwan’s sovereignty could be changed at any time because the external threat it 
faced was in the “present progressive tense.” See ibid., November 30, 2003, p. A1. 
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Assembly election). In addition, for the same reason that I mentioned in the last chapter, I 
also divide the sample of the dataset into two periods (the first period from January 1, 
1990 to June 30, 1995 and the second from July 1, 1995 to December 31, 2004) to 
observe the impacts of elections. 
I present the full set of results of the VAR time-series analysis in Appendix C. For 
the purpose of this chapter’s analysis, I summarize the results about impact of elections in 
Table 4-4. The effects of elections on Taiwan’s actions toward China and China’s actions 




Table 4-4. Estimates of Election Variables in the VAR Model 
    Dep. Variable 
Ind. Var. China’s actions toward Taiwan Taiwan’s actions toward China 








































































































presidential election CT  
Note: The unit of China’s actions toward Taiwan (CT) is a cooperation (or conflict) score of 1.0; the unit 








































































presidential election TC  
Note: The unit of Taiwan’s actions toward China (TC) is a cooperation (or conflict) score of 1.0; the unit 
of presidential election is 100 days. 
 
 
First, at first glance the effect of presidential elections seems to be significant on 
China’s actions toward Taiwan in the first period because the coefficient (-0.000114) is 
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significant at the 0.10 level. But since no popular presidential election was held in 
Taiwan during that period, this effect does not come from presidential elections per se. 
Instead, we can treat the variable of presidential elections as a downward time trend 
throughout the first period. This time trend is shown in both Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4.72 
The negative sign of the coefficient means that during the first period, the earlier the 
time, the more conflictual China’s actions toward Taiwan would be; but as time went by, 
China’s actions toward Taiwan became more and more cooperative. Then, the coefficient 
-0.000114 means when the end of the first period was one more day away, China’s 
actions toward Taiwan would decrease in cooperation score by 0.000114 (or increase 
conflict score by 0.000114). In other words, when the first period’s end was one day 
closer, China’s actions toward Taiwan would increase the cooperation score by 0.000114. 
This effect of the downward time trend is sensible because during the first period of time 
China’s policy toward Taiwan was generally moving in a more and more cooperative 
direction. Particularly, as days went by, China engaged in more dialogues with Taiwan 
and exercised more conciliatory policies that attempted to encourage the expansion of 
Taiwan’s exchanges with the mainland. But as we all know, this effect was disrupted 
when China reacted to President Lee’s U.S. tour with violent missile tests against Taiwan 
in the summer of 1995. 
Second, the effect of presidential elections was not significant on Taiwan’s 
actions toward China (the coefficient is 0.000073) during the first period. This is a 
reasonable result because Taiwan held no popular presidential election during this period. 
The insignificant coefficient also suggests the effect of the downward time trend was not 
substantial either. This does not mean Taiwan initiated no cooperative actions toward 
China as time went by. Instead, it indicates that while Taiwan still maintained 
                                                 
72 Figure 4-3 to Figure 4-6 are based on the data that are used for the VAR time-series analysis. 
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cooperative actions toward China, its conflictual actions toward China also appeared 
more and more frequently since 1993, such as the U.N. bid and other diplomatic actions. 
In addition, Taiwan’s criticism of China over the 1994 Thousand Island (or Qiandao) 
Lake Incident also constituted a significant part of these conflictual actions.73 
Third, during the second period, presidential elections had a significant effect on 
China’s actions toward Taiwan. The coefficient (0.000224) is significant at the level of 
0.05. Its positive sign means when presidential elections were further away, China’s 
actions toward Taiwan were more cooperative or friendly. The other side of this meaning 
is that China’s actions toward Taiwan turned more unfriendly as a presidential election 
neared in Taiwan. In this sense, the coefficient 0.000224 means that when a presidential 
election was one more day away, China would increase its cooperation score of 0.000224 
in its actions toward Taiwan. In other words, as a presidential election was one day 
closer, China would reduce a cooperation score of 0.000224 in its actions against Taiwan. 
Fourth, during the second period the effect of presidential elections was also 
significant on Taiwan’s actions toward China. The coefficient (0.000145) is significant at 
the level of 0.05. Similarly, this positive coefficient means when a presidential election 
was one more day away, the cooperation score of Taiwan’s actions toward China would 
increase 0.000145. Specifically, as a presidential election was one day closer, a 
cooperation score decrease of 0.000145 would occur in Taiwan’s actions toward China. 
This means that when a presidential election was nearing, Taiwan’s actions toward China 
would turn less and less cooperative, or more and more conflictual.  
Fifth, the effect of parliamentary elections was not significant on China’s actions 
toward Taiwan during both the first period (the coefficient is 0.000076) and the second 
                                                 
73 On March 31, 1994, 24 Taiwanese passengers were killed on a ferryboat in the Thousand Island Lake in 
China. In the following months, the Taiwan government strongly criticized China’s poor management of 
the incident. 
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period (the coefficient is -0.000083) [See Figure 4-5 for the effect of parliamentary 
elections on China’s actions toward Taiwan].74 
 
 




































































parliamentary election CT  
Note: The unit of China’s actions toward Taiwan (CT) is a cooperation (or conflict) score of 1.0; the unit 
of parliamentary election is 100 days. 
 
 
Sixth, the effect of parliamentary elections was significant on Taiwan’s actions 
toward China during the first period since the coefficient (0.000461) is significant at the 
level of 0.001. This means when a Legislative Yuan election or a National Assembly 
election was one more day away, the cooperation score of Taiwan’s actions toward China 
would increase by 0.000461. Or, conversely, as a parliamentary election was one day 
closer, the cooperation score of Taiwan’s actions toward China would decrease by 
0.000461.  
                                                 
74 Figure 4-5 shows that, unlike the case of presidential elections, during which China tended to act 
belligerently toward Taiwan prior to elections (see Figure 4-3), China’s conflictual actions toward Taiwan 
were generally less frequent and less intense shortly before parliamentary elections. This also shows that 
China cared about the election of Taiwan’s leader more than that of parliamentary members. 
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Seventh, during the second period the effect of parliamentary elections were 
insignificant on Taiwan’s actions toward China (the coefficient is 0.000121) [See Figure 
4-6 for the effect of parliamentary elections on Taiwan’s actions toward China]. 
 
 




































































parliamentary election TC  
Note: The unit of Taiwan’s actions toward China (TC) is a cooperation (or conflict) score of 1.0; the unit 
of parliamentary election is 100 days. 
 
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the above findings. First, the approaching of 
Taiwan’s popular presidential elections switched China’s actions toward Taiwan onto a 
conflictual track. One can argue that Taiwan’s elections would have nothing to do with 
China. But because a presidential election was the election to select Taiwan’s ultimate 
leader who had the final say on Taiwan’s China policy, China wanted to warn the 
Taiwanese people against electing a candidate who might promote Taiwan’s 
independence. This is why China’s conflictual actions against Taiwan usually occurred 
on the eve of Taiwan’s presidential elections but rarely before parliamentary elections. 
The most notable instance is the Chinese missile test in March 1996. Figure 4-3 indicates 
that the intensity of China’s conflictual actions against Taiwan was strongest in March 
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1996. As I mentioned earlier, China’s intent was to stop the election of Lee Teng-hui, 
whose diplomatic actions were regarded by China as the pursuit of Taiwan’s independent 
statehood. Another example is China’s verbal warnings before the 2000 presidential 
election. In February 2000, China issued a white paper that mentioned the conditions for 
using force against Taiwan. Then China’s prime minister, Zhu Rongji, held a press 
conference in March 2000 to harshly warn against Taiwan-independence. This wave of 
verbal intimidation was believed to be aimed at preventing the victory of the long-time 
Taiwan-independence supporter Chen Shui-bian. 
Second, and more importantly, the findings also support my argument that 
Taiwan’s actions against China became more conflictual when national elections were 
looming. Apparently, the fact that politicians tended to campaign for Taiwan 
independence or other similar issues in national elections had contributed to the 
occurrence of Taiwan’s conflictual actions toward China before the elections. During the 
first period, such an effect of elections appeared when parliamentary elections 
approached since the National Assembly election and the Legislative Yuan election were 
the most important elections at the time. As I have discussed in the case studies, the 
DPP’s campaign for Taiwan independence in the 1991 National Assembly election is the 
most notable instance. 
As for the second period, the results of the VAR analysis show that only 
presidential elections significantly affected Taiwan’s actions toward China. This means 
presidential elections had replaced parliamentary elections as the major elections in 
which Taiwanese politicians would launch aggressive campaigns. As I mentioned earlier, 
the prominent examples showing the effect of presidential elections include President Lee 
Teng-hui’s U.S. tour before the 1996 presidential election, his “state-to-state theory” 
announcement before the 2000 presidential election, and President Chen Shui-bian’s 
 89
promotion of the issues of referendum and a new constitution prior to the 2004 
presidential election. Considering the effects of presidential elections on both Taiwan’s 
actions toward China and China’s actions toward Taiwan, it is fair to conclude that once 
the direct presidential election was initiated in 1996, presidential elections turned out to 
be the primary occasions when politicians appealed to rising Taiwanese identity in order 
to maximize their electoral support. Consequently, the interactions between Taiwan and 
China had also been subjected to new dynamics that were dominated by Taiwan’s 
presidential elections.  
Lastly, I want to discuss the relationship between the rising Taiwanese identity 
and elections from the perspective of model-specification. I have mentioned that the rise 
of Taiwanese identity was a driving force for politicians’ provocative electoral campaigns 
in the second period. But the reason I do not include a variable of Taiwanese identity in 
the VAR model is because the rise and fall of Taiwanese identity per se could hardly 
affect Taiwan’s actions toward China and China’s actions toward Taiwan. Instead, the 
effects of Taiwanese identity were mainly manifested through elections. More 
specifically, in order to win elections, politicians tended to advocate for the issues that 
echoed rising Taiwanese identity in elections; but they rarely promoted such issues when 
elections were still far away, even though the portion of the people who identified 
themselves as Taiwanese might also be high. Therefore, compared with the rise of 
people’s Taiwanese identity, elections would have a more direct influence on Taiwan’s 
actions toward China and thus China’s actions toward Taiwan.  
CONCLUSION 
Scholars share divergent views with respect to the impact of elections on 
politicians’ foreign policy stances. In this chapter I revisit the debate by examining 
Taiwan’s experiences. I argue that due to the conflict over national identity issues, the 
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actions that Taiwanese politicians directed toward China would turn conflictual as 
elections neared. Both the results of case studies and the VAR time-series analysis 
support my argument. 
I conclude the following three points from the discussion in this chapter. First, 
Taiwan’s case indicates that candidates’ tendency to campaign for aggressive foreign 
policies can be rooted in a structural factor, that is, the conflicting national identities that 
are shared by different groups of elites and people. Because elections serve as a forum for 
politicians to advertise different ideas, they can also become an occasion to promote a 
separate national identity or any foreign policy that is based on that identity. Therefore, it 
would not be uncommon to see conflictual foreign policies emerge in elections. 
Second, the incentive mechanism that leads to aggressive campaigns could 
change according to different circumstances. For the DPP in the early 1990s, when 
Taiwan’s authoritarian regime was still powerful, their campaigns were motivated by the 
goal of tearing down the KMT and its Chinese identity. Although without wide support 
from the people, the opposition party still advertised Taiwan independence in elections in 
the hope of building a Taiwanese identity in voters’ minds. At the time, elections were a 
means for the DPP to promote their opinions and persuade voters. More importantly, they 
also served as the means the DPP utilized to rally popular pressures against the KMT. 
But, after the mid-1990s, the provocative campaigns were usually driven by the 
competition for ballots. As the portion of the voters who had a Taiwanese identity grew, 
both the KMT and the DPP launched electoral campaigns that emphasized Taiwan’s 
independent status to compete for the ballots of these voters. 
Third, as I mentioned in the last chapter, after the mid-1990s Taiwan’s conflictual 
actions toward China were driven by the democratic competition between different 
political parties, not the failing transition from authoritarianism to democracy. When the 
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process of Taiwan’s democratic transition unfolded, the idea that elections were the only 
mechanism of political competition also took its root in politicians’ minds. Consequently, 
political parties shared the consensus that maximizing votes to win elections was the only 
way for them to acquire the power. Therefore, when more and more voters considered 
themselves Taiwanese and looked forward to Taiwan’s full international status, most 
candidates launched corresponding campaigns in order to attract these voters. As a result, 
politicians’ actions toward China would become conflictual close to elections. This was 
an outcome brought about by the success of Taiwan’s democratization, not its failure.  
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Chapter 5   
Cross-Strait Economic Exchanges and Taiwan’s Actions Toward China 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cross-Strait economic exchanges, which include indirect trade between Taiwan 
and China and Taiwanese investment in China,75 have constituted one major facet of the 
development of cross-Strait relations since 1987. Because these economic activities are 
occurring between two arch rivals, their effects on cross-Strait political relations are thus 
worth examining.  
Scholars share various opinions about the effects of economic interdependence on 
interstate conflict. In this chapter I investigate whether or not cross-Strait economic 
exchanges exercised any influence on Taiwan’s conflictual actions toward China. My 
argument is that although cross-Strait commerce had created pacifying potential, it still 
did not succeed in restraining Taiwan from directing aggressive actions toward China. To 
elaborate this argument, I offer an explanation that focuses on the clash between 
politicians’ interests and businessmen’s interests. This explanation assumes that Taiwan’s 
leaders seek to maximize their political interests (i.e. winning elections or staying in 
power), while the Taiwanese businessmen who involve themselves in cross-Strait 
commercial activities pursue the expansion of their commercial interests. It also assumes 
that the policy preferences of the leaders and the businessmen would be those that 
maximize their respective interests. Thus, a conflict of interests would occur when 
                                                 
75 For the reason of national security, Taiwan’s government does not allow direct trade between Taiwan 
and China. Consequently, trade activities across the Strait are conducted through Hong Kong. Any direct 
Chinese investment in Taiwan is not allowed by the Taiwan government either.  
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launching aggressive actions toward China could increase the leaders’ chance of winning 
elections, while keeping a peaceful China policy could secure the businessmen’s 
commercial prospects.  
Nonetheless, because of some specific conditions, the leaders’ preference for 
taking conflictual actions toward China can still override the businessmen’s fondness for 
a friendly China policy. In President Lee Teng-hui’s case, it was his strong-man status 
that insulated him from businessmen’s influences. In President Chen Shui-bian’s case, it 
was DPP party activists’ potential for expanding his electoral support that reinforced his 
inattention to businessmen’s policy preferences. 
To support my argument that cross-Strait commerce exercised no significant 
effect on containing Taiwan’s conflictual actions toward China, I will present the results 
of the VAR time-series analysis as evidence. 
In the following, I will begin by reviewing a few studies which research the 
effects of interdependence on interstate conflict. The next section describes the 
development of cross-Strait economic exchanges, which is followed by my explanation 
regarding why cross-Strait commerce was inefficient in stopping Taiwan’s conflictual 
actions toward China. Then, to show that the businessmen who were involved in cross-
Strait economic exchanges were an implicit pacifying power, I am going to lay out the 
preferences they shared with regard to Taiwan’s China policy. In the section that follows, 
I will elaborate my explanation that I presented earlier. Then I discuss the results of the 
VAR analysis. The last section is the conclusion. 
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTERSTATE CONFLICT 
Whether or not interstate economic interactions bring about peace is a hotly 
debated question among scholars. For example, the tradition of commercial liberalism 
claims that economic exchanges can lead to peace and cooperation because trade will 
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produce interdependence among states, and interdependence will create shared interests 
that make the use of force a costly option for solving disputes (Polachek 1980; Oneal and 
Russett 1997, 1999). Other scholars assert that economic interdependence can send costly 
signals to demonstrate the resolve of states. Since these costly signals could reveal states’ 
intensions, they would reduce uncertainty and therefore the probability of fighting 
between states (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; Gartzke and Li 2003).  
Contrary to this view, some people disagree that interstate economic 
interdependence can lead to peace. For example, Gowa and Mansfield (1993) argue that 
trade with an adversary produces a security diseconomy and thus cannot promote peace 
between rival states. Barbieri (1996) argues that it is not interdependence itself that 
determines the impact on interstate relations, but some characteristic of the type of 
interdependence present in the relationship, such as contiguity and joint democracy.   
Taiwan-China relations are an interesting case to test against these different views 
because military conflict has never occurred between the two countries since they 
established close economic ties. In addition, the cross-Strait détente in the early 1990s 
seemed to be accompanied by the growth of such interdependence. However, it is 
undeniable that, particularly after the mid-1990s, some non-military disputes and tensions 
still arose between Taiwan and China even though cross-Strait economic exchanges 
continued to grow steadily. In this chapter I attempt to explain why cross-Strait 
commerce failed to stop Taiwan’s conflictual actions toward China even though it had 
the potential to do so.76  
                                                 
76 Occurrence of wars tends to be the dependent variable in most studies of the literature (Mansfield and 
Pollins 2003: 16). Unlike those studies, this analysis discusses the effects of interdependence on various 
non-military conflicts rather than on wars or military disputes. This is because there has been no military 
dispute across the Taiwan Strait since the mid-1960s.  
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The only work mentioning the connection between cross-Strait commerce and 
cross-Strait peace/conflict is Tung’s work (2002). This study spends some time 
describing how Taiwanese businessmen reacted to both Beijing and Taipei after the 1995 
and 1996 missile crises, but it still lacks a systematic explanation on how cross-Strait 
economic activities are linked to the peace and conflict between Taiwan and China. This 
chapter thus tries to contribute to this under-explored subject by studying the impact (or 
lack thereof) of cross-Strait economic interdependence on Taiwan’s actions toward 
China. I will start by reviewing the development of cross-Strait economic exchanges.  
GROWING CROSS-STRAIT ECONOMIC EXCHANGES  
Among all cross-Strait economic activities, indirect trade occurred at an earlier 
time than Taiwanese investment in China. Taiwan loosened the restrictions on its indirect 
trade with China in 1984 (Mainland Affairs Council 1997: 171), but greater liberalization 
appeared in the late 1980s when the Taiwan government lifted the ban on visiting China. 
Since then, the amount of indirect trade has grown steadily. For example, Table 5-1 and 
Table 5-2 (Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2 as well) show that in the period between 1989 and 
2004 an apparent surging trend occurred in the amount of importation from China to 
Taiwan as well as that of exportation from Taiwan to China (although this trend is much 
less obvious in the figures from Hong Kong’s customs). According to Taiwan’s customs, 
imports from China were only 597.5 million US dollars in 1991, but by 2004 this number 
had become 16.7 billion US dollars. As for the amount of exports to China, this was only 
1.1 million US dollars in 1992, but rose to 34.05 billion US dollars in 2004.77  
                                                 
77 The reason the data varies between the customs figures of Hong Kong, Taiwan and China might be 
caused by the fact that the indirect trade between Taiwan and China via Hong Kong is conducted several 
different ways. Sometimes goods are shipped into the Hong Kong port and customs before being 
transferred, other times they are transferred onto other cargo vessels in the Hong Kong sea area without 
entering into the Hong Kong port and customs. Still other times, goods are exported from Taiwan to Hong 
Kong and then transferred to surface transportation to China so that Hong Kong’s customs can only have 




Table 5-1. Amount of Importation from Mainland China to Taiwan 
(Unit: Million US$) 
Period Imports H Imports T Imports C Imports M 
1989 586.9 － － 586.9 
1990 765.4 － 319.7 765.4 
1991 1,126.0 597.5 594.8 1,125.9 
1992 1,119.0 747.1 698.0 1,119.0 
1993 1,103.6 1,015.5 1,461.8 1,103.6 
1994 1,292.3 1,858.7 2,242.2 1,858.7 
1995 1,574.2 3,091.4 3,098.1 3,091.4 
1996 1,582.4 3,059.8 2,802.7 3,059.8 
1997 1,743.8 3,915.4 3,396.5 3,915.4 
1998 1,654.9 4,110.5 3,869.6 4,110.5 
1999 1,628.1 4,522.2 3,951.7 4,522.2 
2000 1,980.5 6,223.3 4,994.9 6,223.3 
2001 1,693.3 5,902.2 5,000.2 5,902.2 
2002 1,708.1 7,947.7 6,585.9 7,947.7 
2003 2,161.1 10,960.5 9,004.7 10,962.0 
2004 2,485.4 16,681.6 13,545.2 16,678.7 
Source: Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, February 2005, No. 148. 
Note: H means the data is from Hong Kong's customs, T from Taiwan's, C from 
China's, and M from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council. *Imports T and Imports M 










Table 5-2. Amount of Exportation from Taiwan to Mainland China  
(Unit: Million US$) 
Period Exports H Exports T Exports C Exports M 
1989 2,896.5 － － 3,331.9 
1990 3,278.3 － 2,255.0 4,394.6 
1991 4,667.2 － 3,639.0 7,493.5 
1992 6,287.9 1.1 5,881.0 10,547.6 
1993 7,585.4 16.2 12,933.1 13,993.1 
1994 8,517.2 131.6 14,084.8 16,022.5 
1995 9,882.8 376.6 14,783.9 19,433.8 
1996 9,717.6 623.4 16,182.2 20,727.3 
1997 9,715.1 626.5 16,441.7 22,455.2 
1998 8,364.1 834.7 16,629.6 19,840.9 
1999 8,174.9 2,536.9 19,537.5 21,312.5 
2000 9,593.1 4,217.5 25,497.1 25,009.9 
2001 8,811.5 4,745.4 27,339.4 21,945.7 
2002 10,311.8 9,945.0 38,063.1 29,465.0 
2003 11,789.4 21,417.3 49,362.3 35,357.7 
2004 14,761.9 34,046.7 64,778.6 44,960.4 
Source: Cross-Strait Economic Statistics Monthly, February 2005, No. 148. 
Note: H means the data is from Hong Kong's customs, T from Taiwan's, C from 










Figure 5-1. Amount of Importation from Mainland China to Taiwan 
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Figure 5-2. Amount of Exportation from Taiwan to Mainland China  
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On the other hand, the Taiwanese capital investment in China has also expanded 
in a zigzag way since the early 1990s. China started to move toward a market economy 
after Deng Xiaoping launched the historical economic reforms in the late 1970s. Directed 
by Deng’s guidelines of “reform and openness,” China took substantial measures to 
attract foreign capital from all over the world into its burgeoning market economy, 
including from Taiwan. In July 1988, China’s State Council launched a policy to 
encourage investment from Taiwanese businessmen, but Taiwan’s ban on mainland 
investment was not removed until October 1990 (Mainland Affairs Council 1997: 173). 
After that, as the official data from both Taiwan and China in Table 5-3 and Figure 5-3 
show, the amount of Taiwanese investment increased between 1991 and 2004, although 
with some ups and downs in the 1990s. For example, according to Taiwan’s official 
records, the amount was 174.16 million US dollars in 1991 and 6.9 billion US dollars in 
2004. China’s data show that this number is 2.8 billion US dollars in 1991 and 9.3 billion 
US dollars in 2004.78 
One notable fact regarding cross-Strait economic activities is the close link 
between indirect trade and Taiwanese investment in China. As Tung says, Taiwan-
invested enterprises in mainland China play a major role in importing materials, 
machinery, parts, semi-manufactured goods and capital goods from Taiwan. “In the mid-
1990s, around one-third to two-thirds of Taiwan’s exports to China were driven by these 
Taiwan-invested enterprises (2003: 6).” Therefore, the growth of indirect trade across the 
Strait is partly reinforced by Taiwanese businessmen’s investment in the mainland. 
 
                                                 
78 Both Taiwan’s and China’s official data show a general escalation in the amount of Taiwan’s 
investment in China. But it should be pointed out that the figures from Taiwan’s data on mainland 
investment are in fact substantially underestimated and consequently lower than those from China’s. This is 
because many Taiwanese businessmen conduct their investment without the Taiwan government’s 




Table 5-3. Taiwan’s Investment in China (Unit: Million US$) 
Period 
Amount Approved by 
Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Taiwan 
Contracted Amount from 
China's Official Data  
1991 174.16 2,783.00 
1992 246.99 5,543.00 
1993 3,168.42 9,965.00 
1994 962.21 5,395.00 
1995 1,092.71 5,777.00 
1996 1,229.24 5,141.00 
1997 4,334.31 2,814.00 
1998 2,034.62 2,982.00 
1999 1,252.78 3,374.44 
2000 2,607.14 4,041.89 
2001 2,784.15 6,914.19 
2002 6,723.06 6,740.84 
2003 7,698.78 8,557.87 
2004 6,940.66 9,305.94 




































































Amount Approved by Taiwan Ammount in China's data
Source: Same as Table 5-3. 
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The above introduction shows that cross-Strait economic exchanges have been 
growing since the late 1980s. This raises the question of whether or not the conflictual 
level in Taiwan’s actions toward China has also decreased accordingly. I will discuss this 
question in the following section. 
POLITICAL INTERESTS VS. COMMERCIAL INTERESTS 
Although the Taiwan government would sometimes slow down the pace of the 
island’s economic exchanges with mainland China, cross-Strait commerce has hardly 
been the source of cross-Strait tensions when compared with Taiwan’s national identity 
issues. On the one hand, no dispute about trade or mainland investment issues ever 
occurred between Taiwan and China after cross-Strait exchanges were initiated. On the 
other hand, the two countries have never argued about the distribution of economic gains 
either.79  
But, cross-Strait economic exchanges have exercised little effect in containing 
Taiwan’s conflictual actions toward China as well. Even though the amount of Taiwan’s 
trade with China and mainland investment continued to grow after the mid-1990s, as I 
mentioned in Chapter 3, during the period from July 1, 1995 to December 31, 2004 
Taiwan’s conflictual actions toward China in fact occurred at a more frequent rate than 
those in the period from January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1995. Following Mansfield and 
Pollins’ (2001: 843) suggestion that “[m]ore attention needs to be focused on exactly how 
interdependence interacts with domestic institutions, leaders’ preferences, and the 
interests of societal actors to influence interstate violence,” I argue that the failure of 
cross-Strait commerce to restrain Taiwan’s aggressive behaviors is associated with the 
                                                 
79 As Mansfield and Pollins (2003: 3) mention, some scholars claim that the distribution of the gains from 
trade can increase the probability of conflict by shifting interstate power relations. 
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fact that the political interests of Taiwan’s presidents had always overwhelmed the 
commercial interests of businessmen who rely mainly on cross-Strait trade or mainland 
investment for profits. 
Economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait considerably affect the commercial 
interests of a group of actors, that is, the Taiwanese businessmen who involve themselves 
in the exchanges. Thus, in addition to politicians, the Taiwanese business community is 
also an important actor this analysis should pay attention to.  
Both politicians and businessmen have their own interests. These interests, in 
turn, determine their preferences about a specific policy. In Taiwan, the president is the 
ultimate decision maker in the creation of Taiwan’s China policy. His goal is to 
maximize his own political interests, i.e. staying in power or winning elections. 
Therefore, the best China policy option for him would be the one that would best serve 
this goal. Taiwanese businessmen, on the other hand, are participants in the market of 
cross-Strait commerce. Their shared goal is to maximize the commercial interests they 
can catch in the market. Therefore, their preferences about Taiwan’s China policy would 
be those that could secure their commercial interests, such as greater liberalization of 
cross-Strait economic exchanges or any political actions that would not disturb the 
market. In other words, they prefer that Taiwan’s China policy remain friendly or 
peaceful. 
Apparently, the fact that Taiwan’s conflictual behaviors toward China appeared 
more and more frequently means these businessmen’ preferences for a peaceful China 
policy had failed to prevail. Why?  
I argue that one important factor is the president’s concerns about his political 
interests. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, when national elections became a regular 
competition between political parties in Taiwan and when the Taiwanese identity grew 
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stronger among the electorate, the desire to win elections (particularly presidential 
elections) would drive politicians to campaign on the issues that highlighted Taiwan’s 
independent status. In other words, in order to maximize their political interests, i.e. 
maximizing the probability of winning elections, Taiwanese politicians were inclined to 
take actions that were at odds with the business community’s policy preferences.  
The president’s autonomy plays a role here. Both President Lee Teng-hui and 
President Chen Shui-bian had built a close relationship with the business community 
when they were both weak at the early stage of their presidency. But eventually both of 
them could still take conflictual actions toward China without caring about 
businessmen’s preferences. For Lee, he was able to insulate himself from businessmen’s 
influences later when he consolidated his power within the KMT and reached the strong-
man status around 1993. Therefore, when he decided to launch aggressive campaigns 
against China, businessmen’s preferences were never his concern. As for Chen, the fact 
that he was relatively weak all the time eventually forced him to switch his alliance 
partner from the business community to those who could build up his electoral support, 
i.e. the DPP party activists who support Taiwan’s independence.80 So, businessmen’s 
preference for a peaceful China policy was ignored as a result.  
Before I elaborate why the Taiwanese business community did not succeed in 
stopping politicians’ aggressive actions toward China, I will explain the reason why these 
businessmen would constitute a pacifying power. 
BUSINESS COMMUNITY’S POLICY PREFERENCES  
I argue that one key to understanding the effect of cross-Strait economic 
exchanges is the business community which is involved in the commercial activities 
                                                 
80 As I will discuss later, Lin (2005: 25) points out the specific role that party activists play in candidates’ 
position-taking in Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election. 
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between Taiwan and China. Economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait do generate 
the potential to restrain Taiwan’s confrontational actions toward China. This potential is 
created through the economic interests that have been produced by cross-Strait economic 
interactions. More specifically, the growth of cross-Strait economic interdependence has 
fostered a group of Taiwanese businessmen who make their profits from the commercial 
activities between Taiwan and China. As the interests of this group of businessmen rest 
not only on the greater liberalization of cross-Strait economic exchanges but also a 
peaceful relationship between Taiwan and China, the China policy options that these 
businessmen preferred were essentially friendly or peaceful ones, that is, the expansion of 
Taiwan’s economic ties with China and the continuation of peace across the Taiwan 
Strait.  
Winners of Cross-Strait Commerce 
Businesses go wherever they can make money. One major incentive that drives 
Taiwanese businessmen into cross-Strait commercial activities comes from the cheap cost 
of labor, raw materials, and land in China, as well as the Chinese government’s low 
standards of environmental protection. Particularly when the rising prices of the above 
factors and the awakening consciousness of environmental protection are causing the 
costs of production continue to grow in Taiwan, trading with or investing in China has 
appeared to be a much more advantageous option for businessmen. Hence, businessmen 
are the winners in the liberalization of cross-Strait economic exchanges. 
The literature of international political economy has told us that both winners and 
losers in the internationalization of trade and investment will always pursue opposite 
policies to safeguard their respective interests (Gourevitch 1977, 1986; Rogowski 1987; 
Milner 1987, 1988; Frieden 1991; Shafer 1994; Trubowitz 1992, 1998). In Taiwan, 
because the losers in cross-Strait commerce are mainly a minority group of resourceless 
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low-skilled workers who were unemployed after their bosses shut down factories and 
moved capital and machinery to mainland China, the voices as well as potential 
influences of the winners, who are resourceful business owners, always overwhelmed 
those of the losers. These winners are generally composed of the owners of small and 
medium-sized enterprises and those of big businesses. Although these two groups of 
owners are different in terms of the scale of their businesses, they share the following two 
major expectations or policy preferences with regard to cross-Strait economic exchanges. 
Preference for Greater Liberalization of Cross-Strait Commerce 
The Taiwanese business community’s first policy preference is the faster and 
greater liberalization of cross-Strait exchanges, especially Taiwan government’s 
permission for more mainland investment projects and exportation/importation items as 
well as direct transportation links across the Strait.81  
Businessmen have consistently demanded the Taiwan government remove its 
restrictions on cross-Strait commercial activities. For example, as early as 1991, the 
Council for Industrial and Commercial Development R.O.C., a chamber of commerce 
whose members include owners of major enterprises in Taiwan, released a statement that 
advised the government to acknowledge the inevitable trend of cross-Strait commerce 
because they thought Taiwan was too small to become a market with economy of scale.82 
Later on, after President Lee Teng-hui announced the “no hast, be patient” policy in 
September 1996 to limit mainland investment, the business community continued to 
                                                 
81 Under the regulation of Statutes Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the 
Mainland Area, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs divides businessmen’s mainland investment 
projects into those on the permitted list, the prohibited list, and special cases. In terms of exportation and 
importation of goods, the Ministry initially also made a “positive list” of those that could be traded between 
Taiwan and China and banned those that were not on the list.  
82 According to the statement, other countries’ experiences show that a market needs a population of 70 
million people to achieve its economy of scale, but Taiwan has only 20 million people. See Economic 
Daily. News, December 8, 1991, p. 5. 
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request the removal of governmental controls. For example, Wang Yung-ching, the 
president of the Formosa Plastics Group, Taiwan’s leading business in the plastics and 
petrochemical industries, said that Taiwan could never exclude itself from the Chinese 
market. He criticized any interference with cross-Strait commerce by the Taiwan 
government, saying it would only stop Taiwan from reaping opportunities in China.83  
For the business community, another major concern with respect to cross-Strait 
exchanges is the direct links between Taiwan and China. Direct transportation of goods 
and people is not allowed by the Taiwan government. Consequently, Taiwanese 
businessmen have to pay extra costs in both time and money to travel and to ship goods 
between Taiwan and China via a third country or area, which in most cases is Hong 
Kong. According to an official assessment (Executive Yuan 2003: 5), the opening of 
direct sea transportation could save around 820 million NT dollars (about 25.63 million 
US dollars) in shipping costs per year and would cut shipping times in half. In addition, 
the opening of direct air transportation could save around 13.2 billion NT dollars (about 
412.5 million US dollars) for cross-Strait travelers and cut a total of 8.6 million hours of 
travel time per year. Meanwhile, direct air transportation also saves around 810 million 
NT dollars (about 25.3 million US dollars) in shipping goods across the Strait. In 
addition, for individual businesses, direct sea and air links would reduce their shipping 
costs by around 15 to 30%.  
As a result, since the mid-1990s the Taiwanese business community has 
consistently demanded their government lift the ban on direct transportation links. For 
example, surveys in both 1996 and 1998 show that the opening of direct links is one of 
the policy priorities that many Taiwan-invested enterprises in mainland China would 
                                                 
83 Ibid., October 16, 1997, p. 3.  
 107
suggest the Taiwan government undertake. 84  In 2001, in their meetings with 
governmental officials, some businessmen from central, southern, and eastern Taiwan 
also asked the government to lift the ban on cross-Strait direct transportation.85 Big 
enterprises expected the government to open direct links too. For example, Chang Jung-
fa, the owner of the Evergreen Marine Corp and Eva Airways Corp and a famous 
Taiwanese business leader, said in October 1997 that the government should speed up the 
opening of direct transportation.86 Another business leader, Formosa Group’s Wang 
Yung-ching, also said in 2002 that Taiwan needed to open up cross-Strait direct links. 
“Without direct links, Taiwan will get disadvantaged in all respects,” he concluded.87  
Preference for Peace 
Taiwanese businessmen’s second expectation or policy preference is for peace in 
cross-Strait relations. Military conflicts are the greatest threat to commercial activities 
because they not only disrupt international trade and raise the transaction costs but also 
speed up capital outflows and stop inflows. Therefore, the thing that worries Taiwanese 
businessmen the most is any crisis occurring that might escalate into a cross-Strait war. 
The two series of Chinese missile tests against Taiwan in the mid-1990s illustrate the 
negative impact of cross-Strait tensions on Taiwanese businessmen.  
                                                 
84 The surveys are conducted by the Chinese National Federation of Industries, a major industrial business 
association in Taiwan, on sampled Taiwan-invested enterprises in mainland China. For the 1996 survey 
results, see United Daily News, February 27, p. 9. For the 1998 results, see the website of the Chinese 
National Federation of Industries (http://www.cnfi.org.tw/cnfi/ml9807.htm). 
85 The purpose of these meetings was to survey the opinions of local businessmen before the Economic 
Development Advisory Conference was held in August, 2001. Economic Daily News, August 6, 2001, p. 2. 
86 According to one high-ranking official of the Evergreen Group, Chang said this because he saw many 
Taiwanese customers of Evergreen Marine and Eva Airway wasting their time and money to ship or travel 
through a third area. Ibid., October 16, 1997, p. 3.   
87 Ibid., May 17, 2002, p. 1. 
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Right after the July/August 1995 missile crisis, many Taiwanese businessmen in 
Chinese coastal areas complained that the missile tests had caused not only the loss of 
many contracts but also many local workers who tried to escape from the possible cross-
Strait military conflict.88 Similar harm to Taiwanese businesses again occurred when the 
missile tests were resumed in March 1996. For example, according to the president of 
Beijing’s Taiwanese Businessmen’s Association, many factories in Taiwan were forced 
to stop their operation because the supply of raw materials from China to Taiwan was 
interrupted by the missile tests. As a result, the operation of Taiwanese factories in China 
was also affected since no semi-manufactured goods could be exported from Taiwan to 
China either.89 In addition, because costal regions were mostly threatened by the missile 
tests, Taiwan-invested enterprises in these regions suffered large losses as many of their 
foreign customers canceled or postponed their orders from these enterprises.90 
Since cross-Strait tensions are harmful to their business, the Taiwanese business 
community shares the common expectation that cross-Strait relations should be kept 
peaceful, and that Taiwan should make an effort to take friendly rather than provocative 
actions toward China. For example, in 1992 some owners of Taiwan-invested enterprises 
were worried about the cross-Strait tensions caused by the fact that a few Taiwanese 
politicians were campaigning under a “one China, one Taiwan” slogan, that suggests 
Taiwan-independence, in the legislative election.91  
                                                 
88 The officials from Taiwanese Businessmen’s Associations from different Chinese cities made these 
complaints when meeting with the officials from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council in 
Beijing on September 1, 1995. See Tung, 2002: 14. 
89 Ibid., p. 16. 
90 Ibid., p. 17. 
91 One businessman said that they always needed a stable political environment to reduce the risks of 
investment. Another said he would oppose “one China, one Taiwan” if it means Taiwan-independence 
because that would only cause tensions across the Strait and make mainland investments impossible. 
Another mentioned that the rising opinion of Taiwan-independence would just deepen China’s suspicion 
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After China’s 1995 missile tests, the president of the Taiwanese Businessmen’s 
Association in Guangdong Province’s Dongguan said that all Taiwanese businessmen 
hoped both Taiwan and China could resolve their disputes peacefully, while the president 
of Shantou’s Taiwanese Businessmen’s Association (which is also in Guangdong 
Province) said the two countries should stop provoking each other and instead develop a 
peaceful relationship.92  In the spring of 1996, a survey by the Chinese National 
Federation of Industries (which is a major industrial business association in Taiwan) 
showed that many Taiwan-invested enterprises hoped the talks between Taiwan and 
China could be resumed so that their interests would be secured by the healthy 
development of cross-Strait relations.93 At about the same time, in a meeting with 
Taiwan’s mainland affairs officials, some Taiwanese businessmen suggested that Taiwan 
should be calm, rational, and avoid any verbal provocation of China. 94  In sum, 
Taiwanese businessmen wished that Taiwan’s behaviors toward China would be friendly 
and peaceful in general.  
INEFFECTIVENESS OF BUSINESSMEN’S INFLUENCES 
Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, these businessmen’ preferences for a friendly 
or peaceful China policy did not prevail, particularly after the mid-1990s. This means the 
business community was ineffective in realizing their pacifying power. Several factors 
can explain why this happened. For example, Taiwanese businessmen are generally 
inactive on specific cross-Strait political issues (such as those of unification vs. 
                                                                                                                                                 
about Taiwan, which was not what businessmen liked to see. These businessmen’s opinions are from 
United Daily News, October 16, 1992, p. 10. 
92 Ibid., September 29, 1995, p. 10. 
93 Ibid., February 27, 1996, p. 9. 
94 For example, the officials of Zhangzhou’s (in Fujian Province) and Guangzhou’s (in Guangdong 
Province) Taiwanese Businessmen’s Associations both said that the Taiwanese leader should not irritate 
China. Ibid., February 28, 1996, p. 2. 
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independence)95  because their primary concern is commercial interests rather than 
politics and because they attempt to keep a good relationship with different political 
forces (so that their commercial interests would be secured no matter which political 
party is in power) by avoiding any possible offense against politicians.96 In addition, 
businessmen also lack official access to participate in the making of China policy, 
particularly purely political policies.97 Furthermore, although Taiwanese businessmen 
were usually outspoken on cross-Strait economic policy and able to express their relevant 
preferences through several channels, 98  including business leaders’ personal 
                                                 
95 However, there are a few exceptions. One notable example is Shi Wen-lung, the boss of a leading 
petrochemical firm Chi Mei. Shi is widely known for his position of supporting Taiwan-independence. See 
China Times, March 11, 2000, (page unknown).  
96 The following examples show that business interests, not politics, are the foremost concerns for 
Taiwanese businessmen. First, as the pro-independence slogan “one China, one Taiwan” appeared on the 
eve of the 1992 legislative election, a mainland-based Taiwanese businessman complained that “Doing 
business is the most important thing in businessmen’s everyday life, but politicians tend to repeatedly 
discuss those political questions that have no immediate answers.” See United Daily News, October 16, 
1992, p. 10. Likewise, after Lee Teng-hui announced his “special state-to-state theory” in July 1999, a local 
Taiwanese businessman criticized that “Business is the only thing that businessmen care about. … [Lee’s] 
action is actually nonsense. It is really hard for businessmen to imagine what politicians are thinking of in 
their heads.” Ibid., July 14, 1999, p.2. Another example is, when Chen Shui-bian uttered his “one side, one 
country” statement in August 2002, the president of Shantou’s (in Guangdong province) Taiwanese 
Businessmen’s Association responded that “Most Taiwanese businessmen do not understand what ‘one 
side, one country’ really means. For these businessmen, taking good care of their business is their priority. 
As for politics, they think it is better for them not to touch upon it.” See Economic Daily News, August 6, 
2002, p. 5.  
97 Since the period of the 1950s, the making of political policy toward China has been essentially an issue 
of national security and usually controlled exclusively by the president himself, sometimes with his close 
advisors. This tradition was carried on for decades, into the 1990s and even the early 2000s. For example, 
Lee Teng-hui’s “special state-to-state theory” was based on the results of a research conducted by his 
national security advisory team, while the choice of the time he made this announcement was completely 
his own decision. See Zou 2001: 222- 230. In the same way, Chen Shui-bian’s “four No’s” commitment in 
May 2000 were the results of several rounds of his private discussions, or more precisely, negotiations, 
with American Institute in Taiwan’s (AIT) Taipei Director Raymond Burghardt. The purpose of AIT’s 
discussions with Chen on the “four No’s” was to stabilize cross-Strait relations after Chen was elected 
president in March 2000. See China Times, March 22, 2006, p. A5; June 10, 2006, p. A2. 
98 For instance, as the backbone of the mainland-based Taiwanese business community, owners of small 
and medium-sized enterprises can discuss specific cross-Strait economic issues with the officials of the 
Taiwan government on many occasions, such as informal meetings held by the Mainland Affairs Council. 
They can also express their opinions through the presidents of their mainland-based Taiwanese 
Businessmen’s Associations since these presidents usually serve as their representatives. They can even 
voice through the leaders of major chambers of commerce in Taiwan, such as the Chinese National 
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communication with the president,99 their wish to liberalize cross-Strait commerce was 
always offset by the Taiwan government’s concerns about national security as well as 
economic security.100 
But, in my opinion, the most important factor came from politicians’ intention to 
maximize their political interests. Just like businessmen’s goal is to increase business 
interests, politicians seek to maximize their interests too, that is, to win elections or to 
stay in power. This desire subsequently decides their policy positions or preferences. As I 
have shown in Chapter 4, the institutionalization of electoral competition (especially 
presidential elections) had made winning elections an ultimate goal for Taiwanese 
politicians. Thus, when more and more voters shared a Taiwanese identity after the mid-
1990s, and when presidential elections became the most important political competition 
in Taiwan, taking aggressive actions toward China would then be the president’s (or 
presidential candidates’) best option to maximize the votes and win the elections. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Federation of Industries, the General Chamber of Commerce of the R.O.C., and the National Association of 
Small and Medium Enterprises R.O.C., as these leaders usually play an advisory role in the government’s 
economic policy-making and keep good personal relationship with high-ranking officials and even the 
president. 
99 For owners of big business groups, since they are usually regarded as the leaders of Taiwan’s business 
sector, it is not uncommon to see them talk to the presidents personally. For instance, in November 2000 
the head of Formosa Plastics Group Wang Yung-ching, along with three other big-business owners, visited 
Chen Shui-bian in the president’s mansion to hold a private discussion with the president on cross-Strait 
economic issues, including cross-Strait direct links and former president Lee’s “no haste, be patient” 
policy. See United Daily News, November 26, 2000, p. 1. 
100 National security has always been the Taiwan government’s major concern because China never 
eradicates its hostility toward Taiwan. For example, in the beginning of the 1990s, Taiwan’s intelligence 
showed that China was trying to “besiege the politics [in Taiwan] through the business and force the 
[Taiwan] government through the people.” See Economic Daily News, August 4, 1990, p. 2. Sometimes 
this strategy is mentioned together with “advance the unification through direct links.” Ibid., October 8, 
1991, p. 1. Later on, a triad strategy of “blockading Taiwan diplomatically, checking Taiwan militarily, and 
dragging along Taiwan economically” took shape as the general guidelines of China’s Taiwan policy. This 
strategy was clearly mentioned by Chinese deputy prime minister Qian Qichen in 1993. See Chu 1994: 11. 
Moreover, when the scale of cross-Strait commercial activities turned larger and larger, Taipei’s worries 
about national security were more specifically reflected in its concerns regarding Taiwan’s economic 
security, such as the increasing dependence of Taiwan’s export on the mainland, domestic capital shortages 
and job losses in Taiwan, and the “hollowing out” of Taiwan’s industrial structure that might be caused by 
the growing mainland investment. See Dent 2001: 3; Bolt 2001: 97; Tung 2003: 137; Deng 2000: 971. 
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However, neither the president’s policy preferences nor the businessmen’s could 
necessarily become a policy in the end. So, what made the president’s China policy 
preferences override the business community’s eventually?  
The business community was once a close ally for both Lee and Chen at the time 
when the two presidents were weak. Consequently there used to be a chance that 
businessmen’s preferences could affect the presidents’ making of China policies. 
However, with the support of different conditions, both Lee and Chen were able to keep 
themselves autonomous from businessmen’s influences. I argue that, in Lee Teng-hui’s 
case, it was the status as Taiwan’s one-and-only strong leader (which he reached after 
1993) that provided him the privilege of making decisions independently. In Chen Shui-
bian’s case, it was the DPP party activists’ capability to expand his electoral support that 
strengthened his adherence to directing aggressive actions toward China. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, due to the challenges from the mainlanders, Lee 
Teng-hui was weak in the KMT shortly after taking power. Thus, he reached out to the 
business community to build a coalition. Lee not only built a close relationship with 
businessmen at a personal level but also incorporated members of the business 
community into the KMT.101 Even so, Lee was able to ignore businessmen’s preferences 
about cross-Strait issues soon after he consolidated his power within the ruling KMT and 
became the only strong man in early 1993. Lee’s strong-man status was shown in several 
aspects. First, he enjoyed a high-level of support from the people in Taiwan. For 
                                                 
101 Lee was regarded as the first R.O.C. president who frequently met with businessmen, either on dining 
tables or golf courses. See United Daily News, February 13, 1991, p. 3. As for his political coalition with 
businessmen, the composition of KMT’s party leadership is a good example. When the KMT’s 13th party 
congress was held in 1988, the year Lee succeeded to the presidency and KMT chairmanship, only 55 out 
of all 1,200 Party Representatives were businessmen. At the same time, six of the Central Committee 
members were from the business community. In the KMT’s 14th party congress that was held in 1993, the 
time shortly after Hao Pei-tsun resigned from the premiership and Lee just consolidated his power within 
the KMT, among all 2,100 Party Representatives 187 of them came from the business community, a much 
higher ratio than that in 1988. In addition, 15 of the Central Committee members were businessmen, also a 
record-high number (Chang 1999: 69). 
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example, Lee’s approval ratings stayed at a relatively high level since 1993. According to 
the polls of United Daily News, Lee’s ratings were between 70% and 83% in the period 
from early 1993 to May 1996. The lowest point he ever reached was 39% in December 
1997, which was caused by the KMT’s defeat in the 1997 local election and due to 
several shocking crimes uncovered that year. From July 1998 to May 1999, his ratings 
climbed back to a relatively high level from 54% to 66%. In May 2000, the month he 
stepped down, the rating was 74%.102  
Second, as Ho and Leng (2004: 737) mention, in March 1996 Lee was elected 
president in Taiwan’s first popular presidential election with a 54% share of the total 
votes and thus gained a high degree of legitimacy. In addition, Lee’s ruling KMT party 
also held an overwhelming majority in the Legislative Yuan. Furthermore, many 
members of the opposition party, the DPP, were in fact implicit supporters of Lee. 
Consequently, even if Taiwan had almost finished the process of democratic transition at 
the time, Lee actually would have still enjoyed the strong-man position that Chiang Kai-
shek and Chiang Ching-kuo had during the authoritarian period. Without a doubt, this 
strong-man status also granted Lee a commanding position in the making of cross-Strait 
policies. Therefore, when Lee took aggressive actions toward China to impress voters 
with his image of defending Taiwan’s independent status, he would never have to worry 
about the businessmen’s negative responses to these actions; neither would he be 
concerned about losing their support. Although it was possible that businessmen would 
complain about Lee’s aggressive policy in private, they could hardly criticize Lee in 
public since that would only annoy Lee and thus endanger their own interests. 
                                                 
102 See United Daily News, May 19, 1996, p. 2; December 1, 1997, p. 2; July 6, 1998, p. 4; May 20, 1999, 
p. 3; and May 16, 2000, p. 8. 
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Different from Lee’s case, Chen Shui-bian’s weakness as the president resulted 
mainly from the following two facts. First, Chen was elected president in March 2000 
with just 39.3% of the popular vote. Although 39.3% is about the same level as the DPP’s 
general electoral support, it nonetheless reflected the fact that Chen and his party were 
still unable to win wide support from the voters. That is, Chen did not enjoy the high 
degree of legitimacy that Lee Teng-hui earned in the 1996 presidential election. Second, 
Chen’s DPP was a minority party in the Legislative Yuan when Chen won the 
presidential election. Of the total 225 seats in the Legislative Yuan, the DPP only held 70 
of them, while the KMT held a majority with 123 seats.103 Even though shortly after the 
2000 presidential election a small group of KMT members left the KMT and joined the 
newly-formed PFP (People First Party), the DPP was still outnumbered in the Legislative 
Yuan by the KMT plus the PFP, the so-called Pan Blue coalition that shares similar 
ideologies. Although the DPP became the largest party in the Legislative Yuan in the 
2001 legislative election, its 87 seats were still much less than the total of the KMT’s 68 
seats and the PFP’s 46 seats.104 In other words, Chen’s party was still a minority one vis-
à-vis the Pan Blue coalition in Taiwan’s parliament. 
Just like what Lee Teng-hui did, with the weakness that his presidency and his 
party encountered at the onset of his first presidential term, Chen also made a significant 
effort to build up a strong constituency among the business community.105 Chen’s 
                                                 
103 These numbers are the results of the 1998 legislative election, the last one before Chen won the 2000 
presidential election. Ibid., December 6, 1998, p. 1.   
104 A total of 225 seats were determined in the election. The results are from ibid., December 2, 2001, p. 1. 
105 For example, Chen started to call on Taiwan’s major businesses and chambers of commerce right after 
he was elected president. In addition, to strengthen his connection with business groups, Chen frequently 
invited owners of big businesses to the presidential mansion for dinner after he came to power. These 
business groups included those from traditional industries, financial sectors, and electronic sectors. Chen 
did not do this for no reason because these business owners were Chen’s or the DPP’s financial supporters 
and it is said that each of them tended to contribute more than 20 million NT dollars to the DPP in major 
elections. Chen’s relationship with businessmen went even further. For instance, he invited some business 
leaders to join his “advisory team for national affairs” in the 2000 election and continued to consult with 
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difference was that he never reached the strong-man status as Lee did. Chen could hardly 
implement his domestic policies because his party never became the majority party in the 
Legislative Yuan. In addition, Chen’s approval ratings were relatively low most of the 
time. According to polls conducted by the United Daily News, his ratings were above 
75% one month after he took over the presidency (i.e. in June 2000), and mostly above 
60% in July and August 2000. But they started to plunge to lower than 50% and even 
below 40% in October 2000 and then fluctuated somewhere between 47% and 36% most 
of the time from November 2000 to September 2003 (except for March and May 2002 
when his ratings were respectively 61% and 58%).  
Chen was aware that his low approval ratings were harmful to his reelection. In 
particular, as Table 4-3 of Chapter 4 shows, the support he and his vice president 
received from voters was much lower than their opponents before October 2003. So, as 
the 2004 presidential election was approaching, Chen’s only concern was how to boost 
his electoral support so that he could secure victory in the election. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 4, eventually he aggressively campaigned for the issues of referendum and a new 
constitution in order to appease the strong Taiwanese identity that was shared by an 
increasing portion of the voters. 
It was possible that Chen’s aggressive campaigns could weaken businessmen’s 
support for him since these campaigns would inevitably cause cross-Strait tensions that 
were against the interests and preferences of the business community. But obviously the 
desire to win reelection still drove him to launch those campaigns. In addition to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
them after he was sworn in as the president. These business leaders include Shi Wen-lung, the boss of a 
leading petrochemical firm Chi Mei, and Evergreen Group’s Chang Jung-fa, Acer Group’s chairman Stan 
Shih, and the president of Continental Engineering Corporation Nita Ing. Chen also appointed three 
bankers who were close to him to join the Central Bank’s Board of Directors, so that they could get 
involved in the making of the country’s money policy. See respectively Economic Daily News, May 25, 
2000, p. 4; China Times, June 19, 2006, p. A4; United Daily News, March 11, 2000, p. 1; and China Times, 
June 19, 2006, p. A4.  
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incentive that aggressive campaigns were likely to win the votes of those who shared a 
Taiwanese identity, there was another factor that persuaded Chen to get engaged in the 
campaigns: the DPP’s diehard followers, or party activists, who traditionally support 
Taiwan’s independence. As Table 5-4 and Figure 5-4 shows, Taiwan-independence 
supporters are usually the largest portion of DPP voters. We can tell from Table 5-4 that, 
except for the 2001 legislative election,106 the percentage of those who support Taiwan-
independence among DPP voters is at least around 40% in all national elections. If we 
exclude the 2004 legislative election as well, this percentage is over 45%. Moreover, 
except for the 2001 and 2004 legislative elections, the percentage of this group of voters 
tends to be higher than the percentages of those who support unification or the status quo. 
 
 
Table 5-4. DPP Voters’ Positions on Unification vs. Independence (%) 
Election Unification Status quo Independence 
1992 legislative* 31.86 23.04 45.1 
1995 legislative 10.37 40.66 48.97 
1996 presidential 4.06 32.43 63.52 
1998 legislative 9.9 45.05 45.05 
2000 presidential 13.57 40.7 45.73 
2001 legislative 16.63 52.33 31.04 
2004 presidential 8.29 42.75 48.97 
2004 legislative 10.49 49.65 39.86 
* The option in addition to unification and independence is “does not matter.”  
Sources: The datasets of 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections are from surveys conducted by 
the 306 Workshop at National Taiwan University. Those of 1996 and 2000 elections are 
from surveys conducted by Soochow University. The others are TEDS (Taiwan’s 
Election and Democratization Study) datasets (the 2004 legislative dataset is based on 
Questionnaire A).  
 
                                                 
106 The lower percentage in the 2001 legislative election (as well as the 2004 legislative election) might be 
caused by the fact that the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which was established in 2001, had attracted the votes 










































































* The option in addition to unification and independence is “does not matter.”  
Sources: same as Table 5-4. 
 
 
As Lin’s research (2005) on Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election points out, the 
reason these loyal DPP party activists could reinforce Chen’s determination to engage in 
aggressive campaigns is because they could expand his support among the voters. Lin 
indicates that rational candidates would want to appeal to party activists because “Voting 
activists are not only persuaders but [also] agitators.” “When a candidate wins the support 
of an agitator, the support multiplies (2005: 4).” Thus, although Chen was likely to lose 
the business community’s support, he would still keep or even expand voters’ support for 
him since he could easily mobilize those party activists by taking conflictual actions 
toward China. In particular, when these party activists joined Chen’s large-scale mass 
rallies, where he tended to utter provocative rhetoric, Chen usually was able to boost his 
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popularity and renew the momentum of his campaign.107 This explains considerably why 
he would run against businessmen’s preferences later on by launching aggressive 
campaigns toward China. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EVENT DATA 
This section will present and interpret the results of the VAR time-series analysis 
that are related to the effects of cross-Strait economic exchanges. The hardest part this 
VAR analysis encounters is finding a variable that appropriately represents cross-Strait 
economic exchanges. Because the data of other variables in the VAR model are collected 
on a daily basis, daily data for the variable of cross-Strait commerce should also be used. 
However, in both Taiwan’s and China’s official records of cross-Strait economic 
exchanges, the information about the amount of trade (which is the variable that most 
similar research uses to measure economic interdependence) or investment is usually 
compiled on a monthly basis rather than on a daily one. Therefore, this data on trade and 
investment is not helpful. 
Instead, as I mentioned in Chapter 2, I use a variable, “China stocks,” as the proxy 
for cross-Strait commerce. This variable is the daily return of a stock index. The 
calculation of the index is based on the stock prices of Taiwanese listed firms that are 
heavily invested in China. Because such an index stands for stock market participants’ 
judgment on those firms’ profitability in China, and presumably stock market 
                                                 
107 Lin’s research also provides a good argument and an example for this point. He says, “To edge the 
other candidate on the non-policy dimension, a candidate must promote his popularity… which requires 
donations of time and money. In Taiwan, the popularity of a campaigning candidate depends as much on 
mass rallies as on media advertisements, and donations of time are as important as donations of money. The 
2004 election featured several large-scale mass rallies, notably the DPP’s February 28 “Guarding Taiwan 
with Hands in Hands” rally, during which more than one million party supporters held hands to form a 
human chain stretching lengthwise through Taiwan. Such rallies boost candidate popularity and build 
momentum for a campaign. The critical importance of such rallies underscores the rationality for 
candidates to appeal to party activists.” (2005: 24- 25) As Table 4-3 of Chapter 4 shows, shortly before and 
after the February 28 rally, Chen and Lu also improved their support among the voters to just 3 points 
behind their opponents. 
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participants’ judgment is made according to each available piece of information 
regarding the cross-Strait commercial market, this index would reflect the performance of 
each activity in the market of cross-Strait economic exchanges, including trade and 
investment. Therefore, this is a variable that could reveal the information about the cross-
Strait commercial market on a daily basis, which should qualify for the requirement of 
the VAR model as well as the purpose of this analysis. 
Based on Appendix C (i.e. the full set of results of the VAR time-series analysis), 
Table 5-5 summarizes the VAR results that are related to the impact of cross-Strait 
commerce on both Taiwan’s actions toward China and China’s actions toward Taiwan. 
 
 
Table 5-5. Estimates of the “China Stocks” Variable in the VAR Model 
    Dep. Variable 
 Ind. Var. China’s actions toward Taiwan Taiwan’s actions toward China 







China Stocks     
 
 
Table 5-5 shows the following findings. First, the “China Stocks” variable did not 
have any jointly-significant effect on China’s actions toward Taiwan during both the 
period from January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1995 and that from July 1, 1995 to December 31, 
2004. This means during the two periods the market factor of cross-Strait commerce did 
not significantly encourage China’s conflictual actions toward Taiwan; neither did it 
significantly contribute to China’s cooperative actions toward Taiwan. 
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Second, for both of the periods, the effect of “China Stocks” on Taiwan’s actions 
toward China was not jointly-significant either. Likewise, this indicates that cross-Strait 
economic exchanges did not significantly drive Taiwan’s China policy toward a 
confrontational direction; neither did they significantly bring about Taiwan’s cooperative 
actions toward China. This latter point directly supports my argument that cross-Strait 
commerce could not efficiently exercise a pacifying effect on Taiwan’s aggressive 
behavior toward China. That is, the businessmen whose commercial interests relied on 
cross-Strait commerce were unable to stop politicians from seeking their political 
interests. 
To illustrate the lack of a systematic relationship between cross-Strait commerce 
and China’s or Taiwan’s actions, Figures 5-5 to 5-8 demonstrate the path of “China 
Stocks” together with those of China’s actions toward Taiwan and Taiwan’s actions 
toward China during the two periods. 
 
 







































































































Note: The unit of China’s actions toward Taiwan (CT) is a cooperation (or conflict) score of 1.0, while 












































































































Note: The unit of Taiwan’s actions toward China (TC) is a cooperation (or conflict) score of 1.0, while 












































































































































Note: The unit of China’s actions toward Taiwan (CT) is a cooperation (or conflict) score of 1.0, while 













































































































































Note: The unit of Taiwan’s actions toward China (TC) is a cooperation (or conflict) score of 1.0, while 
that of “China Stocks” is one point of the index. 
 
 
Some other points can be made based on the above findings. First, I mentioned in 
Chapter 3 that Taiwan’s actions toward China during the first period were generally more 
peaceful than those in the second period. Supposedly, cross-Strait economic exchanges 
were likely to contribute to the peaceful China policy during this period, but the VAR 
results show that no significant effect was found in this period. I think there are two 
reasons for this insignificant effect. On the one hand, the scale of cross-Strait exchanges 
was still small in the early 1990. As Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2 show, the amount of cross-
Strait trade was generally low from 1989 to 1992. Similarly, Figure 5-3 shows that the 
amount of Taiwan’s mainland investment was also limited in 1991 and 1992. Therefore, 
we can say that the commercial interests that were created by cross-Strait commerce did 
not considerably emerge until after 1993. This point of time is late in the first period of 
my analysis (i.e. from January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1995). Therefore, it is possible that this 
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late appearance of commercial interests would cause the insignificant effect of cross-
Strait economic exchanges on Taiwan’s actions toward China.  
On the other hand, as I argued in Chapter 3, the appearance of a peaceful China 
policy resulted mainly from President Lee Teng-hui’s rational calculation at the 
beginning of the 1990s. That is, the initiation of the peaceful China policy was motivated 
by Lee’s consideration of securing his power at the time, not by his consideration of 
businessmen’s commercial interests. He might have taken some friendly actions toward 
China (such as lifting some restrictions on cross-Strait economic exchanges) after 
learning businessmen’s preferences about China policy, but that was just because those 
actions would also serve his political interests eventually. 
Second, the fact that cross-Strait commerce did not drive Taiwan’s China policy 
toward a confrontational direction also means that cross-Strait trade and Taiwan’s 
mainland investment was not a source of Taiwan’s conflict with China. Rather, as I have 
shown in Chapter 4, the electoral competition that reflected the rising Taiwanese identity 
had brought about Taiwan’s aggressive actions toward China. Namely, it was politicians’ 
concerns about their own political interests, rather than their consideration regarding 
businessmen’s (or the country’s) economic interests, that contributed to the conflictual 
actions.  
Third, it would not be surprising to see cross-Strait economic exchanges exercise 
no effect on China’s actions toward Taiwan. On the one hand, China was ruled by the 
CCP, which is an authoritarian regime. Thus, any societal actors, including Taiwanese 
businessmen, could hardly influence its policy making. On the other hand, in the CCP’s 
making of Taiwan policy, the political consideration of preventing Taiwan from “splitting 
the Chinese territorial sovereignty” would always dominate other concerns that include 
the nation’s economic interests. Particularly, the strong Chinese nationalism in China 
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would never allow the CCP to give in to Taiwan’s attempt to move toward independence 
either. Therefore, even if cross-Straits commerce had also created significant economic 
interests for China, such as the inflow of capital and the creation of millions of jobs for 
Chinese labors, the CCP would still need to show aggressiveness toward Taiwan’s 
independence-leaning actions. 
CONCLUSION  
The analysis of this chapter has come to the following conclusions. First, it shows 
that the economic exchanges between Taiwan and China were not a source of cross-Strait 
conflict. A first glance at the concurrence of growing cross-Strait economic exchanges 
and increasing conflicts across the Strait might lead to the conclusion that economic 
interdependence has contributed to Taiwan’s aggressive actions toward China. But this is 
not a fact. Instead, as I have discussed in the last chapter, Taiwan’s conflictual actions 
toward China are closely associated with the electoral politics within the island. 
Second, cross-Strait economic exchanges have promoted the appearance of a 
peace-making force, that is, the Taiwanese business community whose commercial 
interests rely upon the peace between Taiwan and China as well as the liberalization of 
cross-Strait commerce. But this peace-making force could not work efficiently in the 
making of Taiwan’s China policy due to Taiwan’s electoral politics. While businessmen 
look for commercial interests, politicians also pursue their political interests, i.e. winning 
elections. Thus, with the rise of a strong Taiwanese identity among the voters and the 
institutionalization of electoral competition, leaders in Taiwan tended to take aggressive 
actions toward China in order to win elections, even though these actions contradicted 
businessmen’s preferences. Particularly, with the help of some specific conditions such as 
Lee Teng-hui’s strong-man status and DPP party activists’ support for Chen Shui-bian, 
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state leaders were able to ignore the business community when making their China 
policy.  
Third, it shows that the fundamentalists (i.e. party activists) had been an important 
reason why cross-Strait commerce could not stop Taiwan’s aggressive actions toward 
China. Some liberal peace theorists stress the median voters’ role in the link between 
trade and foreign policy. For example, Papayoanou (1996: 47) argues, “In democracies 
we would expect economic interest groups and the society at large as voters to be fairly 
powerful in relation to the state. This constrains state leaders in democracies to pursue 
policies that are largely consistent with the median preferences of vested interests.” But 
this is not the case in Taiwan, particularly after 2002. As I mentioned earlier, when Chen 
Shui-bian was running for reelection in 2004, he turned to DPP party activists to boost his 
popularity. Consequently, he adopted some aggressive actions toward China to appease 
those DPP fundamentalists, rather than a median approach that was preferred by the 
business community and other median voters. This fact signifies the tendency that 
Taiwanese politics, including the making of cross-Strait policies, has to some extent been 
dominated by DPP party activists. Therefore, we can hardly expect to see the liberal 
peace theory being applied to Taiwan’s case before Chen steps down in 2008. 
The last two conclusions seem to be pessimistic since they imply that the 
development of Taiwan’s domestic politics in the foreseeing future will bring the island’s 
China policy toward a direction of no return, i.e. continuing to be conflictual. While we 
still do not know if this scenario will really happen, another question that we might also 
ask is: Are there any external factors that would affect Taiwan’s actions toward China? In 
the next chapter I am going to discuss such an external factor, that is, the United States. 
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Chapter 6   
The United States as a Factor in Taiwan’s Actions Toward China 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1950s the United State has been a crucial third party in the Taiwan-
China relationship. As the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. has 
regarded the peace of Taiwan Strait as the cornerstone of its East Asia policy. 
Consequently, deterring any Chinese attack on Taiwan has been a major goal for the U.S. 
in its management of the region’s stability.108 Similarly, when electoral competition in 
Taiwan began to complicate the issues of national identity and foreign policy on the 
island in the early 1990s, and when such domestic competition triggered Chinese military 
actions against the island in the mid-1990s, it was not unusual for the U.S. to pay closer 
attention to fine tuning its Taiwan policy. 
As the most important international third party for Taiwan, how did the U.S. 
affect Taiwan’s actions toward China? Did U.S. actions (or policies) toward Taiwan 
always successfully contribute to Taiwan’s cooperative or peaceful gestures toward 
China? In this chapter I argue that the nature of a third party’s influence in conflict 
management must be assessed in the context of regional countries’ domestic politics. In 
                                                 
108 For example, the Shanghai Communiqué that was signed between the U.S. and China on February 27, 
1972 states that “It [The United States government] reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the 
Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” Section 2 (b) of Taiwan Relations Act (1979) also mentions: 
“It is the policy of the United States… (2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, 
security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; (3) to make 
clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China 
rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; (4) to consider 
any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or 
embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United 
States.” See http://taiwansecurity.org/TSR-US.htm . 
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Taiwan’s case, the way the U.S. factor exercised its effects on Taiwan should be 
considered together with Taiwanese politicians’ concerns about their domestic electoral 
interests. In the period from the early 1990s to mid-1995, the U.S. started to direct 
friendly actions toward Taiwan. But because electoral competition had turned more and 
more intense in Taiwan, particularly when the first direct presidential election was going 
to take place in the spring of 1996, Taiwan took advantage of friendly U.S. actions by 
directing conflictual actions toward China (i.e. aggressive diplomatic actions). As for the 
period from mid-1995 to 2004, when presidential elections were nearing, it was common 
to see the U.S. warn Taiwan against any provocative actions, but Taiwan’s leaders tended 
to respond by insisting on engaging in aggressive actions toward China since backing 
down would only cost their or their parties’ electoral interests. On the other hand, when 
presidential elections were distant and Taiwan displayed no provocative behaviors, U.S. 
actions toward Taiwan tended to be cooperative. At the same time, Taiwan’s leaders 
would also pay attention to maintaining the country’s relationship with the U.S. 
Consequently, in order to meet U.S. expectations for a stable cross-Strait relationship, 
Taiwan would respond to cooperative U.S. actions by showing friendly gestures to China. 
In the following, I will start with a brief literature review on a third party’s role in 
the management of regional conflict. Then I elaborate my argument about how the U.S. 
as an external factor affected Taiwan’s actions toward China. The following section 
presents the VAR results concerning the U.S. factor. They show that when controlling for 
the variable of domestic politics, U.S. actions toward Taiwan indeed constitute a variable 
that significantly affected Taiwan’s actions toward China, but in an unclear direction. 
Therefore, I turn to case studies in the following sections to determine the way in which 
Taiwan responded to U.S. actions. First I present an introduction to the United States’ 
historical role for Taiwan, which indicates why the U.S. had been an important external 
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factor for Taiwan’s policy makers. Then, I lay out the baseline of the post-1979 U.S. 
policy toward Taiwan so that the shifts in the U.S.’s Taiwan policy at a later time can be 
easily observed. I then use several examples to illustrate my argument about the effects of 
the shifts in U.S. Taiwan policy. The last section is the conclusion of this chapter. 
A THIRD PARTY’S ROLE IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
IR scholars have recognized the significance of a third party in maintaining 
regional peace or stability. In particular, as regional conflicts have become a widespread 
phenomenon in world politics, how effective a third party manages these conflicts has 
also been a widely contested topic in the IR literature. Among these works, some argue 
that a third party can lead to regional cooperation or the resolution of regional conflicts. 
For example, liberal institutionalists claim that states are likely to cooperate with each 
other if an international institutional arrangement, such as an international organization, 
is set up to enforce rules and communicate information between states (Axelrod and 
Keohane 1993; Keohane 1993; Keohane and Martin 1995). Also, the reasoning behind 
the bargaining theory of war suggests that, by eliminating private information through 
communicating or revealing information, or by stopping the occurrence of commitment 
problems through guaranteeing the enforcement of the negotiated terms, a third party is 
able to contribute to regional conflict resolution (Fearon 1993: 3; Wagner 1999: 13-14; 
Walter 2002).109  
                                                 
109 The bargaining theory of war argues that the reason state leaders still go to war,even when they know 
the costs and risks of fighting, is because of the existence of private information, incentives to misrepresent 
such information, and commitment problems (Fearon 1995: 381). State leaders usually have private 
information about their own country’s military capability and resolve, but do not know much about those of 
their rivals’. In addition, they also tend to misrepresent such private information. This combination of 
asymmetrical information and incentive to dissemble could lead to the miscalculation of both sides’ relative 
military capabilities and the rival’s resolve to fight, therefore making war more likely to occur. 
Commitment problems arise when states have incentives to renege on the negotiated terms and refuse to 
make any commitment to follow these terms. In anticipation of its rival’s inability to make any credible 
commitment, a state would be more likely to choose fighting to secure its own interests rather than accept 
the negotiated terms. Negotiations thus always fail and war becomes unavoidable. 
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However, some other studies show that there is a limit to the third party’s role. 
For example, one of the regional rivals may take advantage of the third party’s friendly 
policy by increasing hostility toward its opponent (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; 
Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999a, 1999b; Goldstein et al. 2001). In addition, rival states 
may both take advantage of the negotiated ceasefires by rearming themselves when an 
outside power intervenes, thus, instead of stopping a regional conflict, a third party’s 
intervention may happen to prolong it (Woodward 1995; Ciment 1997). 
This chapter will follow the above debate by focusing on the role the United 
States played in Taiwan’s actions toward China. As I will show below, how effective a 
third party could maintain the stability of a region has something to do with the regional 
states’ domestic politics. 
POLITICIANS’ DOMESTIC CONCERNS VS. INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS 
To understand how the United States worked as a factor in Taiwan’s actions 
toward China during the period from 1987 to 2004, we have to focus on how Taiwanese 
politicians balanced between their domestic concerns and the international concerns 
involving the U.S. Domestically, politicians’ primary consideration would be the 
maximization of their political interests, i.e. winning elections. Internationally, politicians 
would consider two factors that were associated with the U.S. First, politicians would 
wonder if U.S. policies constituted any restraints or opportunities for Taiwan. That is, 
they would consider how much space U.S. policies had provided for Taiwan’s maneuver 
in cross-Strait relations. Second, Taiwanese politicians would consider if any of their 
actions could possibly offend the U.S. and jeopardize the two countries’ bilateral 
relations. This is because the U.S. has been the one and only ally that Taiwan has been 
able to rely on since the 1950s and thus is very important to Taiwan’s survival.  
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In his discussion of the U.S.-Taiwan-China relations, Wu argues that there is a 
specific pattern for decision makers who face both domestic and international games, that 
is “whenever domestic political competition intensifies, decision-makers swiftly shift to 
the domestic scene, and they do not return to the international game until the domestic 
competition is over and they have secured victory (2006: 10- 13).” This is a pattern that 
indeed occurred among Taiwanese politicians. In my opinion, how politicians balanced 
between the above domestic and international concerns was related to the tempo of 
Taiwan’s domestic political competition. When elections approached, politicians would 
weigh their domestic political interests more than the international concerns. At this time, 
they would take adventurous actions that were provocative toward China in order to 
appease voters who shared a Taiwanese identity, particularly when U.S. policies or 
actions toward Taiwan were supportive. But politicians would still try to do so prior to 
elections, even though such actions were likely to hurt U.S.-Taiwan relations, when U.S. 
policies were unfavorable to Taiwan. When the elections were over, politicians who won 
elections would not need to be aggressive toward China. This was also the time they 
would pay more attention to taking care of Taiwan’s relationship with the U.S.  
Consequently, the way the U.S. factor worked to influence Taiwan’s actions 
toward China is connected to this political tempo in Taiwan. When the election season 
was far away Taiwanese politicians tended to respond to any U.S. actions by showing 
cooperative actions toward China, in the hope of meeting Washington’s expectation for 
stable cross-Strait relations. But when Taiwan entered its election season, politicians 
were likely to respond to any U.S. actions with aggressive actions toward China. That is, 
if the United States directed friendly actions toward Taiwan, these actions could possibly 
encourage Taiwanese politicians to take conflictual actions toward China. But if the U.S. 
directed unfriendly actions toward Taiwan, such as criticizing Taiwan’s provocation, the 
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actions could contribute to Taiwan’s aggressive actions toward China too. This is because 
Taiwanese politicians had to appear aggressive rather than back down in front of voters. 
Under such a situation, any U.S. criticism would only strengthen politicians’ toughness 
and lead to more conflictual actions as a result. 
More specifically, in the period from the early 1990s to mid-1995, the U.S. started 
to show greater support for Taiwan than in the 1980s. But, when Taiwan’s first direct 
presidential election (which was in March 1996) was about to occur, the Taiwanese 
leader took advantage of U.S. support by launching adventurous diplomatic actions that 
were provocative in China’s eyes. This is an example of a triangular interaction-pattern 
that Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997: 516) call the “inverse triangular response.” That is, 
Taiwan directed aggressive actions toward China after receiving U.S. friendly actions. On 
the other hand, for the period from mid-1995 to 2004, presidential elections had 
dominated the rhythm of Taiwanese politics. During election seasons, Taiwan would still 
direct aggressive actions toward China after receiving U.S. conflictual (e.g. criticizing 
Taiwan’s provocative actions, etc.) actions. During non-election seasons, Taiwan would 
direct friendly actions toward China after receiving U.S. friendly actions (e.g. stopping 
criticism of Taiwan, holding high-level dialogues with Taiwan, reassuring Taiwan about 
its security, etc.). This is a pattern that Goldstein and Pevehouse call “triangular 
reciprocity.” 
To demonstrate the effects of the U.S. factor, I will apply both VAR time-series 
analysis and case studies in this chapter. 
RESULTS OF VAR ANALYSIS 
In this section, I present empirical evidence from event data to show the effects of 
“U.S. actions toward Taiwan” on “Taiwan’s actions toward China.” The VAR results in 
Table 6-1 are summarized from the full set of results of the VAR time-series analysis in 
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Appendix C. In addition, in order to estimate the directions in which “Taiwan’s actions 
toward China” (TC) responded to “U.S. actions toward Taiwan” (UT), i.e. if TC 
responded positively/reciprocally or negatively/inversely to UT, I also present the results 
of the impulse response function in Table 6-1 (the signs in parentheses). The findings of 
the results are as follows. 
First, during the first period (i.e. from January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1995), the 
effect of the (lagged) variable of “U.S. actions toward Taiwan” was jointly significant on 
“Taiwan’s actions toward China” at the significance level of .05.  
 
 
Table 6-1. Results of the VAR Analysis and Impulse 
Response Function on UT’s Effects 
    Dep. Variable 
 Ind. Var. Taiwan’s actions toward China 
 1/1/1990- 6/30/1995 7/1/1995- 12/31/2004 
U.S. actions 
toward Taiwan * (?) *** (?) 
Note: 1. *** p<.001; * p<.05. 2. “?” means the response does not have 
any clear direction. 
 
 
Second, the effect of the (lagged) variable of “U.S. actions toward Taiwan” was 
also jointly significant on “Taiwan’s actions toward China” during the second period (i.e. 
from July 1, 1995 to December 31, 2004). The significance level is .001 for this period.  
Third, the results of the impulse response function show that the direction in 
which “Taiwan’s actions toward China” would respond to “U.S. actions toward Taiwan” 
is unclear for both periods. 
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These findings indicate that, controlling for the variable of domestic politics, 
“U.S. actions toward Taiwan” were a significant variable affecting Taiwan’s actions 
against China in both periods. This finding means, through its actions or policies toward 
Taiwan, the United States did play a significant role in influencing how Taiwan acted 
toward China. However, the direction in which “Taiwan’s actions toward China” reacted 
to “U.S. actions toward Taiwan” could not be clearly determined. This is because the 
impulse response function shows the response of TC is sometimes positive and others 
times negative, as Figure 6-1 and Figure 6-2 display. This means the impulse response 
function does not allow the generalization of TC’s response direction. Therefore, I have 
to turn to case studies instead to examine how TC responded to UT. 
 
 





































To illustrate the above relationship between “U.S. actions toward Taiwan” and 
“Taiwan’s actions toward China,” Figure 6-3 and Figure 6-4 respectively show the two 
variables’ paths in both periods. 
 
 
Figure 6-3. Net Cooperation in U.S. Actions toward Taiwan and Taiwan’s Actions 
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Figure 6-4. Net Cooperation in U.S. Actions toward Taiwan and Taiwan’s Actions 
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Before discussing the case studies, I have another point to make about the VAR 
results. That is, although in this chapter I am focusing on the effects of “U.S. actions 
toward Taiwan,” this does not mean that China had no effects on Taiwan’s actions 
toward it. Summarizing from Appendix C, Table 6-2 shows that in the second period the 
effect of the (lagged) variable of “China’s actions toward Taiwan” (CT) on “Taiwan’s 
actions toward China” (TC) is significant at .001 level, although it is also difficult to 
judge how TC responded to CT.110 In other words, China itself is also a variable affecting 
how Taiwan would act toward it. But because I am discussing the U.S. factor in this 
chapter, I will just skip the effects that China exercised and instead concentrate on those 




                                                 




Table 6-2. Results of the VAR Analysis and Impulse 
Response Function on CT’s Effects 
    Dep. Variable 
 Ind. Var. Taiwan’s actions toward China 
 1/1/1990- 6/30/1995 7/1/1995- 12/31/2004 
China’s actions 
toward Taiwan  *** (?) 




In the following I am going to switch to case studies to examine how TC 
responded to UT. I will provide some background information at first: in order to show 
the U.S. factor’s significance for Taiwan, I will start with an introduction to the United 
States’ historical role in Taiwan’s international relations; then I depict the baseline of 
post-1979 U.S. Taiwan policy against which some changes occurring in the 1990s and 
early 2000s can be easily monitored. 
THE UNITED STATES: A CRITICAL THIRD PARTY FOR TAIWAN 
To understand why the U.S. has been a crucial actor for Taiwan, I will quickly 
review the changes in Taiwan-U.S. relations from the 1950s to 1970s. 
Taiwan was in danger of being invaded by China in 1949. In that year, the weary 
KMT regime moved to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War. Meanwhile, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was preparing to give the KMT a final blow from the 
other side of Taiwan Strait. But things changed suddenly when the Korean War broke out 
in June 1950. In order to contain the expansion of the communist bloc, President Truman 
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sent the Seventh Fleet of the U.S. Navy into the Taiwan Strait to protect Taiwan from any 
Chinese attack. For about the following two decades, the U.S. had been Taiwan’s closest 
and staunchest ally. On the security side, the two countries signed the U.S.-R.O.C. 
Mutual Defense Treaty to form a formal military alliance in 1954. On the economic side, 
the U.S. provided Taiwan with aid of around 1.5 billion U.S. dollars during the period 
from 1951 to 1965 (military aid not included), which not only increased Taiwan’s 
agricultural production and strengthened its infrastructure at the time but also contributed 
to the island’s industrial development thereafter (Shiau 1989: 54- 60). Finally on the 
diplomatic side, the U.S. supported Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China. 
As a result, Taiwan was able to keep its seat in the United Nations and in the Security 
Council for around two decades. In the meantime, most of the countries in the world also 
kept official relations with Taiwan. 
From the perspective of the triangular relations between Taiwan, China, and the 
U.S., strong U.S. support for Taiwan in the 1950s and 1960s shows that the U.S. was 
totally “tilting” toward Taiwan during the period. In other words, the balance of power 
across the Taiwan Strait was favorable to Taiwan at the time. But when the U.S. was 
changing its Cold-War grand strategy in the 1970s, this balance of power began to turn 
unfavorable for Taiwan. In the beginning of the 1970s, Nixon and Kissinger sought to 
ally with China in order to balance the Soviet Union. As a result, Taiwan entered an era 
of international isolation. Nixon’s grand strategy contributed to two events that seriously 
damaged Taiwan’s foreign relations in the 1970s: Taiwan lost its U.N. membership in 
1971; then the United States cut official ties with Taiwan, established diplomatic 
relations with China on January 1, 1979, and terminated the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual Defense 
Treaty at the end of 1979. The events generated a chain reaction, where many other 
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countries disconnected their official relations with Taiwan and recognized the People’s 
Republic of China, following the U.S. lead.111  
The above history has shown why the United States is a crucial outsider for 
Taiwan. First, the U.S. has been in a position that could change the balance of power 
across Taiwan Strait. The U.S. supported Taiwan wholeheartedly when trying to contain 
the spread of the communist bloc, but started to ally with China when it later attempted to 
balance the Soviet Union. In other words, the U.S. can shift the balance of power 
between Taiwan and China when its strategic interests change. Second, the above history 
also demonstrates the fact that Taiwan’s destiny depended considerably on the United 
States. The island could hardly survive without U.S. economic aid and military defense; 
neither could it sustain its diplomatic relations with most countries in the world after the 
withdrawal of U.S. support. As Taiwan relied on the U.S. so greatly, the U.S. had become 
the only foreign country that could potentially affect Taiwan in all respects. 
Taiwanese politicians were fully aware of the United States’ critical role for 
Taiwan. Consequently, they not only understood the importance of keeping a good 
relationship with the U.S but also cared about the change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan 
and the consequent variation in Taiwan’s international constraints or opportunities. 
BASELINE OF THE POST-1979 U.S. TAIWAN POLICY 
To accommodate the new situation created by the termination of U.S.-Taiwan 
official ties, the U.S. constructed a framework for the new bilateral relationship with the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué, and the six private 
promises that it gave Taiwan at the same time as the 1982 Communiqué. This framework 
                                                 
111 In 1970, Taiwan had 67 allies while China had 54. In 1971, the number of Taiwan’s allies dropped to 
56 and that of China’s increased to 74. In 1979, only 23 countries still kept their diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan, but 127 countries had established official ties with China. See Wei 1991: 2- 3. 
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basically set the tone for the two countries’ relationship in the 1980s. At the same time, it 
also constitutes the baseline from which U.S. Taiwan policies began to shift in the 1990s. 
Table 6-3 shows how this framework looks across three major issue-areas: the 
contact levels between the U.S. and Taiwan, Taiwan’s security, and Taiwan’s 
international status.112 Tracing the changes in the United States’ Taiwan policy, Table 6-
3 also lists the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, and 1979 Joint Communiqué on the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the People's Republic of China and the 
United States of America. The 1972 Communiqué is the product of Nixon’s 1972 
groundbreaking trip to China, while the 1979 Communiqué was signed when the U.S. 
established official relations with China. 
 
 
Table 6-3. U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s 





“[t]he two sides stated 
that progress toward the 
normalization of 
relations between China 
and the United States is 
in the interests of all 
countries.” 
The U.S. “affirms the 
ultimate objective of the 
withdrawal of all U.S. 
forces and military 
installations from 
Taiwan. In the 
meantime, it will 
“The United States 
acknowledges that all 
Chinese on either side of 
the Taiwan Strait 
maintain there is but one 
China and that Taiwan 
is a part of China. The 
                                                 
112 Generally speaking, the changes in U.S. policy toward Taiwan since 1979 occurred mainly across these 
three different dimensions. First of all, the level of contact is never an issue between countries with 
diplomatic relations. But for Taiwan and the U.S. which do not have any diplomatic ties with each other, 
the shift in the two countries’ contact levels could be a major barometer that measures how friendly the 
U.S. is to Taiwan. For example, when the U.S. sent its Trade Representative to visit Taiwan in 1992, or 
when it allowed Taiwan’s defense minister to visit the States in 2002, the U.S. was considered to be 
sending friendly signals to Taiwan. This is because the U.S. was raising the level of contact between the 
two countries’ to a more official level. The second issue-area where shifts can be observed in the United 
States’ Taiwan policy is Taiwan’s security, particularly the issue of U.S. arms sale to Taiwan. This is 
because U.S. arms sale policies toward Taiwan are usually regarded as an indicator of U.S. resolve to help 
in the island’s defense. Finally, the U.S. position on the issues regarding Taiwan’s future status, that is, 
unification with China or the movement toward de jure independence, is considered another way to gauge 
U.S. support for Taiwan, particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s when Taiwan seemed to be moving 
toward independence. When U.S. officials repeatedly reiterated that the U.S. does not support Taiwan’s 
independence, or when the hierarchy of U.S. officials who make such a declaration turns higher, that means 
the U.S. is adding pressure to Taiwan. 
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progressively reduce its 
forces and military 
installations on Taiwan 
as the tension in the area 
diminishes.” 
United States 
Government does not 
challenge that position.” 










China and the 
United States of 
America) 
 
“The United States of 
America recognizes the 
Government of the 
People’s Republic of 
China as the sole legal 
Government of China. 
Within this context, the 
people of the United 
States will maintain 
cultural, commercial, 
and other unofficial 
relations with the people 
of Taiwan.” 
 “The Government of the 
United States of 
America acknowledges 
the Chinese position that 
there is but one China 
and Taiwan is part of 
China.” 




“It is the policy of the 
United States to preserve 
and promote extensive, 
close, and friendly 
commercial, cultural, 
and other relations 
between the people of 
the United States and the 
people on Taiwan.” 
“It is the policy of the 
United States to … 
provide Taiwan with 
arms of a defensive 
character; and to 
maintain the capacity of 
the United States to 
resist any resort to force 
or other forms of 
coercion that would 
jeopardize the security, 
or the social or economic 
system, of the people on 
 
                                                 
113 The articles regarding Taiwan’s security in Taiwan Relations Act include the following: 
Sec. 2. 
(b) It is the policy of the United States -- …  
   (4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means including by 
boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave 
concern to the United States; 
   (5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and 
   (6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion 
that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. 
Sec. 3.  
(a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to 
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable 
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 
(b)The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and 
services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures 
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Taiwan.”113 






 “the United States 
Government states that it 
does not seek to carry 
out a long-term policy of 
arms sales to Taiwan, 
that its arms sales to 
Taiwan will not exceed, 
either in qualitative or in 
quantitative terms, the 
level of those supplied in 
recent years since the 
establishment of 
diplomatic relations 
between the United 
States and China, and 
that it intends to reduce 
gradually its sales of 
arms to Taiwan, leading 
over a period of time to 
a final resolution.” 
“The United States 
Government … 
reiterates that it has no 
intention of … pursuing 
a policy of ‘two Chinas’ 






 The U.S. would not set a 
date for termination of 
arms sales to Taiwan; 
neither would it consult 
with China in advance 
before making decisions 
about arms sales to 
Taiwan. 








This table shows that in the dimension of contact levels the U.S. had already set 
the goal of normalizing its relations with China when Nixon visited China in 1972. The 
U.S. reached this goal in 1979, sacrificing its official ties with Taiwan. As a result, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States 
military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress. 
(c)The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or 
economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising 
therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, 
appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger. 
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contact level between Taiwan and the U.S. was downgraded to an unofficial one, in 
which top governmental officials of the two countries were unable to have any official 
contact.  
On the part of Taiwan’s security, the termination of the U.S.-R.O.C. Mutual 
Defense Treaty at the end of 1979 also realized the plan that the United States set up in 
the 1972 Communiqué, that is, to withdraw its troops from Taiwan eventually. 
Meanwhile, to fill the security gap that would be caused by the withdrawal of U.S. 
military forces, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the 
U.S. to provide Taiwan with arms and any other help for the island’s self-defense. 
However, this security promise was seriously challenged by the 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint 
Communiqué, which was released when President Reagan visited China in August of that 
year. In the Communiqué the U.S. agreed to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan step by step. 
According to James Lilley, who was the Taipei Office director of the American Institute 
in Taiwan (AIT) from 1982 to 1984 and U.S. Ambassador to China from 1989 to 1991, 
U.S. arms-sale policy in the 1982 Communiqué was a result of the domination of the 
State Department’s pro-China bureaucrats and was against President Reagan’s personal 
good will toward Taiwan. Therefore, in order to balance the damage that might be caused 
to Taiwan by the Communiqué, the U.S. also gave Taiwan six promises to reassure 
Taiwan that it would not set any date to terminate the arms sales, and that it would not 
consult with China before making any decisions about arms sales to Taiwan (Lilley 2003: 
223- 230).114 It is based on these six promises that the U.S. has continued to sell arms to 
Taiwan since 1979.115  
                                                 
114 According to Lilley, the six promises were written by the AIT’s chairman David Dean and forwarded 
by Lilley to Taiwan’s President Chiang Ching-kuo one month before the 1982 Communiqué was formally 
released. Although not directly from President Reagan, the promises generally reflected Reagan’s attitude 
toward Taiwan at the time. The evidence proving this is that, shortly after signing the 1982 Communiqué, 
Regan ordered in a memo that any reduction of arms sale to Taiwan must be based on the premise that 
China would keep its promise of peacefully resolving the Taiwan question; that the arms’ quality and 
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Finally, on the question of Taiwan’s status, the U.S. told China in the 1982 
Communiqué that it had no intention of pursuing a policy of “two Chinas” or “one China, 
one Taiwan,” which is the continuation of its position in the 1972 Communiqué that it 
acknowledges there is one China and Taiwan is part of China. But on the other hand, in 
one of its six promises the U.S. also told Taiwan that it would not formally recognize 
Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Considering these two policies simultaneously, we can 
see that the U.S.’s position is two fold. First, it “acknowledges” but does not “recognize” 
the Chinese position on Taiwan’s status. Second, it would not support the quest for “two 
Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” This two-folded position shows that the U.S. 
follows a “one China” policy, but it also suggests that the U.S. does not fully agree with 
China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan.  
THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. FACTOR: EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES 
Various shifts from the above U.S. policy baseline started to emerge in the early 
1990s. The VAR results have shown that U.S. actions toward Taiwan, which include 
these shifts, significantly influenced the way Taiwan acted toward China in both periods. 
But how did these shifts exercise their influence? Did they reciprocally or inversely lead 
to Taiwan’s actions toward China? By examining the empirical experiences from the 
early 1990s to mid-1995 and from mid-1995 to 2004, the following discussion will show 
that, as electoral competition took its shape in the island, especially when popular 
presidential elections were held every four years, the way the U.S. factor affected 
                                                                                                                                                 
quantity the U.S. provides Taiwan would depend on how much China’s threat to Taiwan is; that the U.S. 
would help Taiwan match China’s improvements in military capabilities. See Lilley 2003: 228- 229; Mann 
1999: 127. 
115 In addition to the three points listed in Table 6-3, the other points of the six promises are: the U.S. 
would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act; it would not mediate between Taiwan and China; it 
would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan, namely, that the question was one to be 
decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations 
with China. See Kennedy 2003: 33. 
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Taiwan’s actions toward China was mainly shaped by Taiwanese politicians’ concerns 
about their domestic political interests. 
 
 
Table 6-4. The Cases 
 Cooperative TC Conflictual TC 
Cooperative 
UT  
* In 1997-1998, the U.S. 
regularly invited Taiwan’s 
national security officials for 
dialogues; the U.S. also signed 
an agreement with Taiwan to 
help the island’s WTO bid. 
Taiwan responded by sending a 
delegation to China for the 2nd 
Koo-Wang talk. 
* In 2001- 2002, President Bush 
expressed his determination to 
defend Taiwan and upgraded 
the two countries’ bilateral 
relations, Taiwan responded by 
showing the intention of 
expanding cross-Strait 
exchanges. 
* In 1992-1995, the U.S. agreed 
to sell F-16s to Taiwan; it also 
sent a cabinet member to visit 
Taiwan and conducted the 
Taiwan policy review. Taiwan 
responded by campaigning for 
Lee Teng-hui’s U.S. visit. 
Conflictual 
UT 
 * President Clinton announced 
the “three No’s” in 1998, Lee 
responded by declaring the 
“special state-to-state theory” in 
1999. 
* In 2003, the U.S. asked Chen 
Shui-bian to stop his 
referendum campaign, Chen 
responded by launching the 
“defensive referendum” and a 
constitution-making campaign.  
 
 
Table 6-4 lists the cases that I am going to discuss in this section. These cases 
cover all outstanding events in which the U.S. either strengthened or curtailed its support 
for Taiwan (i.e. cooperative or conflictual UT) from the early 1990s to 2004. Then, 
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depending on how Taiwan responded in its China policy, they are again divided into 
“cooperative TC” and “conflictual TC.” Below, my discussion of these cases will follow 
the timeline along which they occurred. 
The early 1990s to mid-1995 
In the period from the early 1990s to mid-1995, the constraints imposed by the 
above U.S. policy baseline upon Taiwan seemed to loosen up when the U.S. increasingly 
extended cooperative actions toward Taiwan. Because this also occurred at the time when 
electoral competition started to dominate Taiwan’s domestic politics and when the 
Taiwanese identity began to surge among Taiwanese voters, U.S. cooperative actions 
toward Taiwan happened to play a role in encouraging Taiwan’s conflictual actions 
toward China. Thus, U.S. actions toward Taiwan had triggered Taiwan’s “inverse 
triangular response.”  
It is against two background factors that the U.S. increasingly showed its friendly 
actions to Taiwan. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991 had weakened the 
strategic reason for Nixon’s coalition-building with China in the early 1970s. In other 
words, the fact that the U.S. did not need China as much as it did in the 1970s and 1980s 
gave the U.S. more leverage to show stronger support for Taiwan or improve its 
relationship with the island after 1991. Second, Taiwan was on its way toward becoming 
a democratic country in the beginning of the 1990s. In contrast with the notorious image 
that China left itself in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen incident, Taiwan’s endeavor 
in political liberalization and democratization had helped it build a good reputation 
among Americans. Specifically, the island won considerable respect and support from the 
U.S. Congress, which turned out to be a crucial actor in the event of Lee Teng-hui’s visit 
to the U.S.  
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Throughout the 1980s the U.S. kept its Taiwan policy within the framework of the 
above policy baseline. But since the beginning of the 1990s, some events that signified 
the shift of U.S. Taiwan policy toward a friendly direction have appeared. First, President 
George H. W. Bush announced the sale of 150 F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan at the General 
Dynamics factory in Fort Worth, Texas in September 1992. This was a significant action 
aimed at reinforcing Taiwan’s security. Second, three months later, Bush sent a cabinet 
member, the U.S. trade representative Carla Hills, to Taipei to strengthen America’s 
commercial position in the Taiwan market (Bush 2004: 223-224). Hills’ visit apparently 
was a breakthrough in terms of U.S.-Taiwan contact levels. Most significantly, in 
September 1994 the Clinton administration finished a review on its Taiwan policy, which 
officially upgraded U.S. relations with Taiwan for the first time since 1979. This Taiwan 
policy review is mainly an improvement in the dimension of U.S.-Taiwan contact levels. 
For example, Taiwan can put “Taipei” in the titles of their U.S. offices; its diplomats can 
visit the offices of most U.S. officials; most U.S. cabinet-level officials are allowed to 
visit Taiwan; and Taiwan’s top officials are permitted to make transit stops on U.S. 
territory.116  
                                                 
116 According to Richard C. Bush (2004: 226- 27), the Clinton administration came to the following 
conclusions in the policy review: 
1. The names of Taiwan’s offices in the U.S. were changed from “the Coordination Council for North 
American Affairs” to “the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” (for the office in 
Washington, DC) and “Taipei Economic and Cultural Office” (for those in other U.S. cities).  
2. Taiwan’s diplomats could visit U.S. officials in their offices, except for the State Department, the Old 
Executive Office Building, and the White House. 
3. U.S. cabinet-level officials in economic and functional agencies were permitted to visit Taiwan at an 
appropriate time. 
4. Taiwan’s president, vice president, premier, and vice premier would be allowed to make low-profile 
transit stops in the U.S. 
5. Although U.S. policy since 1979 would not support Taiwan’s membership in international 
organizations where statehood was a prerequisite, it would support ways for its “voice to be heard” in 
those institutions and also support its membership in organizations where statehood was not a 
prerequisite. 
 147
While U.S.-Taiwan relations started to improve on the international front, 
Taiwanese politicians also faced the intensifying electoral competition and the resulting 
awakening of Taiwanese consciousness on the domestic scene. As I mentioned in 
Chapter 4, the DPP’s campaign for U.N. membership had stimulated the Taiwanese 
people’s craving for Taiwan’s complete international status and thus created pressures 
upon the ruling KMT government. Consequently, in order to keep the KMT’s electoral 
advantage, President Lee switched his focus to Taiwan’s diplomatic relations after 
settling the issues of political reforms and securing his power base within the KMT. As 
Lee was about to take bold initiatives in his diplomacy, he took advantage of the friendly 
actions that the U.S. had showed to Taiwan since the early 1990s, particularly the support 
from the U.S. Congress.   
As the promoter of the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. Congress has been an 
important actor in U.S.-Taiwan relations since 1979. Not surprisingly, it was also a 
driving force behind the United States’ 1994 Taiwan policy review. Earlier in May 1994, 
when Lee Teng-hui led a Taiwan delegation to Central America and South Africa, 
Taiwan asked for U.S. permission to make a transit stop that would have included an 
overnight stay in Hawaii. But the Clinton administration decided that Lee’s delegation 
could only have a refueling stop at Hickham Air Force Base and could not go out of the 
Base for the night. The administration’s decision annoyed not just Lee, who refused to 
get off the plane, but also Taiwan’s supporters in Congress. In response to this incident, 
these congressmen pressured the Clinton administration to improve U.S.-Taiwan 
relations as well as pass legislation that would require the administration to grant Lee a 
visa in the future should he wish to come to the U.S (Bush 2004: 225- 226; Chang 2000: 
120- 126). As a response to the congressional demand, in September 1994 the Clinton 
administration released the Taiwan policy review. 
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The strong support that the U.S. Congress showed for Taiwan also motivated Lee 
to work on his visit to the United States prior to his joining in Taiwan’s 1996 presidential 
race. He hired an influential lobbying firm in D.C., Cassidy & Associates, to lobby U.S. 
media and Congress about this issue. For Taiwan, which had been struggling with an 
isolated international status since the 1970s, Lee’s visit to the world’s most powerful 
nation in the capacity of Taiwan’s president would be an unprecedented diplomatic 
success and thus a great advantage for him in the presidential election. But for China, 
Lee’s U.S. trip would be an action of a sovereign state and therefore a clear attempt on 
the part of Taiwan to pursue its independence. Knowing that Lee’s action would be 
deemed as extremely provocative by China, the U.S. executive branch also strongly 
opposed Lee’s visit. But the work done by Cassidy & Associates proved to be successful. 
A bill entitled “Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding a private visit by 
President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States” was 
passed in U.S. House of Representatives on May 2, 1995 with 396 Yeas and 0 Nays, and 
then passed in the Senate on May 9th with 97 senators for it and one against it.117 
Meanwhile, some influential media outlets, such as Washington Post and New York 
Times, also urged the Clinton administration to approve Lee’s visit.118 The pressures 
from Congress and public opinion eventually forced the executive branch to give in. On 
May 22nd the State Department declared that President Clinton had agreed to let Lee visit 
the U.S. in June in the private capacity of Cornell University’s distinguished alumnus.119 
On June 7th, Lee arrived in the U.S. 
                                                 
117 See the record of Roll Call Votes on the Library of Congress’s website http://thomas.loc.gov/ . 
118 See United Daily News, May 11, 1995, p.2 and May 14, 1995, p.4. 
119 Ibid., May 23, 1995, p.1. 
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Mid-1995 to 2004 
In the period from mid-1995 to 2004, U.S. actions toward Taiwan mainly led to 
Taiwan’s “triangular reciprocity.” This triangular interaction pattern is associated with 
the fact that, during this period, presidential elections turned out to be a major seasonal 
factor in Taiwan’s domestic politics. After the 1995 Strait missile crisis that resulted from 
Lee’s U.S. visit, Washington started to realize the importance of keeping Taipei from 
provoking Beijing. Consequently, it would criticize against or warn of any initial 
provocative actions that were directed by Taiwan toward China. However, when a 
presidential election approached, Taiwanese politicians continued to launch aggressive 
campaigns after receiving these confrontational actions from the U.S. In addition to the 
need to appease the rising Taiwanese identity among the voters, these politicians chose to 
do so because they did not want to back down since that would only show their weakness 
vis-à-vis external pressures. On the other hand, when the presidential elections ended, 
Taiwanese leaders would pay more attention to the U.S. factor in order to sustain the two 
countries’ bilateral relationship and fix the damage of the relationship that was caused by 
Taiwan’s defiance to U.S. warnings during election seasons. At this time, U.S. actions 
toward Taiwan would generally be cooperative rather than conflictual since not much 
disagreement was going to exist between the two countries when Taiwan’s presidential 
elections were distant. In the mean time, Taiwan’s leaders would also show cooperative 
actions toward China to meet Washington’s expectation for a stable and calm cross-Strait 
relationship. Thus, the pattern of “triangular reciprocity” also occurred during this period 
of time as Taiwan directed friendly actions toward China after the U.S. directed 
cooperative actions toward Taiwan.  
Some examples illustrate Taiwan’s “triangular reciprocity” during this period of 
time. First, in 1997 and 1998, the off-season from presidential elections in Taiwan, it was 
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common to see Taipei respond to Washington’s cooperative actions toward it with 
friendly actions toward Beijing. During this period, U.S. cooperative actions toward 
Taiwan were exemplified by the fact that ever since the March 1996 missile crisis the 
U.S. had regularly invited Taiwan’s national security officials to hold high-level 
meetings. The contact at such levels was unprecedented after the two countries’ 
diplomatic ties were cut in 1979. These meetings were usually held in New York every 
six months and were attended by the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
the U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor, and Taiwan’s Secretary General of the 
National Security Council.120 The meetings then became an institutionalized channel for 
the two countries’ dialogues on important issues that involves cross-Strait relations. 
Another event signifying U.S. cooperative actions toward Taiwan occurred in 
February 1998, when Taiwan reached a market-opening agreement with the U.S. By 
signing the agreement with Taiwan, the U.S. had helped clear the way for Taiwan to join 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the global trade body. More significantly, through 
this event the U.S. also helped Taiwan advance considerably in terms of the island’s 
attempt to participate in the international community.  
In response to the above friendly actions from the U.S., Taiwan started to send 
conciliatory signals toward China during this off-season from presidential elections. For 
example, on June 23, 1997, the chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council said 
Taiwan was willing to talk with China about political issues and cross-Strait direct links. 
On September 1, 1997, President Lee said he would like to visit China to exchange 
opinions with the Chinese leader. On October 30, 1997, the Mainland Affairs Council 
called for the reopening of cross-Strait talks. In December of that year, President Lee also 
expressed that Taiwan would be glad to reopen cross-Strait dialogues unconditionally. 
                                                 
120 See China Times, January 30, 1999, page unknown; March 25, 1999, page unknown. 
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Later on, both Taiwan’s premier and the Mainland Affairs Council repeated the same 
idea again in January 1998.121 In October 1998, Taiwan eventually sent its delegation to 
China to hold the second Koo-Wang Talk, the meeting between Taiwan’s and China’s 
top negotiators Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan.  
In 1999, Taiwan again entered the presidential election season, and as I mentioned 
in Chapter 4, President Lee declared his “special state-to-state” theory in July when 
interviewed by the Deutsche Welle Radio. Lee’s “theory” was a strong provocation of 
China, since it implied future attempts to pursue Taiwan’s independent status. To some 
extent, it could be regarded as a response to a negative shift in U.S. policy toward 
Taiwan.  
This shift occurred in the dimension of Taiwan’s status.122 In October 1997, 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin arrived in the U.S. for his first state visit. On October 31, 
                                                 
121 See the website of Mainland Affairs Council for the above events ( http://www.mac.gov.tw/ ). 
122 There are two factors contributing to the shift in this respect. First, Lee’s U.S. visit led to the worsening 
of both U.S.-China relations and Taiwan-China relations. Consequently, the U.S. executive branch was 
unhappy about Lee. At first they were not pleased by the fact that Lee tried to manipulate the U.S. 
Congress and public opinion on the issue of his U.S. visit. For example, they sent B. Lynn Pascoe, the 
director of American Institute in Taiwan’s Taipei Office, to ask Lee to give up Taiwan’s lobbying efforts 
on Lee’s U.S. visit. Pascoe told Lee that these efforts could only lead to the deterioration of Taiwan’s 
relations with the State Department, but Lee refused. Then the State Department was infuriated by the fact 
that Taiwan broke its promise to keep Lee’s Cornell speech low key. Taiwan agreed in advance that Lee’s 
speech would not touch any political subjects, but when Lee delivered his speech on June 9th at Cornell 
University, he repeatedly mentioned “Taiwan” or the “Republic of China,” which drew China’s strong 
protest right away (Chang 2000: 125- 128). Most importantly, because Lee’s action not only resulted in the 
Strait missile crises and thus the instability of the East Asian region and also indirectly brought the United 
States into the Strait missile crisis in March 1996, some media and bureaucrats in the State Department 
began to regard Lee as a trouble-maker for the United States (Su 2003: 51; Wang 2005: 189).  
Second, after President Clinton ordered two carrier battle groups to deploy around the Taiwan Strait 
area during the March 1996 missile crisis, the U.S. became clearly aware of the danger and possibility of 
getting involved in a military conflict with China over the Taiwan issue. This awareness made the Clinton 
administration realize the urgency of mending the U.S.-China bilateral relations that had been damaged by 
Lee’s U.S. visit, as well as the necessity to ease the two great powers’ tense relationship which was created 
by the military face-off in March 1996. It is based on this realization that the U.S. began to adopt a strategy 
of “engagement” in its China policy, which focused mainly on U.S.-China summit meetings and dialogues 
to rebuild the two nations’ stable relations (Su 2003: 49). (In fact, U.S. efforts to repair its relations with 
China had started as early as in October 1995, which was two months after the first Strait crisis ended, 
when President Clinton met Chinese President Jiang Zemin in New York. But the two countries’ relations 
turned tense again during the March 1996 Strait crisis. See Sutter 1998: 83, 91.) In the meantime, the 
Clinton administration chose the Taiwan issue as a bargain chip to fix U.S.-China relations. Perhaps to 
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the day after Jiang’s departure from Washington, State Department spokesman James P. 
Rubin mentioned in a press conference that “We don’t support a two-China policy, we 
don’t support Taiwan independence, and we don’t support [Taiwan’s] membership in 
organizations that require you to be a member state.”123 The United States had declared 
in the 1982 Communiqué that it would not pursue a policy of “two Chinas” or “one 
China, one Taiwan,” but Rubin’s statement was the first time the U.S. publicly 
announced that it would “not support” Taiwan independence and Taiwan’s membership 
in international organizations for which statehood is a requirement. The statement 
apparently shows that, on the issue of Taiwan’s status, the U.S. had moved closer to 
China’s position of “opposing” both Taiwan independence and Taiwan’s bid for United 
Nations’ membership. This new change in U.S. policy toward Taiwan was repeated later 
by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and National Security Adviser Samuel 
R. Berger,124 and eventually President Clinton himself when he visited Shanghai on June 
30, 1998. He said: 
I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't 
support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan- one 
China. And, we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any 
organization for which statehood is a requirement.125  
This is called Clinton’s “three No’s policy.” Therefore, Lee’s “special state-to-
state” theory, which was a conflictual action toward China, was essentially a response to 
the above unfavorable shift in U.S. Taiwan policy.  
                                                                                                                                                 
punish Taiwan and appease China at the same time, the U.S. shifted its Taiwan policy toward a direction 
that was against Taiwan. 
123 See United Daily News, November 2, 1997, p. 2; also Wachman 2001: 8. 
124 See United Daily News, July 1, 1998, p. 1. 
125 Ibid.; also Kau 1999: 3. 
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Moreover, when Lee faced mounting U.S. pressures asking him to take his 
“theory” back and return to the “one-China” policy, he only complied with Washington’s 
request superficially.126 On July 13th, AIT’s Taipei director Darryl N. Johnson met with 
Lee in the presidential office to tell Lee that the U.S. still supported the “one China” 
policy. That same day and the following day, the U.S. State Department also repeatedly 
reiterated the United States’ “one China” policy and the “three No’s policy.” Meanwhile, 
some U.S. congressmen, including those who had been friendly toward Taiwan in the 
past, also expressed their opposition to Lee’s “theory.” On July 21st, President Clinton 
mentioned that U.S. policy toward cross-Strait relations consisted of three pillars, which 
included the “one China” policy, cross-Strait dialogue, and peaceful resolution to cross-
Strait differences. On July 22nd, AIT’s chairman Richard C. Bush arrived in Taipei on 
behalf of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright to ask Taipei go back to the 
position of “one China, with respective interpretations” that initially appeared in the 
“1992 Consensus.”127  
                                                 
126 The one-China policy, which refers to the U.S. position in the 1972 Communiqué that there is one 
China and that Taiwan is a part of China, is not just the consensus shared by both China and the U.S. on the 
Taiwan issue but is also regarded by the U.S. as a bedrock principle that stabilizes cross-Strait relations, 
particularly after the 1995 and 1996 missile crises. Clinton’s “three No’s policy” in 1998 is just another 
U.S. endeavor to strengthen this policy’s capacity of maintaining the region’s stability. Therefore, when the 
chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, Su Chi, interpreted Lee’s “special state-to-state theory” in 
a press conference on July 12, 1999 by saying that Taiwan would no more use the term “one China,” the 
Clinton administration was immediately shocked and angered. Pressures from Washington soon arrived in 
Taipei. 
 Lee’s “theory” led to the immediate action by the U.S. also because it caused instability in Taiwan-
China relations right away. In the days that followed Lee’s talk, China suspended Wang Daohan’s 
scheduled October visit to Taiwan, intensely criticized Lee’s attempt to split China’s sovereignty, and 
warned Lee to stop any action that tries to secede from the Chinese territory. In the meantime, Chinese 
fighter jets also repeatedly crossed the imaginary middle line of the Taiwan Strait that separates Taiwan 
from China, which almost triggered a conflict with Taiwan’s military aircrafts. Military exercises were 
reported to be conducted along Chinese coast too. 
127 The “1992 Consensus” means the consensus shared by both China and Taiwan in 1992 regarding the 
interpretations of the “one-China principle.” Because their 1992 administrative talk in Hong Kong on the 
certification of both sides’ official documents was initially stuck when China insisted that the certification 
was “China’s internal affairs,” Taiwan suggested that both sides of the Strait verbally interpret the “one-
China principle” in their respective ways. This suggestion was accepted by China. See Wang 1993, pp. 
247- 253; Su and Cheng 2002, pp. 3- 6. 
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On October 10th, Lee responded to U.S. pressures by saying in his National Day 
speech:  
Although both sides of the Strait have different opinions about the ‘one 
China’ policy, they should still seriously face the fact that cross-Strait 
relations are special state-to-state relations, and conduct constructive 
dialogues on the basis of this fact. Through separate but equal governance 
as well as peaceful competition, they should also pursue peaceful 
unification in the future.128  
Although Lee mentioned the “one China” policy and “unification” in the speech, 
he still insisted on the position of his “theory” solidly. In other words, Lee still responded 
to U.S. conflictual actions (i.e. pressures) toward Taiwan by showing the actions that 
China would deem conflictual. At a time when the 2000 presidential election was around 
the corner, Lee’s insistence is understandable, particularly when a survey showed that 
66% of the respondents supported Lee’s “theory.”129 
Taiwanese politicians’ political craze in the election season subsided after Chen 
Shui-bian was sworn in as president in May 2000. Because the new leader would pay 
more attention to U.S. expectations for a stable cross-Strait relationship, it was not 
unusual for Taiwan to respond to U.S. cooperative actions toward it with friendly 
gestures toward Beijing in this off-season from presidential elections. Since his first day 
as president, Chen took care of the U.S. factor very cautiously. For example, he pledged 
to follow the “four No’s” in his inaugural speech on May 20, 2000,130 which was a result 
of his negotiation with the U.S. about the tone of his China policy.131 More importantly, 
                                                 
128 See United Daily News, October 10, 1999, p. 1. Emphasis is added. 
129 The survey was conducted by China Credit Information Service in the end of August 1999; the results 
were released by Mainland Affairs Council. See China Times, September 4, 1999, page unknown. 
130 Chen pledged that as long as China did not make any attempt to invade Taiwan, then he would not 
declare Taiwan’s independence, not change the national title, not push for the inclusion of the so-called 
“state-to-state theory” in the Constitution, and not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards 
to the question of independence or unification. In addition, he added that the National Unification 
Guidelines and National Unification Council would not be abolished either. 
131 See note 23 in Chapter 5. 
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the U.S. started to show intense support for Taiwan after George W. Bush took over the 
presidency. Thus, Chen’s conciliatory gestures toward China in 2001 and 2002 turned out 
to fit the response pattern of “triangular reciprocity.”  
The election of President George W. Bush in 2000 marked another shift in U.S. 
Taiwan policy. This shift occurred against the backdrop of growing Sino-U.S. tensions. 
The signs of the two powers’ tensions could be traced back to Bush’s election campaign, 
during which he defined China as the United States’ “strategic competitor” instead of 
“strategic partner” which the Clinton administration used to refer to China.132 On April 
1st , 2001, the potential U.S.-China tension that was caused by Bush’s election burst out 
when a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet mid-air over the South 
China Sea.133 Less than a month later, a significant change in U.S. Taiwan policy was 
taking shape with the occurrence of two other events. On April 23rd, Bush approved an 
arms sales package for Taiwan, which was the largest U.S. arms sale to Taiwan since the 
F-16 sale in 1992.134 The next day on April 24th, when interviewed by ABC’s “Good 
Morning America,” Bush said that the United States would do “whatever it took to help 
Taiwan defend herself” in the event of attack by China.135 These two events signified the 
                                                 
132 Traditionally, the GOP is more anticommunist than the Democratic Party (Bush 2005: 246); in 
addition, the opposition party’s presidential candidates (e.g. Bush in this case) tend to attack the incumbent 
administration’s China policy in their election campaigns (Wu 2000a: 16- 18). 
133 The pilot of the Chinese plane was missing after the collision, and the crew on U.S. plane made an 
emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island. China accused the U.S. of infringing on China’s sovereignty 
and demanded an apology from the U.S., but the U.S. refused and instead asked China to return U.S. plane 
and crew as soon as possible. See ibid., April 1, 2001, p. 1; April 5, 2001, p. 1. 
134 The sales included four 1970s vintage Kidd class destroyers equipped with upgraded radar systems, 
eight diesel-powered submarines, and up to 12 P-3 Orion subhunting surveillance planes. See CNN’s 
website http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/24/bush.taiwan.abc/sale.html . 
135 CNN reports, “Asked in the ABC interview if Washington had an obligation to defend the Taiwanese 
in the event of attack by China, which considers the island a renegade province, Bush said: ‘Yes, we do ... 
and the Chinese must understand that. Yes, I would.’ When asked whether the United States would use ‘the 
full force of the American military,’ Bush responded, ‘Whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself.’” 
See CNN’s website http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/24/bush.taiwan.abc/ . 
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Bush administration’s determination to strengthen Taiwan’s defense and security in the 
face of China’s military threat. Later on, when Bush visited China in February 2002, he 
repeatedly mentioned the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act and the United States’ 
defense commitment to Taiwan but said no words about the 1972, 1979, and 1982 
Communiqués that defined U.S.-China relations (Sutter 2002: 4).  
In addition to these commitments regarding Taiwan’s security, the Bush 
administration also substantially increased contact between the U.S. and Taiwan to the 
level that is close to an official one. For example, in August 2000 when Taiwan’s new 
president Chen Shui-bian made a transit stop in Los Angeles, he was restricted by the 
Clinton administration to stay in the hotel without being able to conduct any public 
activities. Under the pressure from the executive branch, some U.S. congressmen also 
cancelled their meetings with Chen. But in May 2001 when Chen made another transit 
stop in the U.S., he was allowed by the Bush administration to visit New York and 
Houston, where he met with some U.S. politicians and businessmen (Sutter 2002: 5; Su 
2003: 237- 238; Hickey 2004: 471). In March 2002, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Tang 
Yiau-ming visited Florida for a business meeting, during which he was able to talk to 
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Tang is the first Taiwanese Defense 
Minister to be admitted to visit the U.S. since 1979 (Hickey 2004: 467). In the next few 
years, Chen and Taiwan’s vice president Annette Lu also made some other transit stops 
within U.S. borders; Chen’s wife even visited Washington D.C. in September 2002 to 
attend a ceremony. Moreover, in September 2002 Bush signed into law the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003. The law not only permits incumbent 
diplomats to accept assignments in Taiwan but also expresses the “sense of the Congress” 
that U.S. flag should be displayed at the “unofficial” U.S. embassy in Taiwan (that is, the 
American Institute in Taiwan) and at the residence of the AIT director “in the same 
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manner as U.S. embassies, consulates and official residences throughout the world.” On 
September 11, 2002, the U.S. flag was flown at the AIT’s Taipei office for the first time 
since 1979 (Hickey 2004: 471- 472). 
In response to these friendly U.S. actions, Chen acted in an extraordinarily 
conciliatory way toward China in the first half of his first term. On the one hand, he 
expanded the scope of cross-Strait exchanges. For example, in late 2001 he started to 
reverse Lee Teng-hui’s policy of restricting mainland investment (i.e. the “no haste, be 
patient” policy) by implementing his own “active opening, effective management.” 
Under the guidance of this new policy, in October 2001 Taiwan agreed to let eight banks 
to open their offices in mainland China. One month later, the US$50 million cap on any 
single mainland investment project was removed. At the same time, businessmen were 
permitted to invest in more diverse industries or sectors, and projects with less than 
US$20 million could be easily approved by the government. On the other hand, he also 
sent China friendly signals about political issues. For example, when meeting with AIT’s 
chairman Richard C. Bush on January 28th, 2002, Chen said Taiwan’s position on cross-
Strait relations was cooperative rather than confrontational, and that “[Taiwan’s] cross-
Strait policies would never change because of the DPP’s victory in the election.” On May 
9th, 2002, he mentioned that cross-Strait dialogues must be reopened so that no 
misperception and misunderstanding would occur between Taiwan and China. He also 
expressed that he would like to visit China to reopen such dialogues. At the same time, he 
declared that “the political integration across the Strait must begin with cross-Strait 
economic and cultural integration; this is a policy goal that would never change.” On 
January 1, 2003, he suggested Taiwan and China “establish a peaceful and stable 
framework of interaction.”136 
                                                 
136 For these events, see the website of Mainland Affairs Council ( http://www.mac.gov.tw/ ); China 
Times, May 10, 2002, page unknown. 
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In 2003, Taiwan was again entering the hot season of the presidential election. As 
I have discussed in Chapter 4, Chen Shui-bian aggressively campaigned on the 
referendum issue throughout all of 2003 and at the beginning of 2004 in order to 
consolidate his electoral support. As Chen’s referendum campaign was a provocation of 
China, another pattern of “triangular reciprocity” seemed to take place since every time 
the U.S. warned Chen against pushing the envelope Chen would choose to continue his 
campaign resolutely.  
U.S. pressures against Chen started to emerge in June 2003. When Bush met with 
Chinese President Hu Jintao in Evian that month, Bush mentioned that the U.S. would 
not support Taiwan independence. This statement was regarded as Bush’s unhappy 
response to Chen’s referendum campaign.137 Later in the same month, the director of 
AIT’s Taipei Office Douglas H. Paal was reported to have told Chen that the U.S. did not 
want Taiwan to hold any referendum on any issue, although Paal denied the report.138 
AIT’s chairwoman Therese Shaheen also met with Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Eugene 
Chien in New York to express the United States’ concerns about the referendum issue.139 
In September, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, who used to be 
friendly toward Taiwan, told the press that holding any referendum would be of no help 
to Taiwan.140 However, Chen responded to these U.S. concerns by saying on September 
28th that he would promote the birth of a new constitution (which strongly suggests the 
pursuit of Taiwan-independence). The U.S. responded immediately. State Department 
spokesman Richard Boucher repeated Chen’s “four No’s” commitment, saying that the 
                                                 
137 United Daily News, June 12, 2003, p. A13. 
138 Ibid., June 21, 2003, p. A1; June 26, 2003, p. A4. 
139 Ibid., June 25, 2003, p. A3. 
140 Ibid., September 19, 2003, p. A2. 
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U.S. took it very seriously and expected it to be followed faithfully.141 Then U.S. 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice warned that no one would be allowed to 
change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.142 A few days later, President Bush also told 
Chinese President Hu Jintao that the U.S. would not support “Taiwan’s moving toward 
independence” when the two leaders met in Bangkok.143 Even so, in late October Chen 
still announced a plan of holding a referendum on the making of a new constitution.144 In 
November, Randy Schriver, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, repeated again that the Bush administration would not support Taiwan’s 
independence.145 Chen responded by announcing at the end of November that, in order to 
defend the country’s sovereignty and security, he would follow Article 17 of the newly-
passed Referendum Law to hold the so-called “defensive referendum” on the same day as 
the upcoming presidential election.146 
Chen’s stubborn attitude annoyed Bush in the end. On December 9th, 2003 Bush 
decided to send Chen a stronger signal. When reaffirming the United States’ “one China” 
policy during his meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at the White House, Bush 
said:  
We oppose any unilateral decision, by either China or Taiwan, to change 
the status quo. … And the comments and actions made by the leader of 
                                                 
141 Ibid., September 30, 2003, p. A1. 
142 Ibid., October 16, 2003, p. A11. 
143 Ibid., October 21, 2003, p. A2; also see Su 2003: 342. 
144 Ibid., October 26, 2003, p. A3. 
145 Ibid., November 22, 2003, p. A4. 
146 Article 17 of the Referendum Law says, with the Executive Yuan’s resolution, the president can hold a 
referendum on national security issues when any external threat is able to interfere with the country’s 
sovereignty. Chen argued Taiwan’s sovereignty could be changed at any time because the external threat it 
faced was in the “present progressive tense.” See ibid., November 30, 2003, p. A1. Shortly before Chen’s 
announcement, the Referendum Law that approximates to the opposition parties’ (the Pan Blue coalition) 
version was passed in Legislative Yuan with the dominance of Pan Blue legislators. 
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Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to 
change the status quo -- which we oppose.147  
For Chen, no U.S. message could be clearer than Bush’s rebuke against “the 
leader of Taiwan.” But because a complete surrender to U.S. pressures could result in a 
high domestic audience cost for Chen in the upcoming presidential election,148 Chen 
chose to insist on holding the so-called “defensive referendum” along with the 
presidential election, though framing the referendum’s questions in a lower key.149 
Therefore, Chen did not totally surrender to U.S. pressures. Rather, he still responded by 
acting aggressively toward China.  
CONCLUSION 
The above analysis leads to two conclusions. First, there was still a limit for the 
United States to successfully stop Taiwan from directing conflictual actions toward 
China. The U.S. has been the most crucial third party in Taiwan-China relations in the 
last five decades. My discussion in this chapter shows that U.S. actions or policies toward 
Taiwan sometimes could still contribute to Taiwan’s responses from which the island 
took provocative actions against China. This situation happened in the early 1990s when 
the U.S. directed a series of favorable actions toward Taiwan as well as when it warned 
Taiwan against any provocative actions during the island’s presidential election seasons.  
                                                 
147 See CNN’s website 
( http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/12/09/bush.china.taiwan/index.html ). 
148 According to Fearon (1994), a domestic audience cost means the domestic political punishment that a 
state leader suffers when he publicly threatens a foreign actor but subsequently backs down in an 
international crisis. In democracies the most common form of a domestic audience cost is the leader’s loss 
in a reelection. 
149 The questions were, first, whether Taiwan should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to 
strengthen the nation’s defensive capabilities; second, whether Taiwan should seek talks with China on the 
establishment of a “peace and stability” framework for cross-Strait interaction. United Daily News, January 
17, 2004, p. A1. The referendum was held on March 20, 2004. Both questions received responses from less 
than the required 50% of voters and were therefore rendered void. 
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Second, the reason there was a limit on U.S. capability to block Taiwan’s 
aggressive actions against China is associated with domestic electoral competition in 
Taiwan. During the seasons of presidential elections Taiwanese politicians would regard 
their domestic political interests as more important than the U.S. factor. Consequently, as 
the Taiwanese identity turned stronger and stronger, they would still resort to aggressive 
campaigns even though the U.S. already sent warnings to Taiwan. In other words, the 
attempt to win elections and avoid the audience cost that might be caused by giving in to 
U.S. pressures would prompt Taiwanese leaders to respond to U.S. confrontational 
actions by continuing their conflictual actions against China.   
These conclusions highlight this chapter’s contribution to the literature, that is, the 
nature of a third party’s influence should be evaluated in the context of regional 
countries’ domestic politics. Without taking these countries’ domestic politics into 
consideration, it would be more difficult to judge the effectiveness of a third party’s 
efforts of conflict management. 
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Taiwan’s relations with China were full of ups and downs from 1987 to 2004. In 
this dissertation I explore Taiwan’s role in the dramatic development of cross-Strait 
relations. More specifically, I discuss the effects of Taiwan’s democratic transition and 
consolidation, cross-Strait commerce, and the United States’ Taiwan policy on Taiwan’s 
actions toward China during the period. By applying the methods of both case studies and 
VAR time-series analysis, this dissertation produces the following findings. 
First, when President Lee Teng-hui took over power in the late 1980s, he initiated 
several domestic political reforms while continuing Chiang Ching-kuo’s liberalization of 
Taiwan’s China policy in order to secure and strengthen his power base within the KMT. 
Lee’s rational decision led to the appearance of a peaceful China policy during most of 
the period of Taiwan’s transition into democracy. 
Second, with national identity as the major political cleavage in Taiwan, 
politicians found new incentives for mobilizing electoral support on national identity as 
elections approached. This was particularly so when elections became an institutionalized 
mechanism of political competition at the end of Taiwan’s political reforms. The result 
was the emergence of more conflictual actions toward China. 
Third, after the mid-1990s, the economic exchanges across the Strait were unable 
to restrain Taiwan’s conflictual actions toward China. This is because Taiwanese leaders’ 
attempt to pursue electoral interests had overridden the policy preferences of those 
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businessmen who were involved in cross-Strait commerce. With Lee Teng-hui as a 
strongman and Chen Shui-bian increasingly relying on party activists, they were able to 
ignore businessmen’s demands for more cross-Strait exchanges and cross-Strait stability. 
Meanwhile, they could also appeal to the rising Taiwanese identity with aggressive 
actions toward China. 
Fourth, U.S. actions toward Taiwan could not successfully stop Taiwan’s 
aggressive actions toward China either. This is because in order to avoid the audience 
cost, Taiwanese politicians were less likely to give in to U.S. pressures during election 
seasons.  
These findings lead to two conclusions. First, we have to look at Taiwan’s 
domestic politics to understand the island’s role in cross-Strait relations from 1987 to 
2004. Realists tend to explain international relations from systemic perspectives. By 
doing so, they are inclined to assume that states are unitary actors and ignore the effects 
that domestic politics might exercise on interstate relations. This dissertation aims at 
supplementing the insufficiency of this realist approach. It shows that domestic political 
factors such as regime transition, electoral competition, and the cleavage of national 
identities are able to influence a country’s foreign policy and thus its relations with other 
countries.  
Second, Taiwanese politicians’ pursuit of domestic political interests is the key to 
understanding the changes of Taiwan’s China policy during and after its democratic 
transition. Consequently, it is also the key for us to understand the failure of the pacifying 
potential of both cross-Strait commerce and U.S. Taiwan policy. At the beginning of the 
democratic transition, Lee Teng-hui’s concern for his power contributed to the 
appearance of a peaceful China policy. Later on, when electoral competition dominated 
the rhythm of Taiwan’s politics and when Taiwanese identity surged among voters, 
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politicians’ desire to win elections instead encouraged them to engage in confrontational 
campaigns against China. At the same time, it was also this desire that drove them to 
neglect both Taiwanese businessmen’s and the United States’ expectations for cross-
Strait stability.  
CONTRIBUTIONS 
With the study of Taiwan’s case, this dissertation also makes contributions to 
several theoretical debates in the literature. 
First, scholars disagree with each other on whether or not a democratizing state is 
likely to be conflict-oriented in its foreign policy. My research shows that a country that 
is experiencing democratic transition can still act peacefully toward other countries. 
During its transition from authoritarianism to democracy, Taiwan’s actions toward China 
were generally peaceful. As Chapter 3 shows, this is mainly a result of Lee Teng-hui’s 
rational calculations shortly after he took over power. This fact highlights the important 
role that a state leader plays in the connection between a country’s democratization and 
its foreign policy. 
Incidentally, although Taiwan’s actions toward China turned conflictual after the 
mid-1990s, the mechanism behind these actions is different from what Mansfield and 
Snyder argue. According to Mansfield and Snyder, international conflicts are most likely 
to occur during an incomplete transition from autocracy toward democracy. In such an 
incomplete transition, state institutions are too weak to guarantee elites a soft landing. 
Therefore, elites tend to resort to playing the nationalist card to amass their popular 
support. The emergence of Taiwan’s conflictual actions toward China is different. First, 
in terms of the underlying mechanism, these conflictual actions did not emerge from 
elites’ uncertainty about their political future. On the contrary, when such uncertainty did 
exist in the beginning of Taiwan’s democratic transition, Lee Teng-hui decided to adopt a 
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more conciliatory China policy. Particularly, after the 1996 presidential election and 
ensuing elite settlement, the sense of uncertainty among most elite factions was no longer 
strong. Rather, as Chapter 4 shows, it was the rising Taiwanese identity among the people 
in Taiwan, which to a large extent grew out of Taiwan’s isolated international status, that 
motivated politicians to embark on aggressive campaigns in highly competitive elections. 
Second, in terms of context, these conflictual actions occurred when Taiwan had 
transformed into a democracy. Even if Taiwan’s democracy was not fully consolidated 
around the mid-1990s, it was hardly an incomplete democracy or a mixed regime, which 
according to Mansfield and Snyder is often war-prone. This is because after the mid-
1990s Taiwan’s democratic institutions, such as free and regular elections, worked 
smoothly throughout Taiwan’s transition into democracy. More importantly, as the two 
elite settlements show, elites were able to follow tacitly the democratic rules when 
competing with each other. This not only protected and strengthened Taiwan’s young 
democratic institutions but also significantly advanced Taiwan’s democratic 
consolidation.150  
Second, scholars also disagree on commercial liberalism’s explanatory power. My 
dissertation indicates that there is indeed a limit when applying commercial liberalism to 
Taiwan’s case. Commercial liberalism claims free trade (or economic exchanges) among 
nations can reduce the likelihood of international war by generating substantial 
commercial interests. Chapter 5 shows cross-Strait economic exchanges do foster 
pacifying potential, that is, the Taiwanese business community which profits from cross-
Strait commerce and which prefers a peaceful and friendly China policy. But eventually 
their preferences were still overridden by politicians’ consideration of political interests. 
                                                 
150 Mansfield and Snyder also admit that Taiwan’s democratic transition was smooth and peaceful because 
the island was institutionally developed. (2005: 270) 
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At first, it was Lee Teng-hui’s strong-man status that strengthened Lee’s ignorance of 
businessmen’s policy preferences. Later, Chen Shui-bian’s reliance on DPP party 
activists for his political career also stopped him from hearing businessmen’s calls. The 
cases of Lee and Chen point out that some non-institutional (or contingent) factors can 
still be important. Chen’s case is particularly significant since it is in contrast with some 
commercial liberalists’ (such as Papayoanou 1996, 1997) argument that median 
economic interests can act as a restraint on or incentive for state leaders. Instead, the DPP 
party activists or fundamentalists have played a big role there, which pulled policy 
outcomes away from the median. This fact demonstrates that it is the partisan interests, 
not the median interests, that dominate the making of Chen’s China policy. 
Third, scholars also debate whether a third party can successfully manage a 
regional conflict. Chapter 6 shows that such achievement of a third party will depend on 
the regional state’s domestic context. In the case of Taiwan, the United States’ 
effectiveness in stopping Taiwan from initiating confrontational actions toward China 
was related to the election cycle in Taiwan. When Taiwan’s election season neared and 
when the U.S. tried to restrain Taiwan’s provocative actions toward China, Taiwanese 
politicians tended to continue their provocative actions because giving in to U.S. 
pressures would only show voters their weakness and consequently cost their victory in 
elections. In this case, U.S. efforts to stabilize the cross-Strait relations would only lead to 
a negative result. On the other hand, when elections were over, Taiwanese leaders would 
switch their focus from domestic concerns to maintaining U.S.-Taiwan relations, 
including extending cooperative gestures toward China to meet U.S. expectations. 
Therefore, this would be the time that the United States’ management of stability in the 
Strait could lead to a positive result. In sum, this chapter has shown that, depending on 
the regional state’s domestic politics, a third party’s management of a regional conflict 
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could sometimes be successful, and sometimes not. Thus, when discussing a third party’s 
role in a regional conflict, people should also take the domestic politics of regional states 
into account. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the near future, I expect that Taiwan’s actions toward China will still be closely 
connected to its electoral competition, particularly the presidential elections. As long as a 
large portion of voters embrace a Taiwanese identity, Taiwan’s actions toward China are 
still likely to turn aggressive whenever elections approach. In other words, the need to 
meet voters’ preferences in elections will still drive Taiwanese politicians’ behaviors on 
cross-Strait issues. Thus, I also expect that, just as occurred before, Taiwan’s conflictual 
actions toward China will most likely be electoral rhetoric rather than high-intensity 
confrontational behaviors. When the elections are over, politicians are likely to turn 
rational and cautious about the reality of international politics. Therefore, both China and 
the United States do not really have to take these provocative actions too seriously since 
these actions are just election rhetoric. Or, as the U.S. case in Chapter 6 shows, their 
overreaction is likely to cause Taiwan to stay on a conflictual course with China. 
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Appendix A  
The WEIS Codes 
Source: Pevehouse and Goldstein (1999c). Some additional codes (in italics) were created by the KEDS 
(Kansas Event Data System) project.   
 
 
Yield (01)   
011. Surrender, yield or order, submit to arrest, etc.  
012. Yield position, retreat; evacuate.  
013. Admit wrongdoing; retract statement.  
014. Accommodate, Cease-fire. 
015. Cede Power. 
 
Comment (02)  
021. Explicit decline to comment.  
022. Comment on situation--pessimistic.  
024. Comment on situation--optimistic.  
025. Explain policy or future position.  
026. Appoint or Elect. 
027. Alter Rules. 
 
Consult (03)  
031. Meet with at neutral site, or send note. 
032. Visit; go to. 
033. Receive visit; host. 
034. Vote, Elect. 
 
Approve (04)  
041. Praise, hail, applaud, condole. 
042. Endorse other's policy or position; give verbal support. 
043. Rally. 
 
Promise (05)  
051. Promise own policy support.  
052. Promise material support.  
053. Promise other future support action.  
054. Assure; reassure.  
055. Promise Rights. 
 
Grant (06)   
061. Express regret; apologize. 
062. Give state invitation. 
063. Grant asylum.  
064. Grant privilege, diplomatic recognition. 
065. Suspend negative sanctions; truce.  
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066. Release and/or return persons or property. 
067. Grant Position. 
 
Reward (07)  
071. Extend economic aid (as gift and/or loan).  
072. Extend military assistance.  
073. Give other assistance. 
 
Agree (08)   
081. Make substantive agreement.  
082. Agree to future action or procedure; agree to meet, to negotiate.   
083. Ally. 
084. Merge; Integrate. 
 
Request (09)  
091. Ask for information. 
092. Ask for policy assistance.  
093. Ask for material assistance. 
094. Request action; call for.  
095. Entreat; plead; appeal to.  
096. Request policy change 
097. Request rights 
 
Propose (10)  
101. Offer proposal. 
102. Urge or suggest action or policy. 
 
Reject (11)  
111. Turn down proposal; reject protest demand, threat, etc. 
112. Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow.  
113. Defy law 
 
Accuse (12)  
121. Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove. 
122. Denounce; denigrate; abuse.  
123. Investigate 
 
Protest (13)  
131. Make complaint (not formal). 
132. Make formal complaint or protest.  
133. Symbolic act 
 
Deny (14)   
141. Deny an accusation.  
142. Deny an attributed policy, action role or position.  
 
Demand (15)  
150. Issue order or command; insist; demand compliance; etc.  
151. Issue Command 
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152. Claim Rights 
 
Warn (16) 
160. Give warning. 
161. Warn of policies 
162. Warn of problem 
 
Threaten (17) 
171. Threat without specific negative sanctions.  
172. Threat with specific non-military negative sanctions.  
173. Threat with force specified. 
174. Ultimatum; threat with negative sanctions and time limit specified. 
 
Demonstrate (18) 
181. Non-military demonstration; to walk out on. 
182. Armed force mobilization.  
 
Reduce Relations (as negative sanctions) (19) 
191. Cancel or postpone planned event. 
192. Reduce routine international activity; recall officials; etc.  
193. Reduce or halt aid. 
194. Halt negotiations. 




Expel (20)   
201. Order personnel out of country.   
202. Expel organization or group. 
203. Ban Organization 
 
Seize (21) 
211. Seize position or possessions.  
212. Detain or arrest person(s).  
213. Hijack; Kidnap 
 
Force (22)   
221. Non-injury obstructive act.  
222. Non-military injury-destruction.  









The Goldstein Net-Cooperation Scale (Goldstein 1992: 376-377.) 
Event Type Weight SD 
223 Military attack; clash; assault -10.0 0.0 
211 Seize position or possessions -9.2 0.7 
222 Nonmilitary destruction/injury -8.7 0.5 
221 Noninjury destructive action -8.3 0.6 
182 Armed force mobilization, exercise, display; military buildup -7.6 1.2 
195 Break diplomatic relations -7.0 1.3 
173 Threat with force specifies -7.0 1.1 
174 Ultimatum; threat with negative sanction and time limit -6.9 1.4 
172 Threat with specific negative nonmilitary sanction -5.8 1.9 
193 Reduce or cut off aid or assistance; act to punish/deprive -5.6 1.4 
181 Nonmilitary demonstration, walk out on  -5.2 2.1 
201 Order person or personnel out of country -5.0 1.7 
202 Expel organization or group -4.9 1.4 
150 Issue order or command, insist, demand compliance -4.9 1.7 
171 Threat without specific negative sanction stated -4.4 1.5 
212 Detain or arrest person(s) -4.4 2.3 
192 Reduce routine international activity; recall officials -4.1 1.2 
112 Refuse; oppose; refuse to allow -4.0 1.5 
111 Turn down proposal; reject protest, demand, threat -4.0 1.5 
194 Halt negotiation -3.8 0.9 
122 Denounce; denigrate; abuse -3.4 1.1 
160 Give warning -3.0 1.3 
132 Issue formal complaint or protest -2.4 0.9 
121 Charge; criticize; blame; disapprove -2.2 1.3 
191 Cancel or postpone planned event -2.2 1.5 
131 Make complaint (not formal) -1.9 0.6 
063 Grant asylum -1.1 2.5 
142 Deny an attributed policy, action, role or position -1.1 1.0 
141 Deny an accusation -0.9 1.3 
023 Comment on situation -0.2 0.5 
102 Urge or suggest action or policy -0.1 1.5 
021 Explicit decline to comment -0.1 0.6 





Event Type Weight SD 
025 Explain or State policy; state future position 0.0 0.0 
091 Ask for information 0.1 0.4 
011 Surrender, yield to order, submit to arrest 0.6 7.2 
012 Yield position; retreat; evacuate 0.6 6.6 
031 Meet with; send note 1.0 0.9 
095 Entreat; plead; appeal to; beg 1.2 1.8 
101 Offer proposal  1.5 1.9 
061 Express regret; apologize 1.8 1.5 
032 Visit; go to 1.9 2.4 
066 Release and/or return persons or property 1.9 2.7 
013 Admit wrongdoing; apologize, retract statement 2.0 2.2 
062 Give state invitation 2.5 2.7 
054 Assure; reassure 2.8 2.2 
033 Receive visit; host 2.8 3.0 
065 Suspend sanctions; end punishment; call truce 2.9 3.6 
082 Agree to future action or procedure, to meet, or to negotiate 3.0 2.5 
092 Ask for policy assistant 3.4 1.1 
093 Ask for material assistance 3.4 2.4 
041 Praise, hail, applaud, extend condolences 3.4 2.1 
042 Endorse other’s policy or position; give verbal support 3.6 1.8 
053 Promise other future support 4.5 1.6 
051 Promise own policy support 4.5 1.7 
052 Promise material support 5.2 1.5 
064 Grant privilege; diplomatic recognition; de facto relations 5.4 1.4 
073 Give other assistance 6.5 1.9 
081 Make substantive agreement 6.5 1.4 
071 Extend economic aid; give, buy, sell, loan, borrow 7.4 1.0 
072 Extend military assistance 8.3 0.9 
   






Table C-1. Results of the VAR Time-Series Analysis (1/1/1990- 6/30/1995)  
Dep. Var. 
Ind. Var. China to Taiwan 
Taiwan to 




Taiwan TAIEX  
China 
Stocks  
China to Taiwan    * **    
Taiwan to China †    † *   
China to US   †   **   
US to China *** †   ** **   
Taiwan to US     ** **   
US to Taiwan * *   * **   
TAIEX        *** *** 




















































Adjusted R2 0.086409 0.078883 0.077345 0.076228 0.095819 0.094916 0.081885 0.089104 
Standard Error of 
Estimate 
1.244918 1.421351 2.206954 1.904142 1.127495 1.047862 102.333322 1.295975 
Durbin-Watson 
Statistics 
2.002318 2.002360 1.992642 2.000609 2.001925 1.992952 2.001383 2.004165 
Number of Observations 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 
Note: 1. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 2. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p< .10. The joint-significance level for the endogenous variables 
is based on the block F test (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989: 845-846; Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999a: 8). 3. Fifteen (15) lags are used for each 
endogenous variable based on Sims’ modified likelihood ratio tests. See Table C-3. 
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Table C-2. Results of the VAR Time-Series Analysis (7/1/1995- 12/31/2004) 
Dep. Var. 
Ind. Var. China to Taiwan 
Taiwan to 




Taiwan TAIEX  
China 
Stocks  
China to Taiwan *** *** † * *** ***   
Taiwan to China ** †       
China to US   *** ***  *   
US to China   *** ***  ***   
Taiwan to US     ***    
US to Taiwan *** ***  †  *** † † 
TAIEX    * † **   * * 
China Stocks     **    ** 
















































Adjusted R2 0.210657 0.109036 0.114268 0.116877 0.088797 0.133730 0.079557 0.076046 
Standard Error of Estimate 2.243832 1.458762 3.105861 3.121655 1.127250 1.295329 85.909583 2.450108 
Durbin-Watson Statistics 1.996477 2.003438 2.003191 2.000389 2.000013 1.998369 2.001290 1.999410 
Number of Observations 3442 3442 3442 3442 3442 3442 3442 3442 
Note: 1. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 2. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p< .10. The joint-significance level for the endogenous variables 
is based on the block F test (Freeman, Williams, and Lin 1989: 845-846; Pevehouse and Goldstein 1999a: 8). 3. Thirty (30) lags are used for each 
endogenous variable based on Sims’ modified likelihood ratio tests. See Table C-3.  
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Table C-3. Results of the Ratio Tests 
 1/1/1990- 6/30/1995 7/1/1995- 12/31/2004 
Lag Test Chi-square (df) Chi-square (df) 
10 vs. 5 369.315808 (320)* 652.374320 (320)*** 
15 vs. 10 388.030413 (320)** 352.977004 (320)† 
20 vs. 15 285.046042 (320) 344.009247 (320) 
25 vs. 20 305.167038 (320) 365.680646 (320)* 
30 vs. 25 327.959261 (320) 409.573004 (320)*** 
35 vs. 30 301.278838 (320) 300.868474 (320) 
40 vs. 35 348.400829 (320) 327.138343 (320) 
30 vs. 15 899.042207 (960) 1107.915186 (960)*** 
30 vs. 10 1252.091544 (1280) 1442.264588 (1280)*** 
Note: 1. The tests for lag length are Sims’ (1980: 17- 18) modified likelihood ratio tests. 
In each test, the shorter lag (restricted) model is the null hypothesis and the longer lag 
(unrestricted) model is the alternative hypothesis. 2. The tests were conducted by RATS 
software, version 5.0. For 1/1/1990- 6/30/1995, the tests clearly indicate that the 15-lag 
model should be used. For 7/1/1995- 12/31/2004, models with 10, 15, and 30 lags 
cannot be rejected at the .05 level when tested, respectively, against 15, 20, and 35 lags. 
However, both 10 lags and 15 lags can be rejected when tested against 30 lags. 3. *** 
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